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Abstract
The Scottish Wars of Edward III, 1327-1338
Christopher A. Candy
Ph. D. Thesis, Department of History, University of Durham, 2004
The fighting that occurred in Scotland during the first decade of Edward 111's
reign has often been recognized as important in the development of the strategies
and tactics that allowed the English to win major victories against the French during
the Hundred Years' War. Despite this, few studies exist that consider the wars as
their primary focus, instead using the conflict of the 1330s as either a prologue to the
fighting in France to follow or as the addendum to the Wars of Independence waged
against Edward's father and grandfather. The major study that does focus solely on
these wars only covers the first half of the conflict and fails to address the
importance of the final three years.
This thesis aims to demonstrate the importance of Edward III's wars in
Scotland as the break from the military practices of Edward It's reign and the key
period for developing the English military machine that would fight the Hundred
Years' War. Extensive government records are contrasted with English and Scottish
chronicles to provide a comprehensive narrative that shows the wars as the primary
focus of political events in England at the time along with its role in military
innovation. The same materials are also used to examine the numerical composition
of the English military year by year and how those numbers changed as new
strategies for fighting the wars became more firmly entrenched
Chapter 1 discusses the broad themes that characterize the decade and
discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the primary and secondary material
available. Chapter 2 covers the approaches to Scotland taken by the regency of
Isabella and Mortimer that Edward III and others would move away from starting in
1332. Chapters 3-6 will illustrate the events of the war from the preparations for the
Dupplin Moor campaign of 1332 to the battle of Culblean in 1335. These events
reopened the previously closed question of Scotland's legal relationship with
England while dramatically altering the English concept of what constituted a
successful military force, though one with important limitations. Chapter 7
addresses the period after Culblean to the siege of Dunbar, left unexamined by the
previous major work on this topic. Not only did these years see both continued
fighting and negotiation, but they also created the rapid deterioration in relations
between Edward and Philip VI of France that would lead to war in 1337. Chapter 8
is concerned with the particulars of English campaigning forces and the changes in
their recruiting and operating patterns. Chapter 9 considers the royal garrisons in
Scotland, their individual histories, and the necessities for their operation. The final
chapter is an examination of the two main components of supporting forces in
Scotland: the naval forces to transport and protect supplies, and the means for
gathering those supplies. Two appendices are included giving the strengths of
individual retinues of men-at-arms and archers for the 1334-7 campaigns as given by
the wardrobe book of Richard Ferriby.
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Introduction
Introduction
This thesis deals with the events of the Anglo-Scottish wars of the 1330s and
the English military machine that allowed Edward III to win numerous successes
against the Scots yet was unable to secure a permanent conquest of any portion of
Scotland save Berwick-upon Tweed. It fills the gap left by studies focusing upon the
reigns of Edward I and II and the wars of the Bruces on one hand and the Hundred
Years' War on the other. Specifically, it will demonstrate the importance of Edward
III's wars in Scotland in resuscitating English military power and transforming it into
a major power in Western Europe, rather than the conflict being an unimportant
prologue to the Hundred Years' War or an addendum to the career of Robert Bruce.
This chapter will consider the overall significance of the wars and discuss broad
themes that will be addressed in the thesis as a whole. It will also detail the various
primary sources available and compare the strengths and weaknesses of the existing
body of secondary works and the limitations of the previous scholarship. Chapter 2
will cover the regency of Isabella and Mortimer, while chapters 3-7 will illustrate the
events of the war from the preparations for the Dupplin Moor campaign of 1332 to
the failure of the siege of Dunbar in 1338. Chapters 8-10 are detailed analyses of the
campaigning forces, the garrisons in Scotland, and the means by which supplies are
gathered and transported to the men in the field.
The Anglo-Scottish wars of the 1330's are of major significance because so
many of the English military tactics and methods associated with the English armies
of the Hundred Years' War were developed in this period. The 1327 campaign
planned by figures that were prominent during Edward II's reign was far different
than the campaign carried out by the disinherited lords with claims in Scotland in
hit rochtction
1332, or those carried out later by Edward III or his captains. 1 The tactics used at
Crecy or Poitiers are little different in description than those seen at Halidon Hi11.2
During Edward's reign, the English armies moved from forces relying on heavy
cavalry provided by the aristocracy in obligatory service, combined with mass
numbers of foot soldiers, to a much more lean and efficient force based around a core
of mixed retinues increasingly recruited through contractual agreements. These
retinues consisted of heavy cavalry and mounted archers, both of whom fought on
foot in defensive formations. Though the creation of an army with significant
numbers of recruits from contracts is first apparent in 1337, the developments
moving English military service in that direction were already evident in the
preceding years of the Anglo-Scottish wars.3
It is also during the these wars that the machinery needed to allow for such
tactics to be adopted was put into place, with a major shift in the number and types of
soldiers being sought to serve on campaign. Increasingly, the counties were called
upon to provide more and more mounted archers, while men-at-arms became
accustomed to fighting while dismounted in a heavy infantry role. After 1335 the
number of troops sought by the crown dropped, as its requests were increasingly
tailored to match the size of the Scottish force that could be mustered by the partisans
of David Bruce. 4 This also reflected the changing makeup of the force, as the crown
increasingly sought mounted archers of higher quality for its infantry and was willing
to pay the higher wages such troops required compared to a standard infantryman.
Compare Jean le Bel, Chronique de Jean le Bel, ed. Jules Viard and Eugene Deprez (Paris: Societe
de l'histoire de France, 1904), pp 42-77 to Bridlington, pp 103-7
2 Chronique de Jean le Bel, pp 102-110; Anonimalle, pp 35-39; Lanercost, pp 279-80
3 N.B. Lewis, 'The recruitment and organization of a contract army, May to November 1337.'
Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 37 (1964) pp 1-19
4 See Chapter 8: The Army
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Though many old veterans of the earlier Scottish wars such as Henry
Beaumont fought in and led English armies, in many ways it is a young man's war.
Edward III himself saw his first campaign only a few months after taking the crown
and before he held true political power. Others such as Thomas Beauchamp, Henry
Lancaster, and household knights such as Reginald Cobham and Thomas Bradeston
were of a younger generation than men like the Earls of Lancaster or Kent who had
dominated military matters through the beginnings of the Isabella and Mortimer
regency. The Anglo-Scottish wars provided the new blood the training ground to
learn the skills that would be used later in fighting in France, making the English
leadership far more effective than it would be otherwise.
While the wars between England and Scotland provided valuable military
experience to Edward III's generation, they also provided the immediate flashpoint
for the next war to require that experience. Due to old alliances and similarities
between England's claim on Scotland and France's claim on Gascony, Philip VI of
France would decide to support the Bruce faction in Scotland diplomatically, and by
1336 would decide to throw its full support behind Scotland and intervene militarily.
This choice, which Philip was not compelled to make, was the immediate cause of
the Hundred Years' War and the cause of the eventual failure of the English efforts in
Scotland.5
The significance of the wars goes far beyond the introduction of new tactics
and its role as part of the prologue of the Hundred Years' War. In addition to
providing the crucible for the English to create and refine a new set of military
tactics, the wars were fundamental in defining the political future of Scotland and
determining whether it would maintain any independence from England. The failure
of the 1327 campaign led to Robert Bruce's rule and the independence of Scotland
3
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being acknowledged in England, while the lengthy conflict after 1332 would help
Scotland in the long term by eliminating many of the rival claims for estates in
Scotland that had been created by Edward I, up to and including Edward Balliol's
claim to the Scottish thi-one.6
The wars could just as easily be seen as the last stage of the conflict that had
been fought intermittently since 1296 as being the prologue to the conflict with
France that would be fought equally as intermittently until the next century. After
decades of suffering defeats at the hands of the Scots, the English were able to
redefine the relative military strengths of Scotland and England and dramatically
improve the reputation of English arms in the fourteenth century. The war with
Scotland had its own causes and peculiar elements independent of any conflicts
between France and England, though the combination of alliances and shared
interests between France and Scotland meant that if either became embroiled in
conflict with England, the other would likely be brought in as well.
To understand the English actions in Scotland and the course they took to
defend their gains requires understanding the tools at their disposal. Introducing
mounted archers as a sizeable component within the English army was a major
change to England's forces, yet these forces did not simply spring out of thin air;
changes had been occurring that altered the composition of English forces leading
into Edward's reign, and would continue throughout it. These changes were critical.
For instance, the chevauchee Edward carried out in 1336 would not have been
possible for an army made mostly of foot soldiers, not when he was reported to have
See Chapter 7 for a more detailed description of the final breach.
6 M.C. Prestwich, Edward I (New Haven, 1997), p p 369-70, 473-4
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covered fifty miles in two days through very harsh terrain and still be in fighting
trim.7
The speed and mobility that saw its genesis in Scotland was a hallmark of
English armies in the Hundred Years' War. How deeply the idea had taken hold can
be seen by studying the composition of the army as it adjusts further or not to take
advantage of such tactics by the percentage of its troops with mounts. Similarly, an
examination of the numbers available through the campaigns allows us to understand
the tactical decisions taken by commanders like Edward III or Thomas Beauchamp,
and judge when they are taking risks, being prudent, or avoiding trouble. A detailed
look at the number of troops with Beauchamp in May 1337 lets us see precisely why
he failed to break the siege of Stirling, and had to wait for the arrival of Edward III in
June before the castle could be relieved. 8 A similar look at the existing information
for the other campaigns of the wars will shed light on the troops employed each year
by the crown, along with the particulars of their actions and the results of the
fighting. The fundamentals of pay, recruitment, and desertion will also be examined,
as well as the difficulties encountered from any study of the surviving records.
While English armies could cut large swathes through Scotland, it was the
garrisons left behind that would make the English occupation succeed or fail.
Understanding the costs and manpower involved in maintaining even a few locations
and the difficulty in doing so when under Scottish pressure is one of the key elements
in understanding the war in Scotland as a whole. The Scots found a strategy that
worked, and had worked for the previous generation: avoid set-piece battles, and
concentrate on taking then destroying castles. The success or failure of the English
7 Original Letters, pp 32-9
8 See Ch. 8: Army
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to counter this strategy would be one of the driving forces behind events from 1334
onwards, and requires examination in detail.
Finally, the processes that supply these troops in Scotland will be addressed.
Providing the large amounts of grain, fish, meat, and other foodstuffs necessary to
feed hundreds if not thousands of troops in Scotland was a major task, requiring a
great deal of organization and planning on the part of royal officials. Though there
were often breakdowns in the mechanism of moving supplies from England north to
the troops, the ability to produce and move the necessary materials over long
distances was a major part of English military strength. Along with understanding the
collection of supplies the main method of transporting them needs to be examined:
the recruitment and operation of the navy. While the navy did participate in attacks
such as that on Berwick in 1333, 9 its most important function was in transporting
supplies, particularly to the stores at Newcastle-upon-Tyne and Berwick. The
difficulties and abuses of the rights of purveyance and the impressment of ships will
also be discussed, in order to help show the limitations of this system of moving
goods to the theatre of war.
There are a few topics that will not be thoroughly analyzed by this thesis,
though they could be of importance for examining the wars of the 1330s as a whole
rather than the English military machine that fought them. For instance, the structure
of the armies of Edward III's opponents will only be handled in passing. While we
have a great deal of information regarding the size, cost, composition, and origins of
Edward III's forces, little more than chronicle references currently exist to inform us
of how many men were fielded by the Scots at any time. The numbers given for
Dupplin Moor and Halidon Hill by English chroniclers are highly inaccurate, though
9 Pluscarden, p268; Lanercost, p273; Scalacronica, p 162; Wyntoun, p398; Brut, p281; Bridlington,
p 112
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none of the chroniclers for either side are wholly reliable. 10 The independent forces
of magnates such as David Strathbogie's will be handled in the same way, for similar
reasons.
The campaign force of 1327 will also be touched on only briefly. It is
important for having been Edward III's first military experience and for marking an
end to the wars of Robert Bruce, rather than for its composition, deployment, or any
other innovation in its operation. It is the changes that begin in 1332 that are
important and that require us to examine how the English campaign forces were
collected and used.
Edward's financial policies will also not be a major topic of discussion.
While the deterioration of his economic situation is important, the reduction in the
numbers of troops employed after the 'Great Offensive' of 1335 has only a passing
connection to fiscal responsibility. It had far more to do with the reduced
importance of the Scottish war in the mindset of Edward III and the English
hierarchy compared to the rapidly worsening relations with France and the promise
of future conflict on the Continent. The success of that season's campaign and the
refusal of the Scots to engage any meaningful English force were powerful
inducements not to commit troops who would engage no enemy and be unneeded for
any purpose. Meanwhile, by 1337 efforts were fully in gear to create a continental
alliance against France, and far more money was being spent or promised to be spent
on the future conflict with France than in the north. Even the ban on exporting wool
and leather from England in 1336 had as much to do with influencing the Flemish
stance between the two powers as any financial aspect.'1
See the descriptions of Dupplin Moor and Halidon Hill in chapters 3 and 4 for examples of this.
I I J. Sumption, The Hundred Years War, v. I: Trial by Battle (London, 1990), p 189
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The primary source material available for this study falls into two major
categories: administrative records, particularly financial ones, and chronicle sources.
Each of these has their strengths and their weaknesses. Financial records have far
less problems in terms of the accuracy of numbers, while chroniclers are often far off
the mark. They also can be used to examine topics that chroniclers would have little
interest in recording — for instance, the means by which grain was purveyed from
Northamptonshire and transported north to Scotland in 1334.12
Chronicle sources, on the other hand, can record details that are simply
lacking from administrative record. However fanciful the tale may be, the
description in the Scotichronicon of Twynam Lourison convincing Edward Balliol to
attack Scotland after being hounded out of the country by James Douglas for adultery
shows a major strength of chronicles: the ability to address why events occur, rather
than just the mechanics of how. I3 They also provide a useful source of information
for checking the veracity of financial records and for introducing first-hand accounts
and other eyewitness information into our consideration of events.
Both types of information have been used extensively in order to present as
clear a picture as possible regarding English military actions in Scotland during the
1330s. Financial records can be used to help confirm dates and to eliminate the
more fanciful elements in the chronicle sources, while the chronicles were
instrumental for filling in gaps where no other records exist and for showing how the
army actually functioned beyond receipts and expenditures. By using both sources,
the analysis is far more accurate and dependable than would be possible by relying
upon one single type of material.
12 PRO E101/577 9
13 Scotichronicon, pp 64-67
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The most useful primary source available for this episode in the Scottish wars
is the controller's copy of the wardrobe book of Richard Ferriby, keeper of the
wardrobe between 30 July 1334 and 31 August 1337 (BL Cotton Nero C VIII). in
clear, concise sections, it lists the expenses incurred by the royal household over four
fiscal years ranging from immediate expenditures such as alms or goods purchased to
the more general costs of wages and support for those employed by the crown. Not
only is the monetary amount listed per expenditure, but a basic summary is given
describing the date the payment was recorded and the purpose for it.
Without the wardrobe book's detailed records of army wages, garrison needs,
and costs incurred on nearly every aspect of the war, much of this thesis would not be
possible. The document's utility was recognized early on by A.E. Prince, and has
been regularly used by nearly every scholar examining the period. For all the scrutiny
it has endured, this document has lost none of its importance, nor has its usefulness
as a mine of new information been diminished. Unfortunately it has not been printed,
unlike the wardrobe book of William Norwell for July 1338 — 27 May 1340. 14 In
particular, the section of the wardrobe book dealing with the king's messengers has
been touched rarely by historians, yet provides much information as to how the king
communicated with his subordinates.
There are limitations to the utility of the wardrobe books of either Ferriby or
Norwell. The very appearance of completeness that they provide can be misleading.
Though both appear to be complete records of all of the financial costs of the periods
they cover, this is not actually the case. Both are summaries of the financial
activities of the royal household for the period, rather than full copies of every receipt
or tally issued or received during the years covered. 15 Many of the particulars of
14 M. Lyon, The Wardrobe book of William de Norwell: 12 July 1338 to 27 May 1340 (Brussels, 1983)
15 See Ch. 8: The Army, for particulars on this problem.
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expenditures were never transferred to the wardrobe books, while in other cases only
a simple summary of several separate transactions was provided. I6 In addition, both
wardrobe books are primarily concerned with the expenditures of the royal
household, and not the costs of royal administration as a whole. For instance, none
of the records of the Exchequer for 1333-7 are included in Ferriby's wardrobe book,
though the inclusion of most of the military costs gives the appearance to the
wardrobe material of being a complete financial record for England during that time.
While the wardrobe books are the most complete compilation of financial
information we have for the time period in question, they are not fully
comprehensive and should be supported by other material where possible.
The majority of other unprinted works in this category can be found in the
Public Records Office, particularly in the King's Remembrancer Accounts Various
(E101) and the Exchequer of Pleas: Miscellaneous Rolls and Papers (E19). Of
particular importance is the account of Thomas Cross, paymaster for the Irish
expedition of 1335 against Bute and Arran, which gives us the best picture of the
resources required for a single campaign in one location. I7 Cross's account
resembles the wardrobe books of Ferriby and Norwell in its format, with separate
sections for receipts, military and naval wages, ship modifications, and the
production of siege engines. It also has the advantage of being comprehensive in
describing the costs of a campaign, though one of much smaller size than those
carried out by the main royal forces in Scotland. This in turn can help to extrapolate
what is missing from the larger financial sources.
For printed record sources, the best source we have is the first volume of the
Rotuli Scotiae, which contains in one location much of the relevant information for
16 See Ch. 9: The Garrisons for examples of this.
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every aspect of the wars, including preparation for the French conflict. 18 Of greatest
importance are the various commissions of array issued by Edward III for the various
English counties, allowing a comparison of the intended number for each year's
campaign and the soldiers actually receiving wages. It also has the most information
on how Edward III attempted to administer the English-held portions of Scotland and
organize its defence, especially writs of protection and the assignment of offices such
as admiral of the fleet or the commanders of various garrisons.
Of the printed calendars, Bain's Calendar of Documents Relating to Scotland,
volume 3 is another highly useful collection of documentation, particularly the
garrison and sheriffs' accounts included in the appendices. I9 These provide much of
the detail missing from the wardrobe books on specific expenditures and allow a
picture of what was required to maintain the English footholds in Scotland. The
usual calendars of Fine, Close, Patent, and other rolls are also highly useful, as they
include several writs that apply to the Scottish wars that were not included in the
Rotuli Scotiae or Bain's Calendar, and are necessary to understand the events
occurring in England at the same time.
The greatest limitation to the utility of administrative records is the
incomplete nature of what has survived to the present day. While the royal records
for Edward III survive in large numbers, there are numerous gaps, such as the failure
of the wardrobe books before 1334 to survive. In addition, the records for many of
the magnates involved in the wars have also failed to survive. The pay records for
Edward Balliol, for instance, survive only in the occasional reflection in Edward III's
finances. Without them, it is almost impossible to establish accurately the number of
17 PRO E101/19/16; see also R. Nicholson. 'An Irish Expedition to Scotland in 1335', IHR v. 13, no.
51 (1963), pp 197-211
IS Rotuli Scotiae in Tirol Londinensi et in Domo Capitulari Westmonasteriensi asservati, vol 1:
Edward 1— Edward III, ed. David Macpherson (London: Record Commission, 1814)
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troops Balliol maintained through the years of the war other than those specifically
paid for by Edward III.
Numerous narrative sources exist that cover this decade, and allow us to catch
sight of events that would otherwise be missed if looked at only through the prism of
administrative or financial accounts. Our understanding of events in Scotland before
1334 would be fragmentary without chronicle sources to lean on, thanks to the lack
of wardrobe books or other comprehensive administrative materials from that period.
For instance, we have no financial or other records illustrating the makeup of the
English army at Halidon Hill, despite it being the most important victory of the entire
decade.
At the same time, the various chronicles have to be approached with a great
deal of skepticism. No chronicle is wholly objective in its approach, and even the
most even-handed of the chronicles will reflect the biases of its author and the
limitations of what information they have available to them. This especially applies
to military matters, where most of the chroniclers have little first-hand knowledge of
military matters or of the battles they describe. There are exceptions to this rule:
Thomas Grey, for instance, was a veteran of the Scottish \Nays, coostahlev trthom
Castle, and wrote part of his chronicle while in captivity in Scotland. 2° There are
essentially three categories of chronicles: those written by Scots, those written by
English authors in close proximity to the border, and those written by English writers
elsewhere.
The choices are relatively limited for the Scottish chronicles: the chronicles of
Fordun and Wyntoun, Fordun's continuator Walter Bower, Barbour's Bruce, and the
19 Calendar of Documents Relating to Scotland, v. 3, ed J. Bain (Edinburgh, 1887)
20 Scalacronica of Sir Thomas Grey, ed. J. Stevenson (Edinburgh: Maitland Club, 1836)
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Book of Pluscarden21. Of these, Bower's Scotichronicon was of particular use,
thanks to the recent translation by D.E.R. Watt and A.B. Scott. Its main drawback is
that it is a much later chronicle than either Fordun or Wyntoun, and draws most of its
material from the two earlier chronicles. Barbour's Bruce is the most unreliable of
the Scottish sources due to being poetry rather than prose, and focusing mostly upon
Robert I of Scotland. All of the Scottish sources show a significant bias against the
English, emphasizing defeats such as Strathbogie's loss at Culblean and generally
listing Scottish casualties as much lower than any English chronicle. They do have
the advantage of the closest proximity and the greatest interest of any of the chronicle
writers, which helps to reduce the effects of their anti-English slant.
Of the 'English' chronicles, Thomas Grey's Scalacronica, the Lanercost and
Bridlington chronicles, and the Anonimalle Chronicle were of the most use. These
four had either were written in the north of England or their authors had access to
first-hand knowledge of the events of the 1330s: for instance, the Lanercost
Chronicle comes from Lanercost Abbey, on the border between England and
Scotland, while Thomas Grey's involvement in the wars has already been
mentioned. 22 Due to this, they also had the most realistic estimates of casualties in
battle of any of the English sources, and the most information as to the details of the
war. They also resembled the Scottish sources in that their main focus was on events
21 John of Fordun, Chronica Gentis Scotorum [Historians of Scotland, v. 1] ed. William F. Skene
(Edinburgh: Edmonston and Douglas, 1871 );Andrew of Wyntoun, Orygvnale Cronykil of Scotland
[Historians of Scotland, v. 2], ed. David Laing. (Edinburgh, 1872); Scotichronicon by Walter Bower,
v. 7, ed. D.E.R. Watt and A.B. Scott (Aberdeen, 1996); John Barbour, The Bruce,ed. W.W. Skeat,
Scottish Text Society, v. 2(1894); The Book of Pluscarden [Historians of Scotland, v. 10], ed. and tr.
Felix J.H. Skene. (Edinburgh, 1890)
22 Scalacronica of Sir Thomas Grey, ed. J. Stevenson (Edinburgh: Maitland Club, 1836); Chronicon
de Lanercost, MCCI-MCCCXLVI, ed. J. Stevenson (Edinburgh: The Bannatyne Club, 1839); Gesta
Edivardi Tertii Auctore Canonic° Bridlingtonensi, in Chronicles of the Reigns of Edward I and
Edward II, v. II, ed. W. Stubbs (London, Rolls Series, 1883); Anonimalle Chronicle 1333-1381, ed.
V.H.Galbraith (Manchester, 1927)
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in the north, rather than the terse summaries provided by chronicles such as Baker.23
These are much more interested in the royal involvement in the wars and its
reflection upon Edward III's reign.
There has been an unfortunate tendency in the secondary literature to gloss
over the decade preceding the Hundred Years' War as unimportant compared to the
events that surround it, or consider it as significant in its own right. Far more
attention has been paid by historians to the turmoil of the previous reign and Robert
I's successful effort to wrench Scotland free of English control, or the famous
struggle of the Hundred Years' War that immediately followed. Colm MacNamee's
recent work on The Wars of the Bruces is a good analysis of the Anglo-Scottish wars
during Robert I's reign, but ends with his death. 24 On the other hand, books such as
H.J. Hewitt's The Organization of War Under Edward III 1338-62 skipped straight
past the first war of Edward III to his second, despite the fact that the two merge
almost indistinguishably into one another in 1337.25
The war received its best early attention from works that were focused on
particular aspects of English military history or a particular event within the 1330s.
Unfortunately, none of these examined all aspects of the war as a united whole. A.E.
Prince's seminal article on the strength of Edward III's armies used Richard
Ferriby's wardrobe book to great effect to estimate the armies from 1334-7, though
inexplicably dismissed 1336 despite Edward III's notable rush to relieve
Kildrummy. 26 This work provided the best early analysis of army strengths for the
23 Galfridi le Baker de Swynebroke, Chronicon, ed. E.M. Thompson. (Oxford, 1889)
24 C. McNamee, The Wars of the Bruces: Scotland, England and Ireland, 1306-1328 (East Linton,
1997)
H.J. Hewitt, The Organization of War Under Edward 111 1338-62 (Manchester, 1958)
26 A.E. Prince, 'The Strength of English Armies in the Reign of Edward III', EHR 183 (1931), pp 353-
371
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1330s, but did not consider the shortcomings of Ferriby's accounts or the limitations
they imposed on generating truly accurate numbers for troop strength during the war.
RanaId Nicholson and N.B. Lewis wrote important articles on specific campaigns in
1335 and 1337, though did not broaden their scope to the military activities of the
war as a whole.27
The book that changed this, and remains the classic on the subject, is RanaId
Nicholson's Edward III and the Scots: The Formative Years of a Militag Career,
1327 to 1335. Nearly every book that touches on the 1330s uses Edward III and the
Scots as the basis of its understanding of the decade. Though more recent
scholarship has corrected several points and clarified a number of matters, it still
remains the definitive work on the subject, as it is the only previous work that
attempts to consider the Anglo-Scottish war of the 1330's as a significant event on its
own. Its greatest shortcoming is its brevity, as Nicholson's narrative cuts off rather
suddenly in the midst of events in 1335. This creates three major problems that have
to be addressed.
While Nicholson's work makes a case for using the battle of Culblean in
November as an ending point for this particular phase of the Anglo-Scottish conflict,
the importance of the battle is overstated: rather than being the 'turning point of the
second war of Scottish Independence', 28 it was just one important step to keeping the
pretensions of the Bruce partisans alive in Scotland. The end result is the impression
of an inorexable march towards the ejection of the English from Scotland that was
only assured in hindsight.
27 R. Nicholson, 'An Irish Expedition to Scotland in 1335', IHR vol 13, no. 51 (1963), pp 197-211;
N.B. Lewis, 'The recruitment and organization of a contract army, May to November 1337,' BITIR 37
(1964), pp 1-19
28 R. Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots: The Formative Years of a Military Career, 1327 to 1335
(Oxford, 1965), p 236
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Nicholson is not the only one to have made this error: he notes that the
previous work of E.M. Barron halted at Bannockburn, though the Anglo-Scottish
wars continued. 29 This same criticism applies to Nicholson's work with its halt at
Culblean, and even to this work with its last event covered being the siege of Dunbar
in the first half of 1338. Rather, it is the problem of trying to separate into segments
a conflict that extended from 1296 through 1346 and beyond, though admittedly with
some pauses and breaks in the fighting. However, Culblean is at best a convenient
point to mark a stage in the Anglo-Scottish wars, rather than as anything more.
Secondly, it gives the impression that military action would be the only form
of interaction from that point onward, rather than negotiation or some form of
compromise. In fact, both sides immediately returned to the negotiation table and
created the most workable compromise to be proposed during the war in January
1336, though other events would overtake this possibility. 30 Not only was it not
inevitable that the Scots would eventually eject the English, it was not inevitable that
the war would end due to one side having achieved a complete victory over the other.
Last, the choice of 1335 for the end of Edward III and the Scots is
problematic because it prevents any real discussion of the importance of the Anglo-
Scottish war being the flashpoint for the Hundred Years' War to follow. Though
Nicholson does briefly discuss the diplomacy between England and France regarding
Scotland in 1335 and the beginnings of the French raids on the southern coast in that
year, there is no thorough examination of how the French insistence on the Scottish
issue in negotiations with Edward III helped to lead to full-blown war in 1337
between France and England. While this war is of major significance on its own, one
of its major results was the Hundred Years' War, and any work that fails to address
29 Nicholson, p 256
1 ° See Chapter 7
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that issue is missing a key element in understanding the importance that was attached
to success in Scotland by the English.
In addition to the problems caused by Nicholson's choice of end date are the
missed opportunities for inquiry that excluding results from excluding 1336 and
1337. These years are notable for the appointment of captains to command the
English forces in Scotland, rather than depending on the presence of the king himself
Because of this, there is more to draw on in terms of administrative arrangements for
the powers wielded by those captains and the contracts that increasingly provided
their troops — especially in 1337. As these developments are one of the major
innovations of the period, it deserves the appropriate investigation.
More recent works have also looked at the wars, but in the context of wider
conflicts. Jonathan Sumption31 and Clifford Rogers 32 both devote extensive portions
of their recent works on the Hundred Years' War and Edward III's strategies to the
events in Scotland, and make a point of recognizing the continuity that runs directly
from the fight between Edward III and the Scots to the worsening relations with
France and eventual war in 1337. Both make a point of recognizing the war with
Scotland as the final trigger for the breakdown in Anglo-Fsench Te121A.ions ana
beginning of the Hundred Years' War.
Sumption devotes a good portion of the first volume of his multi-volume
work to covering the events of the Mortimer Regency and the war in Scotland, as the
first act in the larger Continental war. The work is sound, but suffers from seeing the
war as a prologue to later events, and in focusing on the war's connection to the
Anglo-French relations. The result is to over-emphasize the effects of France upon
the conduct of the war north of the border, particularly after 1335. While France did
31 J. Sumption, The Hundred Years War, v. I: Trial by Battle (London, 1990)
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have a major effect, particularly in the diplomatic sphere, its lack of direct
involvement in Scottish territory meant that the impetus for action in Scotland was in
the hands of same participants in the war that it had been all along.
Rogers meanwhile goes through the 1330's with a fine-toothed comb to show
how it served as the apprenticeship for Edward III and his supporters for the skills
they would need in France and how the tactics they would use to such success had
their beginnings at Dupplin Moor and Halidon Hill. The account is persuasive and
the best recent work, though it falls short in certain categories. It is particularly
strong in the range and breadth of sources used, and the ability to make connections
to events and trends occurring both on the Continent and in the north.
The largest difficulty is its heavy reliance upon chronicle sources for
information on events and the conduct of battles. As discussed elsewhere, the biases
and inaccuracies that are in even the most objective chronicles make them difficult to
use with complete accuracy without other evidence. Rogers does address this
problem by being as comprehensive as possible in referring to as many chronicles as
possible to compare their numbers where possible, such as the number of Scots who
opposed the landing of the Disinherited in 1332. 33 He also does use some
administrative sources, such as Ferriby's wardrobe book. However, with the focus of
his work being on understanding the strategy and mindset of Edward III, Rogers
tends to focus on the chronicles addressing Edward's decisions rather than relying on
administrative or numerical evidence. It allows him to craft a convincing argument,
but one reliant on a certain degree of speculation.
This tendency can occasionally lead Rogers astray, particularly when
combined with occasional problems regarding Scottish geography. A case in point is
32 C. Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy Under Edward III, 1327-1360 (Woodbridge,
2000)
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his analysis of the attempts in 1336 to widen the circle of fortifications protecting the
English- and Balliol-supporting sections of Scotland. By misidentifying a fortress at
Lauriston near Aberdeen as that at Laurieston in Galloway, Rogers then takes a
description of a fortification effort on one portion of the eastern seaboard of Scotland
and turns it into a large-scale attempt at fortification across the breadth of Scottish
terri tory.34
The last difficulty in using Rogers' work for an independent work on the
Anglo-Scottish wars is that Rogers is attempting to prove a specific thesis: that
Edward III was intentionally seeking battle against his opponents using the English
military system of longbow and dismounted men-at-arms. This on occasion seems to
colour his analysis, such as the contradictions in claiming in his introduction that
Edward was both modeling his chevauchees in France on the Scottish campaign of
1327 and attempting to provoke them into battle. 35 Considering the Scottish
avoidance of battle in that campaign, it seems an unusual example to choose.
By contrast, this work is more concerned with establishing the makeup of the
English forces serving in armies and garrisons in Scotland and their support by the
English crown than in proving whether or not Edward M was fonowing a
comprehensive strategy of seeking set-piece baffles with opposing forces. The large
numerical disparity between the English and Scottish forces after 1333 and the
careful positioning of Edward's forces at Berwick before Halidon Hill make his
seeking battle a given point. Because of this, the strategic analysis that Rogers has to
engage in for the wider period of the Hundred Years' War to determine that pattern is
not required for the 1330s. I
33 War Cruel and Sharp, p 36
34 See Chapter 9, Garrisons, for the discussion on Dunnotar, Kinneff, and Lauriston.
35 War Cruel and Sharp, pp 6, 8
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Perhaps the best work on the nuts and bolts of forming the English army in
the period is Andrew Ayton's work on the English aristocracy of the period, seen
through the prism of administrative records, including horse valuations and muster
rolls. 36 Though its scope extends through both the Anglo-Scottish War and the
Hundred Years' War, it provides a wealth of detail on the men serving in Edward's
armies and is perhaps the best help in understanding the specific administrative
records that give us the most information on the armies of the period. The sheer
mass of detail and supporting evidence that Ayton provides can be overwhelming,
and the focus on the aristocracy and the military machine of England over a long
period of time creates the same shortcomings that both Sumption and Rogers suffer.
While Ayton's work tries to draw attention to the change in military service over
Edward III's entire reign, this thesis is specifically focused on providing a snapshot
of the changes that occur due to this specific war and the limits on how far that
change has progressed by the end of the siege of Dunbar in 1338.
Both Mark Ormrod's The Reign of Edward III and Scott Waugh's England in
the Reign of Edward III provide solid general overviews of Edward III's reign, but
have such a breadth of material to cover that they are unable to provide more than a
brief summary of the wars. 37 These two works are also much more focused on
political and social issues of the time period, leaving military matters to receive less
attention than a work specifically focused on those can provide.
Three works were particularly helpful for understanding basic fundamentals
of the reign of Edward III. For understanding the financial circumstances of the
reign, E.B. Fryde's work is particularly recommended, especially his biography of
36 A. Ayton, Knights and Warhorses: Militaly Service and the English Aristocracy under Ed g ard III
(Woodbridge, 1994)
37 W.M. Ormrod, The Reign of Edward III, updated ed. (Stroud, 2000); S.L. Waugh, England in the
Reign of Edward III (Cambridge, 1991)
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William de la Pole. 38 This is especially important for understanding the financial
crisis during the Mortimer regency and the general financial straits that Edward III
would find himself in as his reign continued through the 1330s. On naval matters,
Timothy Runyan's works such as Ships, Seafaring in Society provide a solid
understanding of where the English crown can draw its naval strength. 39 For a more
general understanding of the English military machine than the specifics covered in
this work, Michael Prestwich's Armies and Warfare: The English Experience is the
best summation of warfare in this particular theatre of Europe.4°
33 E.B. Fryde, William de la Pole: Merchant and King's Banker (London, 1988)
19 T. Runyan, (ed.), Ships, Seafaring and Society: Essays in Maritime History (Detroit, 1987)
40 M.C. Prestwich, Armies and Waifare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience (Yale, 1996)
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Like many monarchs, Edward III was heavily influenced by the policies of his
predecessors. To understand the military of his Scottish wars, it is necessary to look
briefly at the three-and-a-half year regency of his mother Isabella and her lover, Roger
Mortimer. Their policies regarding the north of England and Scotland would provide
Edward with his first experiences in dealing with a region that would occupy the first
decade of his reign. Edward would see his first military action within a year of
ascending the throne in 1327, in an army arranged by Mortimer and relying upon his
concepts of military strategy. Its failure would push Edward in a different direction
militarily, and lead him to oppose Mortimer's choices of actions for defending the north.
Edward would also be influenced by the financial activities of Isabella and Mortimer,
both in how they raised revenue, and from their debts that were Edward's legacy to
repay. Finally, their diplomacy would shape his, both in terms of direct royal dealings
with other countries, and in its effects upon the factions within the English court. In
particular, their negotiation of the Treaty of Northampton and its repudiation of Edward's
claims to Scotland would cause him to be all too willing to take a course of action in the
future to reverse what had been given away by his regents.
Isabella and Mortimer had sailed from Dordrecht with a force of Hainaulters on 23
September 1326, landing at Orwell in Suffolk and rapidly gained control of the country,
forcing Edward II to flee into Wales. By 16 November, the coup was complete; Edward
and the younger Despenser had been taken at Neath Abbey. The young Edward III had
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already been declared keeper of the realm on 26 October and by 25 January 1327 was
ruling as king.1
At first glance, the regency was eager to take steps to deal with the problem of
defending the north. Many of the supporters that had brought Isabella and Mortimer back
so successfully from exile were the Disinherited: English lords and Scottish exiles with
disputed claims in Scotland and interests in the north. If the political support of such men
as Henry Beaumont, his brother Louis, and those others whose personal wealth and
power were based in the north had been key in toppling Edward II, it was only fair return
for the regency to try to defend the regions that had provided such support.
Certainly, the region seemed in dire need of help. Though there had been relative
peace in the north since Edward II had arranged the Truce of Bishopthorpe in 1323 with
Robert Bruce, there was an awareness of it being only a cessation of hostilities, with the
underlying questions of England's sovereignty over Scotland still having to be answered
at some point in the future. The damage done to the region during the previous reign was
considerable, and is reflected by the large volume of debt remissions, allowances,
pardons, and respites granted throughout the north during the three years of the regency.
Though the last deep Scottish incursion into England during Edward II's reign occurred
in 1322, the region was years in rebuilding from tho repeated wasting of its croplands,
herds, and structures. 2 As early in the regency as 12 February 1327, the counties of
Northumberland, Cumberland, Westmorland, and the cities of Newcastle and Carlisle
were pardoned their debts at the exchequer.3
M. McKisack The Fourteenth Century, 1307-1399 (Oxford, 1959), pp 83-90
2 For more information on the wasting of the north, see C. McNamee, The Wars of the Bruces: Scotland,
England and Ireland, 1306-1328 (East Linton, 1997), especially pp 72-123
3 CPR 1327-30, p 23
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Several others in a similar vein followed this initial grant. March 6 th saw £80 from
the Carlisle farm pardoned, while the men of Corbridge received five years of the
pontage from the bridge there for its repair on March 16t1 Several individuals, such as
John Clavering, Gilbert Toutheby, John Wysham, and Richard Marshal, received either
pardons on debts or yearly incomes from the exchequer due to the damage done to their
lands, wardships, and offices. 5 Large numbers of respites were issued for the various
northern counties for debts not cancelled or pardoned, while the criminal fines for
Lancashire were cancelled outright in recognition of the damages suffered by the county.6
The city of Newcastle received special attention, being the main base for resisting
the Scottish incursions in Northumberland. 7 Along with the February debt relief, the city
received two years' pardon for the revenues of the city farm to the exchequer for wall
repairs on August 19 th and £201 6s. 8d. in further fann revenues pardoned due to the
city's efforts in defence from the Scots in 1329. 8 The city was also exempted from the
loan on wool in 1327. 9 Farther north along the coast, the town of Bamburgh was another
recipient of royal favour, with several respites and pardons of debts beginning in
September 1327.10
Much like the counties and towns, clerical establishments did not escape either the
negative attention of Scottish raiders or the following acknowledgements of their distress.
The abbey of St. Mary's in York was granted relief of £170 15s. 9d. because of the
ravaging of its lands, and was allowed to stretch out the payments on its remaining debts
CPR 1327-30, pp 32, 35
5 CPR 1327-30, pp 15, 171, 461; CCR 1327-30, pp 2, 166, etc.
6 CCR 1327-30, pp 6, 59, 294 , 72
7 The equivalent for Westmorland and Cumberland was Carlisle.
8 CPR 1327-30, pp 146, 461
9 CCR 1327-30, p 162
I ° CPR 1327-30, p 169; CCR 1327-30, pp 265, 387
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to the crown at a rate of £100 per year." The archdiocese of York received several writs
ordering the revaluation of the properties within its boundaries and the collection of the
clerical tenth at the new levels. 12 The bishopric of Carlisle was pardoned the clerical
tenth outright due to the damage done. 13 Commissioners were also appointed to
determine the charters and muniments stolen by the Scots from the abbey of Ellerton in
Yorkshire and replace them.14
It was in Isabella and Mortimer's best interests to strengthen the north militarily as
well as financially, in order to avoid further damage from future Scottish raids. This need
was emphasized all too clearly by a coronation day assault on Norham Castle by the
Scots on 1 February 1327. 15 A binding truce had previously been agreed on between
Bruce and Edward II in 1323, and was not set to expire until 1336. The attack was a
signal to both sides that the truce, regardless of the terms, was at an end: in Scottish eyes
the change in regime nullified the terms of the truce. Though the attack itself was
unsuccessful and was ignored by the English, appointments of commanders for the
border marches were made. Anthony Lucy was appointed keeper of Carlisle from
February 5 th until Whitsunday (May 31), while Henry Percy was given the custody of the
marches of Scotland for the same period. Keepers were appointed to the royal castles in
the region to defend them against Scottish attack: Robert Horncliffe was entrusted with
Bamburgh while Roger Mauduit received Wark-on-Tweed. I6 Further, Henry Percy,
11 CCR 1327-30, pp 54, 66
12 CCR 1327-30, pp 188, 191, 280, 307, 325,
CCR 1327-30, p48
14 CPR 1327-30, p 207
15 Lanercost, pp 258-9
16 CFR 1327-37, p 24; Nicholson, p 15
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Ralph Neville, Roger Heron, William Rydell, and Gilbert Boroughdon were given power
to maintain the truce with the Scots.I7
From this evidence, we arc provided with a neat picture of a new political
administration having taken over the country and immediately moving to rectify the
errors of the previous reign and protect against new threats on the border. Edward II had
been seen as indifferent to the needs of the north of England, if not ready to turn over the
region to the Scots as the Lanercost chronicler supposed. I8 Contrast this with the flurry
of activity on the part of Isabella and Mortimer, up to the raising of an army including
Hainaulter mercenaries to fight the Weardale campaign in June of 1327. 19
 But how
accurate is this picture? Though the chroniclers later decried the Treaty of Northampton
and the regency's apparent greed in securing it, initially the magnates of England seemed
supportive of the regency — if only in comparison to Edward II. But were the measures
undertaken by Isabella and Mortimer innovative and novel? Did the regency herald a
better situation for the north, or was it business as usual?
There is some debate regarding the speed of recovery of the region from the raids
of the Scots during Edward II's reign and the claim of damages from their depredations
to avoid taxation. For the purposes of the regency, the actual reality had little to do with
the perception that the north had been neglected and required whatever financial aid it
could get. Since the legitimacy of the regency's displacement of Edward II depended in
part upon accusing Edward of incompetence in defending the north and colluding with
the Scots, concrete, public effort had to be made to contrast Isabella and Mortimer from
the previous regime. Giving respites and pardons of debts to northern burgesses,
' 7
 CPR 1327-30, pp 6, 18, 15
18 Lanercost, pp 256-7
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magnates, and clerical institutions provided a happy marriage of political patronage and
legitimation of the regency during the time when a Scottish invasion was a threat, rather
than a reality. In July 1327, the Scots under James Douglas and the earl of Moray
invaded England, advancing into the palatinate of Durham, burning and pillaging as they
went before returning unscathed to Scotland. After this calamity, there was no question
that the respites and pardons of debts had become a necessity.
Despite the perceived neglect of the north by Edward II, the various remits,
pardons, and respites from debt that were granted by the regency had nearly all been
anticipated by him. The town of Bamburgh, for instance, received respite from its debts
in February 1325, after having its previous debts acquitted in March of the previous
year.20 The town of Newcastle was pardoned £100 of its farm in 1325 to help in the
fortification of the town, much like the grant given in August 1327 by the regency.21
These allowances all followed a general respite from all debts for the counties of
Northumberland, Cumberland, and Westmorland until further orders given in December
1325 by the king.22
If the financial side was to be so similarly prosecuted in both regimes, what about
the military? Surely there would be some changes in the military administration, as the
regency attempted to promote its supporters in the legion and lessen the importance of
those in the north who had supported Edward II in the past. If anything, the regency
turned to the men whom Edward II had relied on to secure the north. Anthony Lucy was
the key man behind Andrew Harclay's arrest and was sheriff of Cumberland for the rest
19 CCR 1327'-30, p 118; Rot Scot, pp 210, 211
CCR 1323-7, pp 262, 71
21 CCR 1323-7, p 432; CPR 1327-30, p 146
22 CCR 1323-7, p 439
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of Edward II's reign, along with being keeper of the king's truce with the Scots. 23 Rather
than removing him, the regency confirmed him as keeper of Carlisle and sheriff of
Cumberland. He received £500 for custody of Carlisle through the end of May 1327,
though was paid only in victuals for the £369 7s id owed him for the custody from June
through September 7th.24
In the east, such linchpins as Henry Percy, who received orders to repair Alnwick
in 1326, was commissioned to keep the peace and the truce in Northumberland in 1325,
and was commissioner of the array in Yorkshire in 1326, were kept in place and
confirmed in their positions. 25 Percy's appointment as chief warden of the march came
with the expenses of maintaining the force required to carry out his duties: a fixed fee of
one thousand marks was paid for him to serve from the beginning of the reign to Whit-
Sunday. 26 Roger Mauduit, the keeper of the Umfraville lands in the north after the Earl of
Angus' death, was keeper of Wark in 1327. 27 Though Mauduit was removed as keeper of
the Umfraville lands, Gilbert Boroughdon, the sheriff of Northumberland during 1323-4,
replaced him.28
All five individuals granted the power to keep the truce with the Scots by Isabella
and Mortimer had served in some capacity in the previous reign. Henry Percy's role has
already been mentioned. Ralph Neville was supervisor of array for the North Riding of
Yorkshire and later supervised the array of troops from Northumberland for Edward II's
23 CDS, no. 885
24 Nicholson, p 15; CPR 1327-30, p 164
25 CPR 1324-7, pp 303, 228, 220; CCR 1323-7, p 457
26 Nicholson, p 16
27 CPR 1327-30, p 163; CCR 1323-7, p 485; CFR 1327-37, p 24
28 CCR 1327-30, p 259; CCR 1323-7, pp 99, 272; C.H. Blair, 'The Sheriffs of Northumberland, Part I
(1076-1602)', Archaeologia Aeliana 20, 4th series (1942), p43
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war in Gascony. 29 Roger Heron was constable of Dunstanburgh Castle, in the crown's
hands after Thomas Lancaster's defeat. 3° William Rydell served on previous
commissions to keep the truce and to keep the peace in the north with Percy and Neville
and was supervising the array in Northumberland by 1326. 31 Gilbert Boroughdon as
mentioned previously was sheriff of Northumberland under Edward 11. 32 Heron and
Boroughdon had both served with Rydell on several previous commissions to preserve
the truce, as early as 1320.33
Isabella and Mortimer had run up against the classic problem: how to provide the
strength and effectiveness to adequately defend the north? The options available came
down to four separate solutions, all of which were attempted by the regency. The first
was to depend on the local magnates and population to defend itself. As seen, the
regency heavily exploited this option, and would surely have done so regardless of what
other actions it may have taken. It made sense to have men who knew the region, knew
each other, and knew the opposition actively engaged in trying to defend what was their
home ground.
The difficulties with this scheme were the same ones facing Edward II when he
attempted to use this strategy: there simply were not enough magnates who were
effective enough or powerful enough to defend the north on their own without help from
outside of the northern counties. Even Andrew Harelay, noted (and ennobled) for his
efforts on the border, had proved incapable of stopping the Scottish raids. Edward II was
29 CPR 1324-7, pp 9, 53
3° CCR 1323-7, p 12
31 CPR 1324-7, pp 162, 221, 228
32 CCR 1323-7, pp 9, 272
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seen as having let the north defend itself, and the results of this and his general actions
regarding Scotland were one of the reasons behind his downfall. To secure the north,
other means had to be used.
If the north could not hold on by itself; the second option was for the king to go
north to make sure that it held. Summons to Newcastle for 18 May with their troops were
issued to the magnates on 5 April 1327, followed later in the month by the calling up of
foot soldiers from London and 42 towns on the 25 th . 34 As with Edward I, criminals were
pardoned provided they served in the army. John of Hainault, the brother of the Count of
Hainault whose mercenaries had helped depose Edward II, was persuaded to return with a
large body of mercenaries to join the campaign as well. By 23 May, Edward III was in
York, his army gathering there for the anticipated fight with the Scots.
The resultant campaign of 1327 is well known through the writings of Jean le Bel,
later copied by Jean Froissart. 35 The royal army, wracked by dissension between the
Hainaulters and the archers of the northern counties even before the campaign
commenced, was unable to prevent a Scottish force under James Douglas and the Earl of
Moray from raiding its way down from Scotland into the palatinate of Durham, before
escaping home. Even when the ungainly English forces had finally come face-to-face
with the much more mobile Scots at Stanhope Park, they were unable to force a conflict
where their superior numbers could tell.
33 CPR 1317-21, pp 416, 459; CPR 1324-7, pp 113, 228
34 CCR 1327-30, p 118
35 Jean le Bel, Chronique de Jean le Be!, ed. Jules Viard and Eugene Deprez (Paris: Societe de l'histoire de
France, 1904), pp 42-77
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The only tangible result of the campaign was debt — lots of it. The largest debts of
the regency outside household operations were those owed to John of Hainault, the uncle
of Queen Philippa. Several thousand pounds in wages were owed to the magnate due to
his participation both in the coup that ushered in the regency and the failed Weardale
campaign. Additionally, John had been granted on 7 February 1327 one thousand marks
out of the customs of London for his services. Despite paying £40,540 12s 5 1/4d towards
the large arrears in wages, the crown still had to acknowledge £14,406 6s 8d in debt to
John in March 1328, with the two halves to be paid by the end of the year.36
Both the Bardi bank of Florence and the merchant de la Pole brothers of Hull
loaned funds to pay for John's wages, though the Bardi were by far the greater lenders for
this purpose. The de la Poles loaned £2001 5s 1 1 d in late August to help pay John,37
while the Bardi loaned £900 in September and took on the responsibility of paying John
the £14,406 6s 8d acknowledged as owed to him in March 1328. 38 Since the crown had
used all sorts of expedients including pledging the crown jewels to raise funds for paying
John, the intervention of both foreign and domestic lenders was indispensable. 39 Edward
III would take this example of finance to heart, relying heavily on both the de la Poles
and the Bardi to keep his finances afloat when his military expenditures far outstripped
his resources.
The wages owed by the regency to native soldiers serving in defence of the march
was also sizeable. For example, pay to Henry Percy was in arrears as far back as Edward
36 CPR 1327-30, pp 10, 247
37 CPR 1327-30, p 165
38 CPR 1327-30, pp 247, 254; CCR 1327-30, pp 463, 470
39 CCR 1327-30, p 160
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I's reign for his father's services,40 and the resumption of hostilities only added to this
total. In addition to Percy's stipend as warden of the march, the expenses of the
Weardale campaign incurred further debts: September 1327 saw him being paid £330 3s
4d for himself, 159 men at arms and 200 hobelars during the abortive campaign.4'
However, a compromise was found for paying Percy the mounting amounts due him: in
August 1328 he was granted the right to be quit of rents from the wardships he held for
the amounts he was owed rather than make the mutual payments both parties owed one
another.42 Several other lords such as Roger Swynnerton, Thomas Weston, Thomas
Corbridge, and the Earl of Norfolk also received allowances, grants, or other
recompensation. 43 Had the campaign been successful, these costs would have been offset
by the benefits of victory. However, the lack of results merely made the use of the royal
army even more damaging to the regency than had it never gone north.
The inconclusiveness of the Weardale campaign meant that the appointment of
competent officers was of even more importance than before the royal army's arrival in
the north. Both Henry Percy and Anthony Lucy continued in their posts, while various
nobles such as Hugh Turplington, John Multon, and Robert Watville receiving writs of
protection during their stays in the bordei region. 44 These men were faced with the
Scots' continued efforts to subdue Northumberland. Henry Percy was besieged in
Alnwick for a fortnight, while Warkworth and Norham also came under assault.45
While the campaign was ineffective in protecting the north, it did give the
impression of a willingness to engage the Scots. Though Edward II was seen as
4° CCR 1327-30, p 2
41 CPR 1327-30, p 163
42 CPR 1327-30, p 309
43 CCR 1327-30, pp 160, 172, 264; CPR 1327-30, p 145
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unwilling to do anything for the north, he did arrange for campaigns to deal with
threatened Scottish invasions and to invade Scotland itself in 1310, 1314, 1319, and 1322
after which a negotiated truce in 1323 made further campaigning not an option. Further
preparations had been made in 1308, 1309,1316, 1317, 1318 and 1323 for northern
campaigns, though various combinations of foreign and domestic politics had prevented
actual military action during these years. 46 It was more Edward II's inability to
accomplish anything with his campaigns north that created his reputation than the lack of
campaigns. In this light, the Weardale campaign was a dire prediction of how the
regency would fare should it see continued conflict on the northern border.
The third solution was to call on men from the southern parts of the kingdom to
come north with men and either take over the defence of the area or supplement the
troops already there. Edward II had certainly tried to do this, calling at various times the
earls of Lancaster, Pembroke, Arundel, and John Cromwell to bring large numbers of
troops northward.47 While supporters of the regency such as Hugh Turplington, John
Multon, and Robert Watevill did come north to stay in the region, receiving protection
from lawsuits to do so, there was not the major movement of troops north by southern
magnates that might have been expected.
The earls of Lancaster and Kent did receive commissions as captains of the English
army in the March of Scotland, and took a force to Newcastle including a number of the
Disinherited; however, the commission is dated June 6, and indicates a need to bolster the
44 CPR 1327-30, pp 102, 107, 114
45 Nicholson, p 44
46 McNamee, The Wars of the Bruces: Scotland, England and Ireland, 1306-1328, pp 124-5
47 McNamee; The Wars of the Bruces, pp 147-52
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regional defence due to the delay of the royal army rather than these lords having been
convinced to remain in the area without direct royal military assistance being
forthcoming." Once the royal army had disbanded, most magnates from the south
returned home. The earl of Kent was the only major magnate to stay in the region longer,
receiving a writ of protection in October 1327— the same period of time that saw Robert
Bruce besieging Norham Castle.49
The final solution available to the regency was the most humiliating — negotiating a
peace with the Scots. Any attempts to create a permanent peace of this sort would
require an acknowledgement of Robert Bruce's claim to king of Scotland, free of any
claims of sovereignty by the English Crown. Diplomacy had been ongoing from the very
beginning of the regency: Ivo Aldeburgh, the constable of Barnard Castle in the
palatinate of Durham, was commissioned in December 1326 to treat with the Scots,
acting in that capacity throughout the first half of the year. 5° On 25 April 1327, he
received an appointment to arrange safe-passage of ambassadors from Scotland to
arrange a peace. 51
However, these discussions had not had any success by the time of the Weardale
campaign. Once the military option had been tried and found wanting, diplomacy
became the only means for peace available to the regency with any chance of success.
The Scots besieged Norham, Warkworth, and Alnwick in the last half of 1327, though
none fell. Letters in the fall from the king to John Darcy, then sheriff of York, and to the
48 Rot Scot, p213
49 CPR 1327-1330, p 178
5 ° CCR 1323-6, p 624; CPR 1327-30, pp 25, 33
51 CPR 1327-30, p 95
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supervisors of the array in seven northern counties indicated the belief that Robert Bruce
intended to fortify his men in Northumberland and hold it perrnanently. 52 Archbishop
Melton of York expressed the same belief in letters to Lewis Beaumont, bishop of
Durham, claiming Bruce had already been granting parts of Northumberland to his
vassals. 53
 No campaign in the north was forthcoming; despite ordering the able-bodied
men of the north to prepare for campaign in October, the regency was in no position to
move again to conflict.54
Both Stones and Nicholson have covered in detail the diplomacy of the following
six months. 55 William Denholme and Henry Percy were sent to negotiate with Bruce on
9 October. A flurry of negotiations ensued, with preliminary points of discussion for a
full treaty fleshed out by the end of October and ambassadors for the final negotiations
appointed by 23 November. 56 Truce was arranged to allow for the necessary diplomacy
to be carried out. By 1 March, matters had advanced far enough that Edward issued his
formal quitclaim of his rule and superiority over Scotland, in excruciating and exact
detail. 57 Immediately after, delegates for the English crown left for Edinburgh, to treat
for the first time with the Scots in Scotland. The final details were hammered out by 17
March, and agreed to by the Scottish parliament. The English parliament ratified the
52 Rut Scot, pp 221-2
53 J. Raine (ed), Historical Papers and Letters from Northern Registers (Rolls Series, 1873), pp 344-6, 349-
50
54 Rot Scot, pp 221, 222
55 See E.L.G. Stones, 'The Anglo-Scottish Negotiations of 1327', SHR 30 (1951), pp 49-54; E.L.G. Stones,
'The English Mission to Edinburgh in 1328', SHR 28 (1949), pp 121-32; Nicholson, pp 46-56
56 Rot Scot, p223; E.L.G. Stones, Anglo-Scottish Relations, 1174-1328: Some Selected Documents
(London, 1965) pp 158-160
57 Foedera, p 730; Stones, Anglo-Scottish Relations, 1174-1328: Some Selected Documents, pp 161-63
35
1327-30: The Regency and the north
treaty at Northampton on 4 May 1328, leading to peace and a Scottish king recognized by
the English for the first time since John Ballio1.58
The treaty, known as the 'Shameful Peace', provided for alliance between the two
countries, the lifting of the excommunication for Bruce, the marriage of Edward's sister
Joan to Robert's son David, and a payment of £20,000 to the English king to sweeten the
deal. Unfortunately, the deal was such that no payoff would make it acceptable to certain
parties — the king being foremost amongst them. Politically dominated by Isabella and
Mortimer, Edward was in no position to block the treaty from going forward. However,
his absolute refusal to attend his sister's wedding was keenly felt on both sides of the
border. Though Nicholson indicates that the lack of dowry from the English was an insult
to Bruce, the agreement made at Edinburgh indicates that the Scots themselves had taken
on the responsibility for providing £2,000 worth of lands as dower, which Roger Mauduit
and Robert Tughale were empowered to receive on her behalf on 21 May 1328. 59 The
lack of Edward's attendance was slight enough, and matched in turn by Robert Bruce's
absence.
The treaty received little favour in the eye of the English chroniclers, receiving
near universal condemnation. Geoffrey le Baker wrote of the 'disgraceful peace made
between the English and the Scots', while the author of the Brut called the parliament at
Northampton `accursed'. 6° The Scottish chroniclers, by contrast, reacted positively to
both the treaty and the marriage. Walter Bower's Scotichronicon lists the full text of
Edward's quitclaim to Scotland and notes the £20,000 payment to be made by Robert and
58 Foedera, pp 740-42
59 Stones, Anglo-Scottish Relations, 1174-1328: Some Selected Documents, pp 165; CPR 1327-30, p 272;
Clifford Rogers also notes this point in his War, Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy under Edward III,
1327-1360 (Woodbridge, 2000), p 25
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the Scots to Edward and the agreement to the wedding. 61
 Much more ado is made
regarding the death of Robert Bruce than regarding the treaty with the English, though
the author does mention how Bruce 'vanquished the king and people of England with
such courage and forcefulness that they established a pretended peace with him only out
of fear for their other kingdoms. 62
The £20,000 payment by the Scots did little to increase happiness with the treaty.
Instead, it increased the resentment of Isabella and Mortimer. It was never returned in
any fashion to the northern counties from where it had been bled during the previous
reign. Initially, it was assigned towards paying the huge debts owed to John of Hainault
and the Bardi of Florence, as mentioned. However, the exchequer was forced to find the
funds elsewhere when Isabella selfishly reassigned the Scottish payment to herself. 63 It is
little wonder that the treaty was so disliked when the one tangible gain on the part of the
English ended up enriching the individuals seen as betraying the country.
Though Edward II had found himself negotiating truces with the Scots, including
a thirteen-year truce at Bishopthorpe in May 1323, even he had refused to budge on the
issue of English sovereignty over Scotland. The truce had provided for occupied territory
to be surrendered, new fortifications not already begun in the March to be banned, and
restriction of contact between subjects of the two sides of the conflict. What it did not
address in the slightest was the issue of whether Robert Bruce was due the title of king.
Simply put, no English king was going on his own merits to give away his claims
to Scotland. Such a diminution was not to be accepted, certainly not by choice. The only
6° Baker, p 40; Brut, p 258
61 Scotichronicon, pp 38-9
62 Scotichronicon, p 45
63 CPR 1327-30, p 418, 470, CCR 1327-30, pp 470, 490; Foedera, pp 477, 485
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way this could happen would be if the king were forced to, either through disastrous
defeats or by not controlling his own fate. Even Bannockburn was not able to convince
Edward II to back down and grant Robert what he wished... but Isabella and Mortimer
had full and total control of the political direction of the crown at the time of the Treaty
of Northampton. They personally were losing nothing by bargaining away the king's
sovereignty over Scotland. Only Edward III, helpless to do much more than fume, was
going to lose by their acceding to the Scottish demands.
Isabella and Mortimer had benefited from and taken full advantage of Edward II's
perceived indifference to northern England. However, the perception of activity was at
variance with the reality of what was being done for the north. This is not to say that
Edward II was effective in dealing with the northern problems — the chroniclers seem
fully justified in their anger at years of devastation and destruction visited on the north
before the Truce of Bishopthorpe was concluded in 1323. While the regents may have
engaged in a great deal of visible activity for the north, none of it was innovative. All the
policies that Edward II had pursued — respites and pardons of debts to help financially,
commissioning local magnates to defend the north, royal campaigns to crush Scottish
opposition, the appointment of major magnates from the south as captains on the march,
and the negotiation of truces — all of these were tried in quick succession by the regents,
with little success.
For Edward III, the regency had provided some harsh lessons on ruling the
country. He had participated in an utterly fruitless military campaign, seen his claims to
Scotland signed away by his own mother for her personal gain, and became acquainted
with the damage done to the north and the damage done in turn to his royal reputation.
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There were benefits, however. Isabella and Mortimer's time in power created a lengthy
separation between Edward III's reign and that of his father. This allowed the problems
that carried over from Edward II's reign to be blamed on the regents rather than the
young king. Edward was then able to start afresh once he could wrest power away from
Isabella and Mortimer, without being held responsible for either the aftereffects of his
father's inability to defend the north or for the 'Shameful Peace' which he vocally
opposed. Those three-and-a-half years also allowed him the time to garner further
support and take advantage of the animosity that Mortimer in particular was generating,
an animosity Edward would use to the fullest in 1330.
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It is a sad irony that the only means that Isabella and Mortimer were able to use to
create a peace with the Scots was the one guaranteed to generate conflict in the near
future. The Treaty of Northampton left the regency with the first solid peace in the north
since the time of the Edward I's adjudication between Balliol and Bruce for the Scottish
crown, and Isabella greatly richer. It also left a body of deeply dissatisfied nobles with
unfulfilled claims in Scotland; only Henry Percy had received satisfaction in terms of his
Scottish claims, and there he gained only the right to regain his father's forfeited titles
through the courts.'
When changing circumstances provided the opportunity for these men to take
dramatic action to resurrect their claims in Scotland, they would embrace the chance
wholeheartedly and set off the chain of events that would put England and Scotland at
war after 1332 and lead eventually to the war with France in 1337. By supporting
Edward in his coup of 1330, they later gained his tacit support to carry out a private
campaign against Scotland to unseat the young David Bruce and replace him with
Edward Balliol, whose father had been removed as king of Scotland by Edward I in
1296.2
This group of magnates is commonly referred to as the Disinherited. 3 Their
claims to lands in Scotland varied widely. Some, like Percy, were related to family
Stones, Anglo-Scottish Relations, 1174-1328: Some Selected Documents, p 171
2 M. Prestwich, Edward I, pp 473-4
3 The name was originally attached to them by the chronicler William Dene, as pointed out by Rogers: War
Cruel and Sharp, p 31
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estates and titles held before the start of the Anglo-Scottish Wars that had been forfeited
due to the holders' allegiance to the English crown, rather than the Bruce cause. Others
had claims arising through marriage to heiresses, such as Henry Beaumont's claim to the
earldom of Buchan through his wife, Alice Comyn, or other more dubious claims arising
from the conflicting grants given during the latter years of Edward I's reign after the
deposition of John Balliol. Most found these claims reduced to posturing by the Treaty
of Northampton: only Thomas Wake of Liddell, Henry Beaumont, and William la
Zouche even had the option of taking Percy's path, though none achieved any success.
The political affiliations of this group were utterly dictated by this vision of lost
riches in Scotland. Henry Beaumont had been a major supporter of Edward II until the
Truce of Bishopthorpe, after which he became an exile and one of Isabella's plotters in
Hainault. After their triumphant return, they supported the regency, with Wake,
Beaumont, and John Mowbray being part of the garrison at Newcastle just prior to the
Weardale campaign. 4 Again, the instant that the official policy changed towards some
fon-n of reconciliation with Scotland and the abandonment of support for their personal
claims, the group moved into the an-ns of the opposition. Beaumont, Wake, and David
Strathbogie, the claimant to the earldom of Atholl, joined with Lancaster during his
opposition to the regency in 1328-9. 5 The defeat of the Lancastrian cause was a setback
for the faction: Beaumont once again found his way overseas to plot coups, while Wake
and Strathbogie paid dearly to receive back their English possessions.6
The days in the wilderness were soon to be over for the Disinherited, as a sea
change came about in English political life. The characters in the drama of the regency
4 Scalacronica, p 153
5 CCR 1327-30, pp 528-9; Brut, p 260; Baker, p 42
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were in great part those of the old guard, the generation in power during Edward II's
reign — characters such as Lancaster, Mortimer himself, Beaumont, the royal earls of
Norfolk and Kent. However, a new generation was appearing, along with men who had
not been at the forefront. David Strathbogie, for instance, was just coming into his
majority during the events of 1328, as was Gilbert Umfraville, titular earl of Angus.
These men could provide a new energy to the political landscape, provided an exit could
be found from the factionalism that had prevailed under Edward II and the regency. At
the same time, the leadership in Scotland was changing. Bruce, ailing even in 1327, was
dead by 7 June 1329, with James Douglas to follow the next year, fighting in Spain.'
Thomas Randolph, the Earl of Moray, was left as Guardian for the young David Bruce,
but few obvious leaders were visible should Moray founder. Both Bruce and his heir,
Robert Stewart, were minors.
The exit from factionalism was provided in November 1330, as Edward III with
the help of William Montague and other supporters succeeded in surprising Mortimer at
Nottingham and eliminated the regency. With the removal of Mortimer, Edward III was
able to make a new start, placing the blame for the previous difficulties of his minority
firmly on Mortimer's shoulders. Edward was known to abhor the Treaty of
Northampton, and was much more sympathetic to the Disinherited as a whole, due to
their opposition to Isabella and Mortimer. He would not push the claims of those not
mentioned in the Treaty of Northampton, but it must have been seen as some
improvement to have a monarch who did not see opposition to the Treaty as a threat to
his security.
6 CCR 1327-30, pp 437, 528-9; Foedera, p 796
7 Barbour, pp 178, 188-91
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The last payment of the money owed by the Scots via the Treaty and the general
failure of any further negotiations regarding Beaumont or Wake also signalled a change,
as it removed both any further vested interest on the part of Edward to maintain the
Treaty beyond honour's sake and any reason for Wake and Beaumont to keep their
interests apart from the other Disinherited. Despite an exchange of official
correspondence, 8 Wake and Beaumont received nothing, leaving them no choice in their
minds but to consider other options. As for Edward, no further material advantage could
be expected from a treaty he had opposed and which limited what he felt were rightful
claims in regards to Scotland.
Unable to retrieve his lands in Scotland, Beaumont instead took advantage of
circumstances to retrieve something else from Picardy. While on travels there, he
arranged to bring back Edward Balliol, the eldest son of the former King of Scots, living
in relative obscurity in Picardy. 9 Balliol had on previous occasions attempted to regain
lands and income from Edward II, but had not succeeded. Here was an opportunity to
regain a much grander title than those of his estates in England, and to have aid and help
in doing so. Balliol set up residence at Sandal in Yorkshire, as a guest of the lady Vescy,
Henry Beaumont's sister Isabella.1°
Gaining the support and participation of Edward Balliol was a great coup for the
Disinherited lords in their efforts to regain their lands in Scotland. His claim to the
Scottish throne had stronger legal precedent than that of the Bruces, at least in theory,
through the results of the Great Cause that had selected his father as King of Scotland
8 Foedera, pp 804, 809; CDS, no. 1023
9 Brut, p 274; Baker, p 49; Scotichronicon, pp 64-67, lays blame for Balliol's entry into the adventure on
one Twynam Lourison, an adulterer hounded from Scotland taking revenge
10 Wyntoun, pp 381-2; Pluscarden, p263
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after the death of Alexander III's only remaining heir, the Maid of Norway." The Bruce
claim rested more upon the conquests of the first part of the fourteenth century than the
legal wrangling at the end of the thirteenth. Additionally, Balliol would be attractive to
many of those opposed to the Bruce regime, either through their support of the Comyns
or other similar rivalries, such as those of the men of Galloway with the Bruce holding of
the earldom of Carrick. Rather than simply revolting or carrying rivalries into the
military sphere without any legitimacy, these combatants would be legal combatants
supporting legitimate claims to the kingship in Scotland.
One legal problem with Balliol's claim via the Great Cause was the subsequent
war in Scotland carried out by Edward I. Faced with an alliance between France and
Scotland against England, despite the putative vassalage of Balliol to the crown of
England, Edward I invaded Scotland in 1296. After an initially successful campaign,
John Balliol had to relinquish his claims to the Scottish throne to Edward, and was
removed to the Tower and eventually went into exile in Picardy. 12
 The Balliols would
play no further part in the wars either during Edward I's reign or the reduction and
elimination of English control in Scotland by the Bruces under his son. While the forcible
deposition of John Balliol did call the claim of his son Edward into question, the
difficulty could be sun-nounted provided that the current holder of that authority, Edward
III, would be willing to recognise Balliol's claim as the legitimate one. Implicit in this
circumstance was the subordination of Scotland as a vassal state of England — both by
John Balliol's acknowledgement of it to Edward I and by Edward Balliol resurrecting the
exact claim through Edward III.
The particulars of the Great Cause are nicely detailed in M.C. Prestwich, Edward I (New Haven, 1998),
pp 356-375
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There is no conclusive proof that Edward had given full approval to plans to
remove David Bruce militarily before the Disinherited moved north at the end of July
1332. However, all evidence points to this being likely. Certainly, Edward could not
have missed the signs that major plans were afoot. Major efforts to provide financing for
the expedition were undertaken by the various Disinherited lords, requiring numerous
licenses from the crown. Henry Beaumont gained licenses to lease out the manors of
Loughborough and Whitwick in Leicestershire, while sharing permission with his sister
for Edenham, Barton, and Folkingham in Lincolnshire. 13 Richard Talbot enfeoffed his
relative Thomas with three manors in Gloucestershire, while granting another manor in
Hertfordshire outright to Roger Chauntecler. David Strathbogie rented out the manors of
Stiffkey, Holkham, and West Lexham in Norfolk. 14 Thomas Wake made various
arrangements to raise funds, 15 including granting his Norfolk estate of Stowe Bydon to
Thomas Roscelyn and borrowing 500 marks from the Bardi.16
Wake may have also engaged in more creative methods to finance his part in the
upcoming invasion. May 1332 saw complaint being made by the abbot of Croyland that
Wake and his men had attacked the abbey's fair and lands, stealing massive numbers of
livestock and demanding £500 ransom for their return. The ensuing escalation of
12 M.C. Prestwich, Edward (New Haven, 1998), pp 473-4
CPR 1330-4, p 283
14 CPR 1330-4, pp 305-6
15 Although Nicholson, p 77 points to Wake's dealings with the priory of Haltemprice in Yorkshire as an
example of his efforts to raise money, it is more likely the alienations made in 1332 were continuations of
the dealings of the early part of the year before, when Wake granted lands and meadows worth 64s (CPR
1330-4 p 67), a toft and the advowson of the church in Belton, Haxholm Island (CPR 1330-4, p 151), and
arranged the transfer of the advowson of the church of Elvele to Haltemprice from the abbey of Selby (CPR
1330-4, p 84).
16 CPR 1330-4, p 367; CCR 1330-4, p 614
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problems between Wake and the abbot led to Wake having to stay in England to avoid
armed conflict between his men and the abbot, as ordered by the king. 1 7
Nor did Edward completely ignore the evidence of activity. Writs were issued as
early as October 1331 to prevent the gathering of troops, either under the guise of
tournaments or for transport overseas. I8 Men-at-arms gathering for invading Scotland in
the northern counties were to be arrested by the sheriffs by royal order, according to
orders sent in March of 1332. However, this was counterbalanced by gifts made by the
king such as £500 to Henry Beaumont I9 and the appointment of several prominent
members of the adventure to be commissioners of the peace under the Statute of
Winchester. 20 That the king would appoint several of the men who were 'suspected' of
gathering troops to break the peace with Scotland to keep the peace shows either a
remarkable amount of optimism on Edward III's part or a tacit acceptance or approval of
these men and their choice of action.
As a whole, the Disinherited had a great deal of good will to draw on with
Edward. As mentioned previously, they had been supportive of Edward's attempt to
throw off Mortimer's regency, particularly in the case of Henry Beaumont; most had had
their lands confiscated and fines imposed during the abortive Lancastrian opposition to
Mortimer in 1329, while Beaumont fled overseas in a well-practised manoeuvre to plot in
France against those in control of the crown of England. 21 They also advocated a martial
policy in respect to Scotland much more in tune with the feelings of Edward, who keenly
felt the disappointment of the defeat of the Weardale campaign and the humiliating
17 CPR 1330-4, p 351; CCR 1333-7,p 116
18 CCR 1330-3, pp 397-8
19 CPR 1330-4, p 270
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Treaty of Northampton that followed. Considering that Edward hated the Treaty so much
that he deliberately snubbed his sister's marriage to demonstrate this disapproval, any
supporters of a more hostile course with the northern neighbours would be seen as fellow
travellers, especially when this had placed them in opposition to Mortimer and his
policies.22
Further approval than the appointments to keep the peace, if less public, was
likely given by Edward directly to the Disinherited. Recognising this opportunity to
eliminate the 'Shameful Peace' that he had so opposed during his minority, he agreed to
the invasion according to various chronicles, albeit with certain conditions. First, the
invasion could not be carried out overland from England; such movement would require
Edward's permission to cross the border in violation of the current treaty. However
odious the Treaty of Northampton may have been to Edward, he was bound by its terms
until such time as it was invalid — such as the deposition of David Bruce and a more
acceptable alternative such as Edward Balliol was in his place. Though the gathering of
men and munitions in Yorkshire must have been equally as obvious, Edward could claim
a thin veneer of deniability as to their destination as long as they were merely 'passing
overseas.' This also allowed for Edward to possibly profit even if the gamble failed — by
the confiscation of the Disinherited's property in England for violating the treaty.23
Second, Edward likely received the homage oath of Balliol for Scotland, though
for obvious reasons did not do so publicly. Later letters patent issued by Edward Balliol
in November 1332 indicated that Balliol had already given his homage oath before his
"Richard Talbot (Gloucester), Thomas Wake of Licidel (Lincoln), Henry Beaumont (Lincoln), Fulk
FitzWarin (Shropshire); CPR 1330-4, pp 285-8
21 Foedera, p 796; CCR 1327-30 pp 425, 437, 528, 529
22 Pluscarden, p 257
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departure from England, with full acknowledgement of the sovereignty of England over
Scotland and the oath itself quoted in ft11. 24 This was a sensible precaution, as Edward
III would have little to gain from the deposition of his brother-in-law, no matter how
odious a treaty they had between them, without material gains promised and sworn to for
the English crown. With this oath also came more material enrichments, which would
come to light after the dust had settled in the summer of 1332.
Having gained the crucial acquiescence of Edward, the Disinherited prepared
their force in Yorkshire through the first part of 1332, with the March proclamations
against the gathering of forces to attack Scotland in the northern counties apparently
being ignored by all and sundry. 25 Despite the efforts to raise funds for the expedition,
the number of troops that assembled was rather small. Unlike many battles narrated by
chroniclers, the Disinherited's numbers were not exaggerated at all in the telling. Most
reports put their numbers at about fifteen hundred men, one-third of whom were
cavalry. 26 Such numbers only highlight the necessity of Balliol's participation in the
effort, since the conventional thinking would require that such a group receive large
amounts of local support on landing in Scotland, support that would require a legitimate
claim to back.
Support was expected from Donald of Mar, whose long career had intersected
Beaumont's at numerous points. Both had been major supporters of Edward II until
Beaumont's falling out with the king after the Truce of Bishopthorpe, and both were
named as conspirators to restore Edward II to the throne in 1330 in the confession of the
23 Baker, p 49; Lanercost, p 267
24 Foedera, pp 847-8
25 Foedera, p 833
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Earl of Kent. Though their political interests had differing motivations,27 their mutual
interest in the same causes had given them a long history and acquaintance to draw upon.
Mar was also heavily involved in the Disinherited's original plotting according to the
Lanercost and Bridlington chroniclers, having encouraged Balliol to participate and
assured the Disinherited of his support.28
Mar's possible sympathies for the Disinherited became much more important with
the death on 20 July 1332 of the Earl of Moray, acting as the Guardian of Scotland during
David Bruce's minority. Numerous stories circulated hinting at poison being used by the
Disinherited, as Moray had been the main driving force in maintaining a united front in
opposition to Beaumont and his allies. 29 The timing of the expedition was probably
based in part on Moray's lingering illness, as his death would leave few strong accepted
leaders in Scotland to oppose any strong, well-conceived and well-executed action. Mar,
one of the commanders of the 1327 campaign and closely related to the Bruces through
his mother, was one of the few choices available with both the experience and the status
to be chosen as Moray's replacement.
The need for a replacement to be selected hurriedly was well known. Grey's
Scalacronica tells of the Disinherited petitioning to have their grievances redressed by
Edward III or let them take matters into their own hands. According to the chronicle, the
response from Moray when presented with the threat was to 'let the ball roll'.3°
Scalacronica, p 159; Bridlington, pp 102-6; Lanercost, p 267; Anonimal le, p 150, refers to the force as
2,500 rather than 1,500.
27 Beaumont's motivation appears solely to be the recovery of the earldom of Buchan, while Mar's status as
Earl of Mar was secure. Beaumont's participation in the plot of 1330 would have been triggered by the
Treaty of Northampton and the obstructions that Isabella and Mortimer through it had placed upon his
ambitions.
28 Lanercost, p 267; Bridlington, p 104
29 Wyntoun, p 383; Barbour, p 196; Pluscarclen, pp 262-4; Scotichronicon, pp 72-3
39 Scalacronica, p 159
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Regardless of the veracity of the report i the gathering of men south of the border was
well known, and few doubted the necessity to prepare for military action. Mar was
eventually chosen to fill the post of Guardian, though not without some difficulty.32
The Disinherited sailed from the Yorkshire ports of Ravenser, Barton and Hull on
31 July 1332 northward towards the Firth of Forth, with the intention of landing at
Kinghorn in order to assemble their force and move on Perth, the de facto capital of
Scotland. Invading by sea allowed Beaumont to keep the exact destination secret, forcing
Mar to consider the defence of several different locations. From the Firth of Forth, the
fleet could attack Edinburgh or Stirling, or move farther up the coast to threaten Fife or
Perth. Mar split the forces available to him, placing the southern troops under Patrick,
Earl of March, while taking command of those north of the Firth of Forth himself
The selection of Mar, despite his previous connections with those he was to
defend the country against, secured his loyalties firmly for the Bruce cause. Any help that
he might have been expected to give the Disinherited was not to be forthcoming, despite
any sympathies he might have felt for their circumstances. Unfortunately for him and the
Scots, the taint of the associations would still linger.
Overall, the adventure held a surprising similarity to that undertaken by
Beaumont, Isabella, and Mortimer in 1326. Both had a relatively small force of veteran,
hand-picked troops at their command, transported by sea to a location near enough to
make a direct march on the political centre of the country in question, yet far enough to
avoid overwhelming initial opposition while local support or waverers could choose to
switch sides and join the army in its procession towards political ascendancy. Both
3 I Letters were sent to Moray by Edward in April 1332; CDS, no. 1050; Foedera, p 837; see Nicholson, p
77
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operated under the figurehead of a man with obvious claims to legitimacy to head the
nation, while supported by others with their own agendas. Both expected serious support
from major magnates upon landing, and did not expect a long, drawn-out conflict to
occur. That Beaumont was involved in the planning of both adventures lends credence to
his Scottish attempt in 1332 being modelled on the effort in 1326. The key factor
missing in the Scottish example was the loathing that Edward II had engendered in a
wide swathe of the English political spectrum, and the numerous examples of his
incompetence. Though the minority lent itself to weakness, it also kept David Bruce free
from any negative reactions attached to his Guardians and removed that push towards
Balliol that had existed in England forcing the opposition towards Isabella, Mortimer, and
the young Edward III.
The naval force reached Kinghorn on 6 August 1332, where it was met upon
landing with a local force from Fife under the earl of Fife, Alexander Seton the younger
and Robert Bruce, the illegitimate son of Robert Bruce and Mar's main rival for the
Guardianship. The number of Scots involved is uncertain, varying widely from chronicle
to chronicle; however, the presence of both Fife and Bruce implies a large force, in line
with accounts such as the Lanercost Chronicle which numbers them at around four
thousand. This force was repulsed by archery and a charge by the footmen of the
invaders, killing Alexander Seton the younger. 33 This minor victory was followed up
with a rapid disembarkation of the invading force, which then immediately moved to
Dunfermline Abbey while the fleet made its way around Fife to the Tay. At Dunfermline
32 Scalacronica, p 159; Pluscarden, p 264; Wyntoun, p 384; Scotichronicon, pp 72-3
33 Plus -car den, p 265; Lanercost, p 267; Bridlington, p 104; Scalacronica, p 159; Ttlyntoun, p 384;
Scotichronicon, pp 72-5
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the force spent two days gathering food and supplying itself for the upcoming march,
while arming with five hundred pikes found stored there.
It has been suggested that marching on the abbey at Lindorcs could have served
the same purpose, but that Beaumont and the other leaders of the invaders avoided this in
order to provide them with no escape but victory in marching to Perth via an inland
route. 34 It is unlikely that the Dunfen-nline march was for navigational purposes, as
several of the leaders of the expedition and likely many of the troops had fought
previously in Scotland and were well acquainted with its terrain. Another possible factor
in the choice of Dunfermline is a strategic one, wrapped up in the debatable loyalties of
Donald of Mar. While Beaumont and the others had hopes for Mar's support, they had at
times been on opposing sides and were well aware that their goals simply coincided at
times, rather than were true bedfellows. Because of this, the Disinherited had to balance
finely their actions to allow for Mar to support them should he wish to, while not
compromising their own plans by informing him of them without safeguards.
Considering that Mar was selected Guardian after the Disinherited sailed, they would
have no way to know precisely what Mar's position was upon landing, not where
precisely where he would be or the amount of forces he had to hand. Travelling to
Dunfen-nline would allow them to ascertain Mar's location and whether or not he would
support them, without deviating from their aim of taking Perth.
After the two-day delay at Dunfermline, Balliol and Beaumont moved north, to
find on 10 August their path across the Earn River blocked by Mar, while Dunbar had
rapidly moved his southern force through Stirling up to Auchterarder, less than a day's
34 See War Cruel and Sharp, pp 37-8; Brut, p 275
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march away from the Disinherited at Forteviot. 35 Any hope for Mar's support was
eliminated upon contact with the Scots, and his expressed pity for their plight. 36 The
mismatch in numbers was apparent to all, and the Scots seemed willing to wait until
Dunbar's force had completely cut off any retreat before attacking the Disinherited. They
passed the time carousing and taunting the English. Unfortunately for the partying Scots,
their prey were shown an unguarded ford by a Scot, 37 allowing them to cross the Earn
and use the surprise to mount a night attack on one of the Scottish encampments at Gask,
to great success. The cheer at this initial victory was tempered by morning, as scouts led
by Thomas Vescy and Ralph Stafford discovered the main Scottish force drawn up in two
large battles and moving to engage.
Though Dunbar's southern troops were not in position to join the fight, the
numerical disadvantage the English faced was extreme. No administrative records exist
to give us independent figures from chronicle sources; however, the English chronicles
estimated forty thousand, while the Scots grant thirty thousand. 38 Among these were the
earls of Fife, Moray (the young heir of the deceased Guardian), Menteith, and Mar
himself, along with Mar's rival Robert Bruce and Alexander Fraser. Regardless of which
figure is accepted as to the number of Scots, the disparity was still that of greater than ten
to one. On the other hand, the English troops were cf much better quality than those of
the Scots, specialised soldiers rather than the levies that comprised the main force under
Mar's command. The efforts of the English scouts and Mar's decision to move to engage
also allowed the Disinherited the choice of ground, dismounting the men-at-arms to form
35 Wyntoun, pp 385-6; Pluscarden, p 265; Brut, p276; Sculacronica, p 159; Lanercost, pp 267-8;
Scotichronicon, pp 74-77
36 Bridlington, p 105
37 Wyntoun, pp 387, Scotichronicon, pp 76-77
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a narrow front line flanked by archers in a form to become extremely common in English
military practice over the next century. Only a small body of cavalry was kept in reserve,
though the horses of the men-at-arms were kept at hand to the rear. The entire force was
situated at one end of a narrow glen, restricting the approach path that the Scots would
have to take.39
The haste of the engagement also served to stiffen the resolve of the invaders, as it
gave no opportunity to seek options other than fighting. The sheer size of the opposing
force had caused some trepidation amongst the Disinherited, especially as the promised
support from within Scotland failed to materialise. That same disparity however made
the Scots overconfident, preventing negotiations other than Mar's refusal to support
Balliol and Beaumont, and moving them to engage at dawn on 11 August before any
further discussions could be undertaken between the two forces.°
Though Mar had given over any thought to support the Disinherited, his previous
associations with them came brutally to the fore. According to the Brut, Mar suggested
giving the Disinherited a chance to surrender; this gave to Robert Bruce, Mar's failed
rival for the Guardianship, the opening to accuse Mar of treason in the face of battle.
Mar denied the charges, swearing to strike the Disinherited first as proof. Out of rivalry
or his own failure at Kinghorn, Bruce declared the same, causing the commanders of the
two Scottish battles to order a headlong rush into the enemy and lose the cohesion crucial
to such a battle.41
88 Wyntoun, p 385; Fordun, p 355; Brut, p 277; Lanercost, p 268; Anonimalle, p 148; Bridlington, p 106;
Baker, p 49
39 Bridlington, p 106; Scalacronica, p 160
49 A speech by Fulk Fitzwarin may have also helped morale, but the situation had essentially been one of
'fight or die' since Dunbar's force had moved into position at Auchterarder; see War Cruel and Sharp, pp
41-2 regarding Fitzwarin.
41 Brut, p 276
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Bruce's smaller battle reached the English lines first, forcing the wall of men-at-
arms back twenty or thirty feet. At this point came the curious command from Ralph
Stafford to turn their shoulders to the pikes, not their chests: whether meant figuratively
or literally, it put heart into the English at a desperate point. Unfortunately for the Scots,
the line held, while the arrow storms slashing into the flanks of the formation forced
those men towards the centre, crushing the formation into an immobile mass. The coup
de grace was delivered by Mar, as his force slammed into the rear of Bruce's battle,
attempting to push it forward but accomplishing nothing more than crushing the entire
force together too tightly to manoeuvre, fight, or even breathe. Those who lost their
footing were trampled, and those who did not suffocated while still standing.42
The Disinherited kept their cohesion, and continued the slaughter as long as they
could. Many of the men-at-arms remounted to hunt down survivors attempting to retreat
under Duncan, Earl of Fife. Those not involved in the pursuit continued the bloody work
of killing any in the mass of bodies still alive, leaving a pile of dead several feet high.43
The number of Scots lost, much like the number that came to the field, is uncertain and
varies widely: Scottish chroniclers tend to put the numbers at two or three thousand,"
while the English sources give far higher numbers, with thirteen thousand being the low
figure.45 English casualties were light: two knights and thirty-three esquires being
named, and none of the common soldiery at al1.46
What is certain is the high number of casualties at the top of the Scottish
command. Mar died in the press of his own making, with Bruce also paying the price for
42 Wyntoun, p 388; Bridlington, p 106; Brut, pp 278-9; Scalacronica, p 160; Lanercost, p 268; Pluscarden,
p 266; Scotichronicon, pp 75-9
43 Lanercost, p 268; Brut, p 279; Scalacronica, p 160; Scotichronicon, pp 78-9
44 Wyntoun, p 388; Pluscarden, p 266
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his temper. Menteith, Moray, and Alexander Fraser were also caught in the debacle,
along with a good portion of the Scottish baronage and gentry. Only Fife managed to
escape the death trap, only to be captured during the pursuit. This decimation of the
Scottish force's leadership and its rout at the hand of a tiny force was stunning to the
Scots, who had generally been the winners in conflicts with the English for the past
twenty years. Chroniclers laid blame either on divine providence or the pride of the
Scots.47
Though much has been made of the new generation coming up during this period,
such as Ralph Stafford, 48 it is worth noting that the driving force and the de facto leader
of their expedition was Henry Beaumont — a man whose career had spanned the entire
extent of the Anglo-Scottish wars, and who was by no means a member of the new
generation of Edward III. Though the rise of this new generation of warriors, including a
new monarch untainted by the failure of his father, had set the stage for the changes in
tactics and fortunes of the English, the experience of older fighters such as the earlier
Harclay and Beaumont allowed for the development and initial use of the innovations.
The psychological blow that this loss inflicted on the Scots coloured the reactions
of the other Scottish host advancing on the Disinherited and its leader, Patrick, Earl of
March (Dunbar). While the Disinherited moved into an unresisting Perth and frantically
shored up the defences in preparation for Dunbar's assault, the earl paused for several
days to gather more men and prepare siege equipment. An attack on the English ships
supporting the force in Perth on 24 August was the final straw, as the pirates under the
45
46
47 
Anonimalle, p 150; Melsa, p 364
Anonimalle, p 150; Knighton, p 463; Melsa, p 364
Wyntoun, p 389; Bridlington, p 107; Lanercost, p 269; Scalacronica, p 160; Scotichronicon, p 79
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Fleming John Crabbe were routed after an initial success against Beaumont's personal
ship.49 Faced with rapidly dwindling supplies and no ability to cut off the Disinherited
from further outside support, Dunbar chose to disband his force rather than assault a force
with the benefit of Perth's palisade that had so readily beaten the Scots already without
such an advantage.50
The dissolution of the last major force opposing the Disinherited signalled the
beginning of a rapid retrenchment of magnates in eastern Scotland wanting to protect
their personal interests and side with the now victorious interlopers. The Earl of Fife,
already having retreated from two conflicts with Balliol's forces, now came over to
Balliol's side, as did a major portion of the ecclesiastical community in the region. 51 By
24 September, Balliol was sufficiently secure to have himself crowned as King of Scots
at the abbey of Scone, the traditional coronation site. The Bishop of Dunkeld, William
Sinclair, carried out the ceremony, with Duncan, Earl of Fife, as the major lay
representative in the ceremony. James Ben, the Bishop of St. Andrews who normally
would have carried out the coronation, refused to, preferring exile.52
Elsewhere, the conflict was only beginning. Encouraged by the return of a Balliol
to a semblance of power in Scotland, the men of Galloway rose up under Eustace
Maxwell and engaged the Bruce supporters in the sokth, particularly Patrick Dunbar and
Alexander Bruce, earl of Carrick. 53 As Dunbar and Bruce were joined by Mar's
replacement as Guardian, Sir Andrew Murray, John Randolph, earl of Moray, and
48 See J. Bothwell, 'Edward III and the 'New Nobility': Largesse and Limitation in Fourteenth-Century
England', EHR, v. 112 no. 449 (1997) pp 1111-1140, as an example
49 Bridlington, p 107-8; Wyntoun, pp 389-91; Anonimalle, p 150; Baker p49; Lanercost, p 269
89 Bridlington, p 108; Brut, p 279; Scalacronica, p 161
8I Brut, p 280; Wyntoun, p 392; Lanercost, p 269; Scotichronicon, pp 80-1
82 Pluscarden, p 267; Lctnercost, p 269; Scotichronica pp 82-83
83 Lanercost, p 269; Anonimalle, p 152
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Archibald Douglas, the Balliol partisans were overmatched. Despite this, they were left
to their own devices until after the coronation of Balliol, who then moved quickly south
to rescue one of the few overt movements of support for his new reign.
The effectiveness of Balliol's forces earlier came into play again, as their
presence over the next two months caused many to submit rather than try their arms
directly against the Disinherited army. Among these was Alexander Bruce, though others
had to be subdued by more forceful means. An attempted ambush at Jedburgh at the
beginning of October achieved little more than the capture of Robert Lauder the
younger, 54 while an even bolder action at Roxburgh cost them even more dearly.
Balliol's forces had taken up residence in the ruins of the castle there, while Balliol
visited the abbey of Kelso, across the Tweed via a single bridge. Murray attempted to
catch the English unawares and smash the bridge to isolate Balliol away from his forces.
The attempt was detected, and Murray was captured during the reverse. Also captured
was John Crabbe, who had led the Flemish pirates who had attacked the Disinherited's
fleet in August. 55 With yet another Guardian eliminated from action by Balliol's forces
and the loss of one of the few mercenary captains of skill available to the Scots, a crisis
of leadership was brewing for the Bruce pal tisans that would have to be answered in the
coming months for their cause to survive. For the moment, the role of Guardian fell to
Archibald Douglas, brother of the famous James Douglas who had made his name during
the fight against Edward II and who died carrying Robert Bruce's heart into battle in
Spain.56
54 Scalacronica, p 161
55 Scalacronica, p 161; Lanercost, p 270; Anonimalle, pp 152-4; Bridlington, p 109; Wyntoun, pp 396-7
56Scotichronicon, pp 82-83; Fordun, p356; James's death: Scotichronicon, pp 66-73
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While Balliol's army was achieving successes, his partisans elsewhere, lukewarm
or otherwise were suffering reverses. Though Balliol had gone a long way towards
securing the south, the cost was paid on 7 October 1332 with the loss of Perth to an
assault by forces of Simon Fraser, Robert Keith, and John Lindsay. Unsurprisingly, the
Earl of Fife switched sides once again, and the town's defences were destroyed.57
Balliol's writ ran only where Balliol himself was; the native support he had hoped to
gather appeared only in the south where he was now operating, and the anaemic support
of turncoats such as Fife seemed guaranteed to disappear at the first contact with an
opponent.
All of this martial activity on behalf of both Bruce and Balliol did not go
unnoticed or unremarked upon south of the border. Edward III appointed Henry Percy
warden of the March on 10 August, after receiving a report from Roger Mauduit and
Roger Heron that the Scots were alarmed at Beaumont's expedition, which was at that
moment reaching the Earn river in its move towards Perth and Dupplin. This report from
the Northumberland knights allowed Edward to take precautions without appearing in
collusion with the Disinherited. 58 Edward was not yet ready to involve himself directly
in events in Scotland, but kept a keen eye on events.
October brought further action in Edward's court, alongside the preparations for a
possible policy change away from the relative aloofness with which the new conflict
north of the border had been treated to this time. Parliament had been called into session
on 8 September in order to make arrangements for a campaign in Ireland in support of the
English administration there. The events north of the border necessitated a change in
87 Wyntoun, p 394; Scotichronicon pp 82-3; Lanercost pp 269-70
58 CDS, no. 1057
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these plans: the planned expedition to Ireland was cancelled while a tenth and fifteenth
tax was issued for the specific defence of the realm against the Scots. 59 Regardless of
Edward's attempts to stay publicly aloof from the fighting north of the border, the
English origins of the invaders made England vulnerable to possible counterattack. Writs
for the array of two thousand troops in Lancashire, Yorkshire, Derbyshire and Cheshire
were issued on 7 October, to further bolster the defence of the north, while summons
were issued on 20 October for a new parliament to discuss the rapid change of events in
Scotland in December.6°
While Balliol settled into Kelso Abbey to begin dealing with the administrative
work of securing his hold and that of his followers on Scotland, Edward III continued
playing his game of wait-and-see. The former justiciar of Ireland, John Darcy, was sent to
meet for negotiations with two envoys from the Bruce faction in late October. 61 At the
same time, Edward had little difficulty accepting the captives Andrew Murray and John
Crabbe whom Balliol sent south to him, taking the opportunity to subvert Crabbe to his
own service after purchasing the Fleming's captivity from his own household knight,
Walter Mauny. 62 The appearance of relative impartiality was severely marred on 23
November, when Balliol issued letters patent detailing the supposed agreement between
himself and Edward III, reached before the Disinherited's departure from England.63
This agreement acknowledged that the kingship of Scotland was held of the King of
England by homage and fealty, with the exact form supposedly used at the time of
swearing given. Further details outlined the relationship and defined its terms, including
59 CPR 1330-4, p 323; Rot Par!, pp 66-7
Foedera, p 846; Rot Par!, p 69
61 Foedera, p 847
62 Wyntoun, pp 396-7; Bridlington, p 109; Lanercost, p 270; PRO E4031270 (1 October 1333)
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the military service owed to the English crown and the renewal of the bonds of homage
by both Edward's heirs.
Key to this agreement was the tangible repayment of Edward III's covert approval
of the coup. Land worth £2000 was to be transferred permanently into English control to
be part of England proper, including the rich port of Berwick. The port was the largest
town in Scotland at the time, along with having the highest income from customs duties
due to the wool trade from Lothian, Tweeddale, and Teviotdale - £640 a year on
average. 64 There were few alternatives to Berwick, as the nearest major port was Perth.
Unfortunately, the cession of lands to England had the same difficulties for the Scottish
crown as ceding sovereignty over Scotland had had for the English crown — any monarch
willing to make the concession would heavily damage their own legitimacy in
collaborating with his foreign rival.
In November 1332, this did not appear to be a great worry for Balliol. The
victory at Roxburgh and Murray's capture there had apparently put an end to Scottish
resistance for the moment: according to English chroniclers, Archibald Douglas and
Patrick Dunbar entered into a truce with Balliol until 2 February so that a parliament
could be held to reconcile the two sides. With hostilities disposed of, Balliol's army
could disperse, having dealt with the military opposition. 65 So far, Balliol and Beaumont
had had little occur differently in their campaign than had occurred for Isabella and
Mortimer. Beaumont and Strathbogie made their way south to the English parliament in
December, in order to present the changed circumstances in Scotland to the Parliament
63 Foedera, pp 847-8
64 J. Campbell, 'England, Scotland and the Hundred Years' War', in The Wars of Edward III, ed. C. Rogers
(Woodbridge, 1999), p 206
65 Anonirnalle, p 152; Knighton, p 465; Melsa, pp 366-7
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and Balliol's letters regarding his deal with Edward 111. 66 Beaumont, in turn, was
appointed to deal with Balliol on Edward's behalf on 17 December.67
Edward had received little support for direct involvement in the war north of the
border: memories were too strong of the previous reign's wars, along with the campaign
of 1327. The September parliament had granted a tax of a tenth and a fifteenth for the
defence of the realm against the Scots. although by no means was this an endorsement for
offensive action north of the Tweed. 68 The parliament in early December failed to
provide Edward III either with support for reclaiming direct lordship over Scotland or in
becoming directly involved with the civil war then brewing. Edward, despite Balliol's
letters to the contrary, was claiming not to have taken sides: even after three days of
deliberations, neither could parliament. 69 The parliament was recessed until 20 January,
as it appeared that the situation in Scotland was well in hand.
In the short space of two years the Disinherited had succeeded in completely
reversing their fortunes in Scotland, thanks to the death of leaders such as the Earl of
Moray in Scotland and the tacit support of a newly independent Edward III chafing to be
rid of the 'Shameful Peace'. They had won a major victory over a far superior Scottish
force using tactics that were a departure from those seen in 1327, and had succeeded in
eliminating or capturing most of the competent Scottish leaders. However, the retaking
of Perth by Bruce partisans in October signalled that the support for Balliol's regime was
not nearly as secure as the Disinherited could wish. This weakness would be highlighted
all too well by events in the upcoming months.
66 Lanercost, p 270; Bridlington, p 109; Scalacronica, p 161
67 CDS, no. 1071
68 Rot Par!, pp 66-7
69 Rot Par!, p 67
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By December of 1332, the Disinherited had made great strides towards taking
control of Scotland and regaining their lost lands and titles. They had successfully
defeated the main Scottish army under Donald of Mar at Dupplin Moor and forced the
young Scottish king, David Bruce, to flee to Dumbarton to avoid capture. Edward
Balliol, having asserted his claim to the Scottish throne at Scone, then moved southward
to support his adherents in Galloway against remnants of the Bruce faction. This wave of
success was fragile, as the support for Balliol amongst the native Scottish magnates was
lukewarm at best, and the English parliament showed scarce more interest providing aid
for his regime. Only a major reversal in Balliol's fortunes in December 1332 convinced
Edward and the English Parliament to intervene to defeat the Scots, restore Balliol and
gain a great deal of territory in the bargain.
Edward had been treating Balliol's faction with more warmth as their fortunes
improved in the fall of 1332, though he was not supporting Balliol openly with the fate of
Scotland still not fully settled. The ability to take such a middle course ended abruptly on
17 December, when an attack by Archibald Douglas and the earl of Moray caught Balliol
by surprise at Annan, killing his brother Henry amongst a number of other supporters and
sending him flying across the border to Carlisle. 1 Alongside the previous loss of Perth
and the dispersal of his faction, the ambush at Annan left Balliol without any of the gains
the Disinherited had made in the previous year, and the aura of invincibility that had
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followed him from Dupplin Moor was gone. Having dissipated much of their wealth and
ability to raise troops earlier in the year, the Balliol faction was dependent on the
intervention of Edward III to reverse the tide.
Such a reverse as Annan was not likely to make the English parliament more
amenable to armed intervention in Scotland. When the December parliament reconvened
on 20 January, it singularly failed to support any intervention north of the border. 2 Any
actions Edward wished to take either on his own behalf or that of Balliol would not have
the support of new taxes levied to help pay for them. This did not deter Edward, as he
began ordering the raising of troops before the month was out. 3 While parliament had
been put off adventuring in Scotland, Edward III realised that the failure of Balliol and
his 'English' supporters would irretrievably damage any future attempt to reverse the
Treaty of Northampton and reassert sovereignty over Scotland.
A rapid flurry of decisions gave permission for Balliol and the Disinherited to
invade from England while the necessary machinery for Edward to invade Scotland
himself was put in place. On 20 February, the exchequer and chancery were transferred to
York as had become customary during the active campaigning periods of the Scottish
wars, while Manent Francisci of the Bardi was entrusted with the purveyance and
collection of over 15,000 quarters of wheat and 22,100 quarters of oats as the core
supplies of what promised to be a major campaign. 4 The tenth and fifteenth agreed on in
September 1332 proved providential; the abbot of St. Mary's was appointed receiver of
the moneys from the northern counties in order to provide the funds necessary for
1 Wyntoun, pp 394-5; Lanercast, pp 270-1; Scalacronica, p 161; Scotichronicon, pp 82-5; Bridlington, pp
109-10; Pluscarden, p 267
2 Rot Parl, p69
3 CPR 1330-4, pp 400-1
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prosecuting the preparations for war. 5 The grant meant to be spent defending the realm
from the Scots would instead be used to campaign against them. Much of it was
immediately disbursed as gifts to both the Disinherited and English lords without a direct
stake in Scotland who planned to join in the upcoming campaign.6
Of necessity, the terms of homage that had been published by Balliol in
November 1332 but not confin-ned by Edward III at the December parliament were now
put fully and publicly into effect. On 12 February Balliol confirmed the letters patent
from November, with Alexander Mowbray and John Felton acting as proxy, swearing
upon Balliol's soul to uphold the provisions of the homage oath. 7 Combined with the
large amount of funds being channelled to Balliol, this oathtaking allowed Edward to cast
the campaign as the reclamation of rights unfairly removed from Balliol's grasp. Though
a heavy price was expected later for that support, there was not the attempt at taking
Scotland solely for the English crown that Edward may have been contemplating during
the winter parliament.
Balliol's force was large, with a number of prominent magnates from the
Disinherited and England proper, including a number of Edward's own household
bannerets such as William Montague and Ralph Neville. It even included Henry
Lancaster (the earl of Lancaster's son, also known as Grosmont), Richard FitzAlan, earl
of Arundel, and Henry Percy, who had avoided dealings with the Disinherited after
settling his grievances in Scotland in previous years. Despite this preponderance of royal
and baronial influence, this group did operate independently of Edward's army, being the
4 CCR 1333-7, pp 18-19; CPR 1330-4 p 409
5 CPR 1330-4, p 395
6 CCR 1333-7, pp 7-8
7 Bridlington, p 111; Muninuth, p 67; Foedera, p 853
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first to enter Scotland in either late February or early March. 8 The suggestion that the
confusion of dates was due to several contingents entering Scotland separately is
credible. 9 With the large force financed by both the crown and the resources of the
English lords not present during the previous year, Balliol and his troops could expect
circumstances to be more like the triumphant procession into Galloway of the previous
year, rather than the ignominious retreat forced upon them after the premature dispersal
of their forces. In addition, any checks would likely receive the full attention of the royal
forces soon to follow.
Though Balliol's army had gathered at Carlisle, the expectation all round was that
Berwick would be the focus of the campaign. While the lands to be handed to Edward
III had not been defined, the one notable exception to this was Berwick and the
surrounding countryside. Combined with its economic importance, its port, its
population, and its fortifications, few other targets would have made immediate sense.
Both Roxburgh and Edinburgh were ruins, having been slighted by Robert Bruce; the
nearest major strong point on the east coast was Stirling. 10 As it was to be handed to
Edward III, his primary goal would be to get it into English hands as quickly as possible,
both for garrisoning it and for supplying the army, who otherwise depended on supplies
shipped in either at Carlisle's port at Skinburness or Newcastle-upon-Tyne.
By 13 March, the army from Carlisle had reached Berwick and begun the siege.
The defences of Berwick had been entrusted to Patrick Dunbar, earl of March and
8 Anonimalle, p 154; Lanercost, p 272; Scalacronica, p 162; Wyntoun, p 298
9 War, Cruel and Sharp, p 59
I ° Dunbar was in need of repair at this time, and would not be strengthened until the following year. CDS,
no. 1115, 1126
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Alexander Seton. 11 Defending Berwick was an important, though inevitable departure
from the Scottish defensive strategies south of the Firth of Forth of the previous thirty
years. Under Robert Bruce, the majority of fortifications in southern Scotland had been
slighted and rendered as indefensible as possible. Experience had shown that the castles
provided little advantage against the vastly larger resources of the English crown and
provided bases for the English to extend their power over the countryside once they had
been taken. Operating on their own ground, the Scots did not require such a strong
fallback position, but could avoid conflict and strike at the supply lines of the invaders or
into England itself on destructive raids. Defending Berwick therefore was against the
grain of Scottish military policy. However, its economic importance required the Scots
to hold it for their long-term prospects, and denying the English its use as a forward
supply base would greatly lengthen their supply lines and complicate their activities in
Scotland.
Berwick was not the only exception to the destruction of fortresses in the south.
Lochmaben, on the river Annan in eastern Galloway, was also kept intact and garrisoned,
though it lacked the economic importance of Berwick. Despite the concentration on
Berwick's riches as the reason for its defence, it seems likely that both Berwick and
Lochmaben were meant to be actively defended, as both sat on the main invasion routes
from Northumberland and Carlisle, respectively. Also, the occasional mention of smaller
keeps and towers such as that taken by Balliol's forces at Oxnam just before besieging
Berwick points to the policy of destroying castles being focused on those large enough to
provide bases for large garrisons and significant supplies.12
I I Scotichronicon, pp 88-9
12 Knighton, p 466; Nicholson deduced the actual fortress taken in Edward III and the Scots, p 110
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Rather than attack Balliol's force during its siege, the Scots under Archibald
Douglas resorted to the tried and true tactic of raiding into Northumberland and
Cumberland and attempting to force a lifting of the siege in order to try to halt the
damage being caused by raiding. I3 The tactic had been very successful in 1319 when
Edward II had attempted to regain the town after its loss the previous year. Unfortunately
for Douglas, he failed to take into account the exact nature of the force then besieging
Berwick. Though many of the men attacking Berwick held lands in Cumberland and
Northumberland, that army was not an army of the English crown with responsibilities of
defending Northumberland; the rationale was that it was an army of 'Scots', or men with
Scottish claims, prosecuting a siege on behalf of a claimant to the Scottish crown. Their
overriding interests were in Scotland, and had no responsibility to respond to attacks on
England.
Because of this, the besiegers ignored the raids, while Edward III finally had his
casus belli with which to change opinion in England to fully support the war.
Technically, England had not entered the war: it merely had allowed Balliol to re-enter
his own kingdom from English territory, and to allow Englishmen to go with him should
they so wish. That the logic was completely specious and self-serving was irrelevant for
Edward III's purposes: regardless of the validity of the claims, it allowed him to portray
the Scottish raids in the worst possible light. Whether in letters to other European
monarchs or in writs issued within England, the claim that the Scots had broken the peace
was used repeatedly to justify the upcoming and fully-planned campaign. 14
Lanercost, p 273; Knighton, p 466
14 Foedera, pp 855-7, 860, 862
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While the forces being collected were to be at Newcastle by 30 May, Edward had
decided to move north weeks earlier, arriving at the siege by 9 May. Balliol's party had
already done much of the initial preparation for the siege before the king's arrival. The
town's outside water supplies had been cut off by the destruction of four water conduits
leading to the town, while the besieging force's camp and siege lines had been fortified to
reduce the possibility of successful relief effort. 15 English ships, in case of any attempts
by either Scottish vessels or a rumoured French relief force, were also blocking resupply
lines by sea.16
With the arrival of the royal reinforcements, the siege moved from a relatively
lukewarm stage of blockade and local raiding to a hot stage of assaults and bombardment
from siege weapons, including guns. I7 Two major attacks on 18 and 20 May signalled a
period of regular assaults and bombardment that would last until 27 June. Interspersed
with these attacks were negotiations with the town's garrison to convince Dunbar and
Seton to surrender before an assault carried Berwick by ston-n.
It was in the best interests of Edward III for a negotiated settlement to be carried
out: the bombardment was causing heavy damage both to the walls of the town and the
buildings within it, while the privations of the siege and the lack of food from several
weeks of hardship were taking a toll on the town's populace. 18 As Berwick was to be
handed over to the English crown, damaging such an economic prize when avoidable
made little sense. For the garrison's part, arranging a truce preceding surrendering on
ten-ns would allow them relief from the constant pressure of attacks and bombardment,
15 Brut, p 281; Melsa, p 378
16 The French force never sailed; see War Cruel and Sharp, p 63
17 Brut, p 281
18 Brut, p 282
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along with safeguarding their lives should no relief be forthcoming. Such negotiations
were not unusual, and no chronicler describes them as out of the ordinary. The key for
the English was to place the garrison in dire enough straits so as to convince them of the
need to come to terms; thus the continued assaults and bombardment, rather than simply
resorting to blockade.
The breaking point came on 26 June. A large-scale attack commenced by both
the besiegers on land and the fleet blockading the harbour, which assaulted the sea wall at
high tide. The garrison had foreseen such an attack, and had made preparations to burn
the ships when they closed. Unfortunately, they did not make adequate preparations for
protecting the town's buildings while carrying out the attack. The resulting inferno
devastated much of the town, forcing the garrison to seek a truce while trying to bring it
under control. This was granted, with the besiegers believing that the town would be
surrendered to them in return on the next day. This belief was dashed when Alexander
Seton refused to surrender the town after the garrison successfully controlled the
flames. 19 An additional assault caused another change of heart; a fifteen-day truce was
soon agreed on, backed up with the giving of twelve hostages to Edward as surety that
the town would be surrendered if not relieved by outside forces by 11 July.
This arrangement suited Edward III perfectly. It forced Archibald Douglas, who
had been gathering as large a force as possible while the English were occupied at
Berwick, to take one of three courses of action. He could either allow the garrison to
surrender, invalidating the strategy that saw Berwick defended in the first place; he could
engage the English army head-o h with the forces at his disposal; or he could find a way
19 Pluscarden, p 268; Lanercost, p 273; Scalacronica, p 162; Wyntoun, p 398; Brut, p 281; Bridlington, p
112
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to bypass the English and relieve the town through another route. The last would be
difficult with both land and sea approaches covered, but was the path Douglas resolved
upon. Crossing the Tweed at the Yair Ford upstream from the besiegers, 2° the Scots
made a demonstration of Tweedmouth by razing it to the ground. The demonstration
went unheeded; despite threats by the Scots to continue the raiding southward, Edward
was firmly committed to taking Berwick. 21
 Even the threat of besieging Bamburgh to
capture Queen Philippa was ineffective.
More effective was the crossing of a force of two hundred by the ford leading
from Tweedmouth to Berwick's southern gate that evening. Though cavalry under
William Montague attacked this force before it reached safety, enough of the troop made
entry into the town for the Scots to consider the town 'relieved', and for the head of the
relief force, William Keith, to take over as warden. 22
 The difficulty lay in the
interpretation of 'relieved', and in the particular manner in which it was carried out.
Specifically, the truce agreement had specified entering the town from the Scottish side;
as a result, Edward demanded the surrender of the town. When Keith and the garrison
refused, Edward emphasised his position by hanging Thomas Seton, son of the just-
relieved warden of the town, and threatening further reprisals. The hurried negotiations
resulting from such harsh tactics led to a new agreement being hammered out that left no
possible room for disagreement. Further hostages were given to Edward, and the truce
was to last until the morning of 20 July. The town could be relieved in three ways; either
by crossing the Berwick stream to the west and engaging the English successfully; from
20	 •	 •This l ies (appropriately enough) by the village of Yair, upstream and to the west of the current town of
Galashiels. The route was later known as a favoured reavers' route in the sixteenth century. It was
sufficiently far west that the English army would have had no ability to intercept the Scottish army until it
was in England and moving east along the south bank of the Tweed.
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the north, between the Tweed and the sea; or by forcing a company of two hundred men-
at-anns through the English into Berwick with less than thirty losses. No relief by sea or
from England would count. William Keith was given leave to ride to Douglas to inform
him of the terms, to allow him to engage as he would to attempt to relieve the town.
Should the relief fail, the town would then surrender. The terms were lenient; the
garrison would be spared, as would their goods, buildings, offices, etc. No laws would
change, and those who wished to continue in the town could do so without any fines,
while those who wished to leave had forty days, and the ability to do with their property
as they saw fit.23
This indenture eliminated the last room for manoeuvre available to Archibald
Douglas. He had to engage the English on ground of their choosing and their timing.
Perversely, this indenture also served the purposes of one of Douglas's rivals; it freed the
Earl of March to be in a position of power regardless of who succeeded in winning the
upcoming fight. Douglas had no such reassurances, and the short period between
William Keith's departure to find Douglas on 16 July and the anticipated surrender date
on the 20 th meant that he had little time to pull his troops back from ravaging
Northumberland and prepare for battle at Berwick.
Moving quickly, Douglas reached Duns by the end of 18 June, setting the stage
for the battle the next day. 24 Edward chose his ground with care, preparing his lines on
Halidon Hill, a rise to the northwest of the town that covered both approaches to the city
and guaranteed that both armies would clash well before Berwick could be reached by
21 Scalacronica, p 162-3; Wyntoun, p 399; Melsa, p 369
22 Bridlington, p 113; Scalacronica, p 163; Foedera, pp 865-6
23 Foedera, pp 864-5
24 Wyntoun, p 399
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any Scottish troops. In a nod to the two hundred picked Scots sure to try to break through
to Berwick, two hundred English men-at-arms stood by to engage them. 25 The rest of the
men-at arms, bar a rear guard of five hundred to block the Berwick garrison from sallying
forth,26 formed into three battles of dismounted men-at-arms, each flanked in some
manner by wings of archers. 27 Edward III commanded the centre, while his brother John
of Eltham and the constable Edward Bohun commanded the right-hand battle. As the
putative King of Scots, Edward Balliol had command of the left-hand battle. There
seems to have been no distinction made between the various Disinherited magnates or
those directly under Edward III, as Henry Beaumont and the earls of Atholl and Angus
were in Eltham's battle, rather than with Balliol. The tactics were essentially those of
Dupplin Moor, on a larger scale. The Scots in turn moved around under the cover of hills
to the north of Berwick to take up positions on the hill north of Halidon, before making
their final assault.28
The size of the two opposing forces is indeterminate; no direct records exist for
the Scottish force at all, while the English army, though well documented from 1334
onward, does not have any pay roll records surviving. The Scottish force must have been
large, though not nearly so large as the fanciful numbers recounted by chroniclers such as
Wyntoun or Bridlington. 29 Seven earls fought alongside Douglas, and he had had several
months to gather troops from across Scotland. The most reasonable chronicle puts the
25 Bridlington, pp 114-5
26 Baker, p51
27 Bridlington, pp 114; Brut, p 285; Lanercost, p 274
28 Kelly DeVries' statement that the Scots chose the battle site on Halidon hill is erroneous; Edward III had
had two months to choose precisely where to fight an opposing army should one appear, and the nature of
the agreed terms of surrender of Berwick meant that Douglas and the Scots had to force the issue and attack
the English, as a standoff or draw would still leave the town in English hands by the next day. Kelly
DeVries, Infantiy Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Centioy (Woodbridge, 1996), pp 121-4
29 60,000: Wyntoun, p 369; Bridlington, p 115
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Scots at roughly 15,000 men. 30 These were arrayed in three separate schiltrons, or
battles. The earl of Moray, John Randolph, led the first, Robert Stewart, David Bruce's
Scottish heir the second and Archibald Douglas the third.31
It is similarly hard to determine the size of the English army, though most
chroniclers agreed it was noticeably smaller than the Scottish force. 32 Rogers'
supposition of thirteen thousand as a high point seems plausible, as does his estimation of
less than ten thousand men by the time of the battle. In 1300, Edward I undertook a
similar campaign close to the border to attack Caerlaverock Castle in Galloway; though
no major engagements other than that brief siege occurred, the army suffered a forty
percent loss in troops in two months due to desertion and combat loss. 33 Considering the
repeated assaults on Berwick in addition to a similar time spent in the field, it would
seem highly likely that Edward suffered similar casualty rates, if not greater. This would
have left under eight thousand men by the time of the battle in July. Edward's concern
about desertion and loss reinforces this feeling, as several letters and writs made clear his
feelings regarding the shrinking army.34
The proceedings began with a single combat in which Robert Benhale, one of
Edward's household knights, killed a Scottish champion named Turnbull. 35 The combat
between the armies promised to be less equal. The English were well placed for battle on
Halidon, blocking the approaches to Berwick and holding the high ground. The Scots, on
the other hand, had to descend from their hill, cross a bog at the saddle between the hills,
and then struggle up the slope of Halidon before even engaging the foe. In addition, the
30 Hemingburgh, pp 308-9
31 Brut, p 283; Bridlington, pp 115-6; Lanercost, p 274
32 Scalacronica, p 163; Wyntoun, p 399; Brut, p 285; Hemingburgh, p 308
33 Liber Quotidianus Controtulatoris Garderobiae 1299-1300, ed. J. Topham et al (1787), pp 249-54
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Scots chose to dismount their men-at-anns as well, which would slow the attack and
exhaust the men having to struggle over the difficult terrain. Had more time been
available, the Scots could perhaps have manoeuvred to make for a more equal contest;
unfortunately for them, the deadline of the truce precluded anything other than a frontal
assault.
The net result was that the English forces would be significantly outnumbered,
although without the crushing ratio that had been defeated at Dupplin Moor. However,
the English forces were almost certainly of better quality, raised to fight an offensive war
rather than for home defence, and were likely to be overall more heavily armed and
armoured than their opposing counterparts. Also, the makeup of the English forces was
eminently suited for fighting the mass of foot infantry that comprised the Scottish force,
with the large wings of archers allowing great damage to be done well before the
spearmen of the Scottish army could engage their opponents.
The result was a slaughter. Left exhausted by the difficult terrain and the climb
up the high hil1,36 the Scots found themselves on the receiving end. of a brutal drubl5mg
delivered by storms of arrows and the spears and swords of the English men-at-arms.
Moray's battle engaged Balliol, while Stewart's troop hit the centre and Edward III.
Neither lasted long under the hail of arrows and the impact with the waiting English men-
at-arms; Moray's battle had fallen apart before Stewart's had even engaged, though the
latter soon followed, either from the losses it was suffering or from the morale loss it took
on seeing Moray's forces break and attempt to leave the field. Douglas fared somewhat
better, as his battle contained those two hundred men chosen to try to break through and
34 CCR 1333-7, p 117; Rot Scot, pp 244, 249
35 Baker, p 51
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enter Berwick in fulfilment of the third condition of the siege teiins. As the battle fell
apart around the Scots, a remnant under Hugh of Ross made a last stand; this earned the
admiration and note of chroniclers on both sides, though it failed to do more than provide
a last heroic note to Ross's death.37
The rout became total as the English men-at-arms mounted their horses kept near
their lines for such an opportunity and pursued the dissolving Scottish host for six to
eight miles, killing many and turning the defeat into an utter catastrophe. 38 Any Scots
leaving the field had to do so on foot, as the grooms holding the horses of the dismounted
soldiers fled as the defeat became apparent, using the horses for their own escape and
leaving the others including the magnates to their fate. 39 Only nightfall caused the
slaughter to cease, but the damage had already been done. The English had decimated
the Scottish force, especially its leadership. The five earls of Carrick, Lennox, Ross,
Sutherland, and the Scottish claimant to Atholl, John Campbell, were all left dead on the
field, as was Archibald Douglas, three brothers of Robert Stewart, several of the
prominent Fraser family, and others the chroniclers felt it too lamentable to name in
full.° The rank and file also suffered severely , klmnagl-‘ kicw, cVlo'i1NC.V.S •13 .\&\ *vivx-ve,
numbers reported. Scottish sources tend to put the number at around ten thousand all
told, while the English chroniclers tend to use far more inflated figures. 41 Regardless of
the numbers, there was no doubt in either side's mind that the Scottish army had been
singularly ill-used.
36 Scotichronicon, pp 92-3
37 Wyntoun, p 401; Scotichronicon, pp 92-3 (though Bower has Ross's contingent fighting Balliol, not
Eltham and Beaumont); Bridlington, p 116; Lanercost, p 274
38 Baker, p 52; Melsa, p 370
39 Brut, p 285; Murimuth, p 68; Bridlington, p 116; Baker, p 52; Melsa, p 370
40 Scotichronicon, pp 92-3; Fordun, p 356
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Their opponents, on the other hand, seem to have barely suffered at all. English
sources tell of only a handful dead during the battle, either seven or fourteen men
depending on the chronicle.42
 The contrast was striking, and numerous reasons were
given as to why the Scots suffered such a defeat. Scottish sources focus on their pride, or
the 'stupid reasoning' of the people of Berwick to convince Douglas to fight. 43
 Nearly all
mention the deadly work of the archers. While the usual attributions to divine favour
were often given,'" few appear to have missed the more corporeal tactic behind the
Scottish rout.
The consequences were immediate, and sizeable. With the destruction of the
Scottish relief force, Keith, Seton and Dunbar were left with no recourse but to surrender
Berwick by the terms of the truce agreement. The Earl of March profited handsomely,
receiving vast sums in return for changing allegiance to Edward's side and supporting the
newly ascendant regime. In addition, he profited from the intransigence of his own
tenants; those who did not come over with Dunbar to the king's peace saw their lands
forfeited and placed in the earl's all too willing hands. 45
 A major portion of these
proceeds went to rebuilding his castle at Dunbar, apparently at the behest. of Xar XW46
It would prove to be a worthwhile investment for Dunbar in future years, though it is
questionable, considering his unique position straddling both factions, whether he would
have chosen to do so without the pressure from the English crown.
41 Scotichronicon, pp 92-3; Wyntoun, p 402 for the Scot sources; the English sources vary from the Brut's
35,712 to Baker's 60,000; Brut, p 286, Baker, p 52
42 Fourteen: Melsa, p 370; Bridlington, p 116; Seven, Brut, p 288. Baker does not list the English losses;
neither do the Scot sources.
43 For the former, Wyntoun, p 403; the latter, Scotichronicon, pp 90-1
44 see Lanercost, p 274 for a prime example
45 CDS , nos. 1115, 1121, 1126
46 Scalacronica, p 163; Scotichronicon, pp 92-3
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In contrast was Edward III's ordering the execution of those taken captive during
the battle, rather than allowing negotiations for individual ransoms. Neither side had
shown an inclination for the siege and attempted relief to be anything more than a fight to
the death,47 so those not protected by the terms of the surrender had to face the
consequences of being the loser in a conflict purportedly between two men claiming the
crown of Scotland. The severity of this order was likely influenced by the resounding
nature of the victory involved, the consideration of the men fighting as essentially being
rebels against the lawful king, and by the unlikelihood of the men who had fought the
relief effort of being capable of reconciliation with Balliol and his adherents. Dunbar and
the garrison of Berwick, by making terms for their surrender, had demonstrated an ability
to come to some understanding with Balliol and Edward III, regardless of the coercion
involved.
Numerous other rewards were handed out by both Edward III and Balliol, ranging
from the usual grants to military supporters such as Henry Percy, William Montague, and
John Warenne, to new positions and exemptions, to fees and tolls for various
administrators and merchants who had aided in the running of the campaign." The most
important of these were the speculative grants by Balliol of lands being held by those still
adhering to the Bruce cause. Most of these were made to Disinherited lords already hell-
bent on reasserting control over the lands already claimed by them. David Strathbogie
received the offices and lands of Robert Stewart, while Richard Talbot gained claim to
Mar — despite the fact that its centrepiece castle of Kildrummy was still holding out for
47 Bridlington, p 115; Melsa, p 369; Baker, p 50; Lanercost, p 272, etc.
48 PRO E159/109; CPR 1330-4, p 462; Foedera, p 868; CPR 1330-4, pp 456-8, 483
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the young David Bruce. 49 Further grants were made to other prominent English nobles
who had entered into Balliol's service or were now aligned with him, such as Henry
Percy. Percy had arranged an indenture for life with Balliol for 2,000 marcates of land,
which now translated into large swathes in Annandale and Moffatdale, including the
other large fortress still existing in southern Scotland, Lochmaben.5°
Following Halidon, the various Balliol supporters strove to consolidate their new
supremacy in Scotland, and to make what personal gains they could. The Bruce-held
lands were rapidly overrun over the next year, with few fortifications holding out against
the tide. Only Dumbarton, Loch Leven, Kildrummy, Urquhart, and Loch Doon escaped,
according to chroniclers. 51 Balliol appeared to be rapidly securing his position in
Scotland, with Perth as the centre of his administration.
Archibald Douglas's success in surprising Balliol at Annan and expelling him
from Scotland in December 1332 proved all too short-lived. It provided Edward III the
necessary propaganda to intervene in Scotland on behalf of Balliol and his adherents with
the full support of Parliament. The result was an even more devastating victory for the
English at Halidon Hill than that scored by the Disinherited at Dupplin Moor. This
occurred despite the Scots once again outnumbering their opponents, validating the new
tactics being employed by the English and shattering Scottish morale. It also guaranteed
that the English would stay involved in Scotland for years to come in order to secure
Balliol's throne and to secure the vast part of southern Scotland ceded to Edward III as
his reward for the English intervention.
49 Wyntoun, pp 407, 413
s° J.M.W. Bean, 'The Percies and their estates in Scotland', Archaeologia Aeliana, (4th Series) 35 (1957), p
94
31 Scotichronicon, pp 92-3; Wyntottn, p 404
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With the English victory at Halidon Hill and the capture of Berwick, the main
military strength of the Bruce partisans had been destroyed. Balliol and the Disinherited
now had a major opportunity to snuff out the last of the Bruce support and put an end to
the fighting that was ravaging Scotland for the second year running. Unfortunately,
several problems existed that would prove fatal for a lasting peace in Scotland and
acceptance of Balliol as a replacement for the minor Bruce. These problems would see
the Disinherited position erode in Scotland so severely that by September 1334, they had
been expelled once more from Scotland. An attempted winter campaign by Edward III
was unable to retrieve the situation, with the only results being the capitulation of Henry
Beaumont at Dundarg and the defection of Patrick Dunbar to the Bruce cause.
The first and most obvious problem facing the Disinherited was the continued
activities of Bruce supporters to retake Scotland. Key in this was two failures: the
inability to capture David Bruce himself, and the escape of several key figures of the new
generation of Scottish leaders from Halidon Hill. Bruce was successfully evacuated from
Dumbarton via a French fleet, was welcomed by the French king and given sanctuary out
of either Balliol or Edward III's reach.' Robert Stewart had not been captured at Halidon
Hill, and had successfully made his escape to Dumbarton via Rothesay before Balliol
took the latter in his western procession. 2 July 1334 saw major successes on Stewart's
part, as he used supporters of his in the Isles to retake Dunoon castle on the Isle of Cowal.
I Scalacronica, p 164; Lanercost, p 278
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This in turn triggered an uprising that took Rothesay castle and set the stage for further
uprisings in Carrick, Renfrew, Clydesdale, and Cunningham after John Randolph, the
earl of Moray, returned from escorting David Bruce to safety and negotiating for French
support.3
Though the older generation of Bruce supporters had been comprehensively
thinned by the defeats at Dupplin Moor and Halidon Hill, the failure to eliminate the
younger generation typified by Stewart and Randolph allowed the Bruce faction to
operate under vibrant, competent leadership. Another error compounding this problem
was the release of Andrew Murray, captured at Roxburgh Bridge, after the payment of
ransom. The decision was odd, considering that it came after the execution of prisoners
at Halidon Hill in part to eliminate the leadership possibilities in Scotland. 4 It would also
prove horribly shortsighted, as Murray would be very active in resurrecting Bruce's
hopes.
The second problem for Balliol was in the nature of the men supporting him, and
what had to be done in order to garner their support. Essentially two groups were
supporting the bid for power in Scotland: the Disinherited lords attempting to resurrect
their old claims, or English lords seeking to earn a new stake in Scotland and seeing an
opportunity for advancement. The two groups are essentially indistinguishable, for both
were rewarded for their loyalty in the same manner — by the forfeiture and reassigning of
lands from Bruce partisans. By necessity, this required major upheaval and conflict, and
2 Scotichronicon, pp 96-7; Wyntoun, p 404
3 Wyntoun, p 415; Scalacronica, p 164; Lanercost, p 278; Melsa, p 373; Scotichronicon, pp 102-5
4 Fordun, p 357; Wynioun, p407; Bridlington, p 119 for Murray's release; Melsa, p 370; Wyntoun, p 401;
Murimuth, p 68 for the execution of prisoners
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the tearing apart of the political framework in Scotland that allowed for concerted action
amongst its aristocracy.
These men were also far more interested in their individual advancement and
enrichment than in loyalty to Scotland or to Edward Balliol. Most of the Disinherited had
proven in past actions their willingness to oppose their lawful sovereign in England if it
would further their ambitions. Beaumont, Wake, and Strathbogie had all been implicated
in plots against either Edward II or Isabella and Mortimer, whenever the English crown
was not supporting their personal interests north of the border regardless of its effect on
England as a whole. Events would prove that this attitude of self-centred partisanship
would not change when the issue was Scotland, rather than its southern neighbour. The
best example of this was the dispute that arose between the brother and daughters of John
Mowbray, who had been one of the casualties of the Christmas attack at Annan. In and of
themselves, Alexander Mowbray and the daughters were not a widespread danger to
Balliol's regime; however, each side had allies that took the problem from an inheritance
dispute to a major controversy. Balliol vacillated, first supporting Alexander against the
three major Disinherited magnates, and as a result lost their immediate support as they
left for their own domains in August 1334. In a panic, he threw his support the other
way, doing even more damage to his own cause. Having already alienated the supporters
of the daughters, his intention to now deprive Alexander caused him to defect to Andrew
Mun-ay, who was leading the resurgent Bruce faction in north and west Scotland.5
Those English lords coming north suffered the same problems of any foreigner
coming in and gaining power at the expense of local magnates; they did not have the web
5 Bridlington, p 119; Scotichronicon, pp 94-95; Wyntoun, pp 406-7; Brut, p280; Scalacronica, p 164;
Melsa, p 372
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of relationships with others in the region who had been in place previously, and therefore
aroused suspicion. Additionally, many of these were much more likely to support
Edward III's program in Scotland than Balliol's, due to Edward III's greater power and
influence (and money), and their greater interests in England. Balliol desperately needed
the support of magnates who had been part of the Bruce regime, such as the earls of
March and Fife, in order to gain any legitimacy as a king of Scotland, rather than the
leader of a group of quarrelsome foreign adventurers without cohesion. Getting this
support on a long-term basis, as opposed to the short-term consideration of fear for life
and limb, meant being King of Scotland first and foremost, with the responsibilities of the
position as well as its rights. This included among other things the need to be even-
handed in his support, rather than narrowly focused on a particular faction, however
important it was initially for his ascendancy. The more lands that Balliol had to grant
away to his English supporters, the greater the difficulty he would have in convincing
those in Scotland of his legitimacy.
In addition, he also had to balance their rivalries brought with them from the
English political milieu, aud keep tl\etti di-vected tow axds tke, N4S.d.et
 %oak seco.t\\%,
country. The prototypical example is the feud that brewed up between Henry Percy and
Edward Bohun over Lochmaben castle. Balliol had originally promised it to Percy in
August 1333, though it was still in Scottish hands. It fell not to Percy, but to Bohun, who
was intent on pursuing a grant by Edward I to the previous earl of Hereford of Annandale
and Lochmaben. The resulting conflict of two of Balliol's major supporters further
sapped his ability to exert authority and to stamp out the last embers of rebellion.6
6 CDS, flOS . 1099, 1101; CCR 1333-7,p 185
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The third difficulty, and arguably the hardest to overcome, was the introduction of
the English crown into the political scene of Scotland, and Edward III's diverging agenda
from Balliol. While certain goals were the same for both — the pacification of Scotland,
the entrenchment of Balliol's administration and authority — many of Edward III's
personal goals and priorities were either a distraction for Balliol or a direct hindrance to
his rule.
Most problematic was the financial settlement required in exchange for Edward
III's support in the Halidon Hill campaign. The huge land grant that had accompanied
Balliol's giving homage to Edward had not been forgotten, nor was Edward very patient
in terms of enacting the particulars of the relationship already spelled out. An English
administration was installed in Berwick immediately upon its capture, both to run the
town permanently as an English holding and to use it for a supply base in case of later
military action. Henry Percy was appointed warden of the town and castle, while Robert
Tughale became chamberlain of the town, its sheriff, and the keeper of the king's
victuals. A new mayor and chancellor were also appointed and the customs collection
was placed into English hands. 7 Though the precise lands to be given to Edward still had
to be determined and agreed on by a Scottish parliament, he had already built the
framework for their administration.
When that parliament did meet at Holyrood in July 1334, the pain that would
accompany specifying those lands became immediately apparent. Eight separate counties
— Berwick, Roxburgh, Selkirk, East, Mid, and West Lothian, Peebles, and Dumfries were
to be handed over permanently to the English crown as a permanent alienation from
Scotland. That the Scottish parliament was meeting in lands that were to be handed to
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the English must have been rather ironic to many at that session. Though Balliol did
have previous agreement from the parliament to the cession of the lands, 8 it was a far cry
from agreeing to unspecified grants to watching the entirety of the lands east of Wigtown
and south of the Firth of Forth disappear forever from Scottish hands.
The £2000 of lands granted after the crushing victories of 1333 and the Holyrood
parliament of 1334 were rather different than those envisioned in the agreements
published by Edward Balliol in November 1332. The 1332 agreement was focused upon
Berwick and its immediate surroundings as the necessary cost of resurrecting a dormant
claim to the Scottish crown and the acquiescence of Edward III to Balliol's pursuit of the
same. Berwick therefore was the prize granted by a newly crowned Scottish monarch
who had won his position through his own martial activities and those of his supporters.
The huge swathe granted in 1334 came from very different circumstances. Where in
1332 Edward III was to receive the rewards for his support in the legal sphere and his
passive support, in 1334 he was taking the large slice owed him for having thrown the
entire might of England behind Balliol and resurrecting an otherwise doomed attempt to
claim the crown. That Balliol's supporters seemed to have gained a crushing ascendancy
through the latter half of 1333 and the first part of 1334 was immaterial; none of it could
have occurred without Edward III.
Balliol was given no real choice in the matter: the price had to be paid, and this
was how it was specified. However, the grant severely compromised his attempts to gain
legitimacy; it gave the impression that his crown rested solely upon the power of England
and could not be sustained otherwise. For some chroniclers, the grant was the catalyst to
7 Rot Scot, p 2568 Foedera, p 888
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the risings that would follow. 9 Other questions hung over the relationship between the
English and Scottish crowns, and the duties of the relationship to one another. After
some equivocation, Balliol was granted special concessions as part of his station; he did
not have to attend the English king in parliament, nor did Edward III have the right to
hear appeals from Balliol's Scotland. His military service was specified in detail. In
return for all of this, Edward III promised to uphold Balliol's title at his own expense.1°
In reality, Balliol's crown relied in the long term upon English arms and English
support. The majority of those witnessing the cession to England were Disinherited
lords; even the strongest of the Bruce faction to come over to Balliol, the Earl of March,
was receiving large sums from the English exchequer to keep him loyal." Should that
support waver or the English crown be distracted by events elsewhere, the effects could
be disastrous, and would prove to be so in years to come. At the same time, it allowed
Edward to apply undue influence upon decisions north of the border. All of the
Disinherited had major interests in England, and Edward was not afraid to distribute
money to more than the Earl of March. Further evidence of Edward III's willingness to
intrude on events when it suited him was the Bohun-Percy dispute, which was pushed to
a settlement by Edward. 12
 Combined with the large sums Balliol himself was receiving
from Edward III, the impression is that Balliol was l ittle more than a pawn, in place to
deal with the mess created by Edward III's self-centred priorities.
These defects in Balliol's regime rapidly led to reversals for its supporters.
Beaumont, Strathbogie, and Talbot, having dispersed after Balliol's decision against their
9 Hemingburgh, pp 309-10; Me1sa, p 372
1 ° Rot Scot, pp 261-2
11 CDS, nos. 1115, 1126; PRO E403127114
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claimant in the Mowbray affair, each found themselves the particular target of Bruce
activity in September 1334. Talbot was captured by Godfrey Ross and William Keith as
he headed through Lothian towards England; 13 Beaumont would find himself besieged in
his Buchan keep of Dundarg by Murray and Alexander Mowbray, who by this point had
turned coat, forcing Balliol to flee to Berwick; 14 and Strathbogie would find himself the
quarry in a long-drawn out chase by a vengeful John Randolph, earl of Moray.
Beaumont would not escape Dundarg for months; Talbot survived to be ransomed along
with John Felton and John Stirling, but the rest of his party was executed; and Strathbogie
was brought to heel and forced to switch sides and support David Bruce.15
Much of the difficulty of securing Scotland was the unwillingness of the newly
enfeoffed Disinherited to see the need to put aside their personal feuds and staunchly
support Balliol. As their grants derived their legitimacy solely from his hold on the
throne, leaving him weak while pursuing their own feuds or petty goals merely
endangered their own holdings in the face of a small but united opposition who could
pick and choose their targets and take advantage of their isolation. None of these three
magnates could have been so neatly ellrninated 'com the playing Cteld had 'they stayed on
with their supporters in Perth and provided a united front. Instead, spread about
piecemeal and unwilling to combine to deal with threats, they found themselves
overtaken by an enemy willing to strike where they were weak and use their strength to
their best advantage. Balliol's inability to recover without regrouping first in England
12 Edward convinced Percy to give way, in exchange for other lands and offices at Jedburgh. Nicholson, p
170; CCR 1333-7, p 327; Rot Scot, p 280
13 Fordun, p 357; Wyntoun, p433; Scalacronica, p 164; Melsa, p 372; Foedera, p 904
Melsa, p 372; Bridlington, p 119; Lanercost, p 278; Scotichronicon, pp 94-5; Fordun, pp 357-8
15 Bridlington, p 119-20; Scalacronica, p 164; Wyntoun, p 417
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was also a major hindrance; by the end of that horrible September, he had essentially
been expelled once again from Scotland.
Edward III was aware of the situation in the north, but did not instantly raise a
new army and rush north to counteract the growing rebellions. His administration had
been long on officials and short on actual troops, with twenty to forty troops commonly
assigned to the sheriff of each county. I6 The numbers appear small, but were not the only
forces within the area. Several magnates were operating in the English-held areas to
secure their own grants and titles, with considerable forces of their own. The most
notable of these would have been Edward Bohun and Henry Percy, as mentioned
previously. With the most influential local magnate in southern Scotland in the person of
the Earl of March now in the English camp, one can see how Edward would have thought
that what little force he provided was enough. Those magnates already in situ were given
full rights to deal with the rebellion on 3 August, with Henry Percy and Ralph Neville
taking military charge of the marches."
Some have faulted Edward III for not taking quicker action to raise an army to
march north. However, this would be unduly harsh, especially in light of what little
information Edward III had, and the effort required for gathering any significant numbers
of troops to aid the forces already in Scotland. Many of the soldiers that could be called
upon at very short notice were already in Scotland, serving with various magnates such as
Percy if not in the royal garrisons. Any further troops would have to be arranged through
16 PRO E404/3/18, E403/276, E403/282; while Rogers has pointed out that Ferriby's wardrobe book shows
no payments for garrisons before September 1334, this is unsurprising as the first entries by month occur in
August of the same year; any previous payments would almost certainly have been accounted for in
previous accounts. An example of this practice can be seen in Ferriby's book, as several contingents have
their pay recorded through November 1337, despite Fen-iby's office ending on 30 August 1337. War Cruel
and Sharp, pp 77-8n; BL Cotton Nero VIII, fos. 248r, 262v-263r
17 Rot Scot, p 276
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new indentures or commissions of array. The earliest arrangements for troops were made
on 20 August, with the bulk sent during September. Supplies for campaigning and ships
for support were ordered up by 1 September. I8 The earliest that any royal force would be
able to enter Scotland was October, and the vagaries of military preparation made it
likely to be later than this. It is hard to see Edward's reactions as slow or underestimating
the importance of events north of the border, when only a month passed between hearing
of the rebellion and the machinery for creating the army to deal with it being put fully in
motion.I9
In addition, a session of parliament had already been called for 19 September; 2° it
made little sense to hurriedly put together an army and throw it into the field when many
of the magnates who would participate would also be attending the parliament and its
business. The parliament itself was a profitable one, as a tenth and fifteenth was granted
to help cover the expenses of the Halidon Hill campaign and the upcoming winter
engagement.2I The granting of the tax was a bright spot in an otherwise dismal month of
news. What remained to be seen was whether the situation could be reversed as
decisively as it had been the previous year.
Winter campaigning is difficult at the best of times, and both the English and
Scots were well aware of its importance for English control north of the Tweed. The
weather was especially harsh on horseflesh, and the Scots were accustomed to using the
seasonal withdrawal of English arms to reclaim the momentary gains made during the
royal army's summer campaigning season. Edward I had had difficulty in keeping his
18 Rot Scot, pp 276-9; Foedera, p 892
19 see Nicholson, pp 167-8; C Rogers takes a much more balanced view; War Cruel and Sharp, pp 81-2
20 CCR 1333-7, p 349-50
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horses alive while wintering at Linlithgow in 1301-2, but had felt it necessary to winter
again in Scotland in 1303-4 in order to secure the country. 22 Edward Balliol advised
carrying the war through winter, and the Lanercost chronicler mentions both the
difficulties and the necessity of the strategy at multiple points.23
This campaign had two widely disparate goals. First was securing the newly
received counties in southern Scotland and eliminating the disturbances and rebellions
that were making it immensely difficult for the English administration to carry out its
functions. The chamberlain at Berwick would refuse to answer for the issues of the town
for 1334 and 1335 due to the disturbances interfering with his officers, 24 while the
capture of Richard Talbot, albeit at the hands of sudden turncoats, showed the difficulties
of having few local garrisons to provide refuge and control over the surrounding lands. If
the southern counties could be made secure, it would move the area of conflict northward
into the lands providing the bulk of the support for the Bruce faction that had not been
heavily involved in the fighting.
To do this, Edward aimed to repair the slighted fortress at Roxburgh, just across
the Tweed from Kelso Abbey. If the castle could be made habitable and defensible, its
position at the upper reaches of the Tweed would in theory allow the garrisons based
there and at Berwick to secure most of the Tweeddale region and push the disputed
regions farther north and west, away from the English border and restricting their
geographical scope. Until the walls were repaired, a large force would be necessary to
21 Rot Par!, p 447; Mark Onrirod estimates the total yield as £36,600. W.M. Ontrod, The Reign of Edward
III, updated ed (Stroud, 2000), p 189
22 Prestwich, Edward I, pp 494, 499
23 PRO C4916129; Lanercost pp 214, 287
24 PRO E372/180
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secure the site and avoid the work party being overrun by a raiding force. Once the site
was secure, a far smaller garrison would be able to maintain itself just as effectively.
Second, Edward needed to help secure the position of those men supporting
Balliol in Scotland, with a sufficient show of force to quell the rebellion then gathering
speed. Though most of the rebellion was diffuse and hard to target, there were two areas
that were obviously in trouble; the western seaboard, with the losses of Rothesay and
Dunoon, and the far north, where Henry Beaumont was besieged at Dundarg. While
there is no explicit evidence that a long-range campaign was specifically intended,
Edward's actions, both in planning the campaign and in his demands during the winter,
indicate that far more was intended than simply securing the most southerly portion of his
own Scottish lands.
The most likely target for this show of force would have been Dundarg. The
fortress was the centrepiece for Beaumont's earldom of Buchan; relieving him would
both secure his control over an important northern lordship and force his besiegers
Andrew Murray and Alexander Mowbray from the field for a time, if not result in their
capture or death. It also would extend English power northwards into areas that had not
been entered by English royal armies since the time of Edward I. Most of the
Disinherited's claimed lands were in this region, with Buchan, Mar, Atholl, Strathbogie,
Angus, and Strathearn taking up the bulk of the lowlands north of Perth. 25
 This was
especially important after the disastrous outcome of the Mowbray affair and the
elimination of many of the Disinherited from the field of play, at least for a time. With
David Strathbogie's turning coat and Richard Talbot's capture and imprisonment, the
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only major holdout of the Disinherited north of Perth was Beaumont. Unless he could be
relieved, Balliol and his partisans were in severe danger of being completely removed
from Scotland north of the Firth of Forth.26
The west, on the other hand, was an area with strong associations with Robert
Stewart and the Bruces. The uprising had begun in lands held by Stewart, after all, and
the major holdings of the Bruce family were centred on the earldom of Carrick. It would
not have the possible affinities to Balliol that the eastern seaboard north of Perth could if
sufficiently controlled. Also, the relatively easy loss of Rothesay showed that any gains
in the area were in danger of simply being lost again the instant the royal army departed
once more.
Further, the large number of ships one would expect for actions in the Isles or to
resupply campaigners in Carrick and Clydesdale was not requested, and those ships that
did participate in the winter's campaign were not from the west coast of England or
Ireland, as one might expect if Rothesay or any of the other recent Bruce gains were the
target. All of the nine ships under household pay during the winter campaign came from
the eastern ports of Gosford, Kingston-upon-Hull, Newcastle, King's Lynn, Ravenser, or
Grimsby. 27 Ships were also being sent directly to Beaumont for his resupply and for his
defence against Murray and Mowbray; 28 although this is no indicator of the intended
target of the campaign, it does show that Beaumont was firmly in Edward's mind in
terms of the winter's priorities.
25 Henry Beaumont claimed Buchan; Richard Talbot through his wife claimed Mar. David Strathbogie
claimed Strathbogie and Atholl, while Gilbert d'Umfraville claimed Angus. Strachearn had been recently
conferred upon the earl Warenne, though he made relatively little effort to secure the title.
26 Lanercost, p 278; Anonimalle, p 2; Bridlington, p 120
27 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 264r
28 The orders were given on 20 September, after planning for the campaign had begun: Rot Scot, p 279
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By 14 November, Edward had sufficient forces in hand for the first goal to be
carried out, and moved north to cross into Scotland. The army was a small one, though
far larger than anything that could be raised by the Bruce partisans at the time, consisting
of 1258 men-at-arms, 1408 mounted archers, 1117 foot archers, 100 `an-nati' from York,
and 25 miners from the Forest of Dean. In addition, contingents drawn from the royal
lands in Wales provided another 879 foot, 27 vintenars, and 108 horse of different types.
180 royal servants of varying stripe and a work party of 55 masons, 35 carpenters, 3
smiths, 4 tilers, and 106 workmen supported this martial element.29 Whatever might
happen with the northern trek, Edward certainly intended to make sure his southern goal
was well and truly achieved.
The army did not arrive at Roxburgh until 23 November, due to a slow pace of
just under ten miles per day. 3° While the two hundred workmen that had accompanied
the army got to work, Edward and his army waited for further reinforcements to swell
their numbers and allow for sufficient strength to strike northward. 3I The reinforcements
were to be relatively few and far between, much to the chagrin of the king. Though a few
contingents such as the 173 from Richrnondshire and the 318 under Roger Corbet from
South Wales did join the army at Roxburgh after the king's arrival, not enough were
forthcoming to do more than carry out pacification efforts in the local region.32
This was not for lack of the king demanding more soldiers; if anything, his
strident calls for expected service may have put off potential troops. Writs to absent
knights and contingents were issued on 15 and 20 November, while over a thousand
29 BL Cotton Nero C VIII fos. 233r-235v, 252r-254v
BL Cotton Nero C VIII fo. 234r; CPR 1334-8, p 48
31 Workmen: BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 254r
32 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 254, 254v
93
1334: Reverses and Roxburgh
hobelars and five thousand archers were called up from Yorkshire to be mustered by 22
November. As the demanded numbers failed to appear, the severity of the writs
demanding service increased. 15 December saw 29 knights threatened with full
forfeiture if they did not show by New Year's Day, and the sheriffs of Yorkshire,
Lincolnshire, Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire were to order any men-at-arms not already
serving in Scotland to do so under similar tlareats. 33 Similar writs were sent to the
commissioners of array in Yorkshire, demanding well-armed and armoured archers from
those ordered arrayed by 22 November. The latter demands showed how aware Edward
had become of the difficulties in recruiting troops: only a fifth of the numbers previously
ordered arrayed were told to come north. 34 The results were decidedly mixed. Though
some contingents did arrive to reinforce Edward — 30 from Lancashire, 211 from
Nottinghamshire, 120 hobelars from Durham, and 254 from Derbyshire — little else was
fortheoming.35
The difficulties in gathering troops were mainly due to the weather. As
previously mentioned, winter campaigning is difficult at the best of times and the winter
of 1334-5 was one of the worst. 36 It was difficult enough to convince men to come north
and serve during winter in the previous fall; it would have been immeasurably more
difficult to do so once the full severity of the winter had become apparent to those
receiving the king's demands from afar. The end result was Edward having to abandon
his strike north and disband his relatively useless army after using them to comb Lothian
33 Rot Scot, pp 292-4, 302
34 Rot Scot, pp 302-4
35 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 254r
36 Knighton, p 472; Wars of Edward III, ed. C. Rogers (Woodbridge, 1999), p 44
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and Ettrick forest for Bruce partisans, without success. 37 Further damage was done to
southern Scotland by the earls of Warwick, Oxford, and Edward Balliol as they raided the
lands passed through on their way to Carlisle. 38 By 11 February, the king's army had
fully dispersed, leaving the defence of the region in John of Eltham's hands with 221
men-at-arms and 48 mounted archers through 19 March in addition to the garrisons at
Roxburgh and Berwick.39
The failure of Edward to make his northern sally was costly for Henry Beaumont.
Faced with effective siege weapons and no relief, he had little option but to surrender two
days before Christmas.40 In addition to the heavy ransom he was required to pay, his
parole also removed him from play until the next summer, and eliminated the last major
supporter north of Perth in Balliol's camp. 41 The Scots had succeeded in the equivalent
goal to that of Edward's in the south — eliminating the enemy support in the core areas so
that attention could be turned to expanding those regions outward.
The bad news only got worse, with the defection of Patrick Dunbar to the Bruce
camp even before the army had disbanded. 42 Faced with the apparent inability of Balliol
and Edward III to defend adequately or rescue their strongest partisans from Bruce
supporters, and the second expulsion of Edward Balliol in as many years, earl Patrick
acted as he had consistently done: going with whichever side he felt would protect his
control over his lands and titles in the long run, preserving his livelihood and power. A
personal element may have been part of this, as one chronicle blames the failure of
Edward III to prosecute robbers who had attacked earl Patrick as the cause of his
37 Lanercost, p 279; Scalacronica, pp 164-5; Anonimulle, p 3
38 Anonimalle, p 3
39 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 233r
40 Wyntoun, pp 427-8; Fordun p 357; Scalacronica, p 164; Lanercost p 278; Bridlington, p 121
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betraya1. 43 If this factored into his thinking, it would simply have confirmed the
impression that the English crown was unwilling or unable to provide Dunbar security
and protect his power. The indiscriminate harrying of southern Scotland once Dundarg
had fallen would have been further evidence of this, as the failure to target selectively the
ravaging would indicate a callous disregard for Dunbar's position as an English
44
supporter.	 The destruction was certainly counterproductive, as it showed that any
magnate in southern Scotland was at risk from the English forces, regardless of whom
they supported or whether their lands were in the areas ceded to England.
Dunbar likely had been contemplating a transfer of allegiance for some time, as
there was little more than a month between the surrender of Dundarg and the confiscation
of his lands due to rebellion. The loss of his support was nearly as devastating as
Beaumont's ejection from Buchan, as it removed the only major native Scottish magnate
supporting Edward in the lands nominally ceded to England.45
The year 1333 and Halidon Hill had demonstrated the capability of English arms
and confirmed its ability to defeat any Scottish army in the field. Yet the events of 1334
showed that however successful the English army had been in individual engagements,
the Disinherited were unable to keep their conquests in the face of constant Scottish
pressure. Nor were the English effective in exerting their military strength either outside
the main campaigning season or in the far northern reaches of Scotland. The loss of
Patrick Dunbar showed the weakness of support for Balliol and the difficulties the
41 CPR 1334-8, p 165
42 Anonimalle, p 2; Melsa, p 375; CDS, nos. 1142, 1145, 1146
43 Scalacronica, pp 164-5
44 Capgrave, p 203, Me/so, p 373
45 While Eustace Maxwell, lord of Caerlaverock was in Edward's service by this point, his position as a
staunch Balliol partisan and his Galloway origins made his support without the political impact that
Dunbar's had.
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English would face in garnering any significant loyalty north of Berwick. With the loss
of Dundarg and Scotland north of Perth, what had been a civil war was rapidly turning
into a prolonged foreign invasion.
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6
1335: The Great Offensive and Culblean
The collapse of Edward III's campaign into Scotland over the 1335 New Year
was the capstone of another dismal showing by the Disinherited in maintaining their
foothold in Scotland. With Strathbogie's defection to the Bruce cause, Beaumont's
capitulation at Dundarg, and Richard Talbot's capture, many of the greatest of the
Disinherited lost everything in Scotland. Meanwhile, by September 1334, Balliol had
once again fled to England after the defection of Alexander Mowbray. It was
increasingly obvious that without major English royal assistance, the Balliol faction was
incapable of maintaining itself in Scotland in the face of Bruce opposition. Limited
assistance would not be enough, as the failure of the Roxburgh campaign during the
winter showed. Edward III would demonstrate precisely how effective that English
assistance could be with the largest show of English military strength of the war.
Balliol's position would be mostly restored by the campaign, leading to both sides
entering serious negotiations by autumn to find a compromise on the war. However, the
entry of France into the diplomatic negotiations in January promised trouble in the future,
and the defeat and death of David Strathbogie at Culblean after returning to Balliol's
camp gave the Bruce camp good news to end the year.
The military failures of 1334 and early 1335 were accompanied by equally
worrying developments in the diplomatic realm. While Edward's personal attention was
focused on his northern military efforts, others carried out the delicate diplomatic dance
with France necessitated by rising tensions regarding Aquitaine. The Archbishop of
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Canterbury, John Stratford, was dispatched in October 1334 to carry out negotiations
with Philip VI over the Agenais, still held in French hands after the War of St. Sardos in
1324-5, and for a possible crusade to the Holy Land.' While previous negotiations to this
point had gone well, the introduction of the Scottish question proved to be a point of
major contention. French interference and support for the Bruces was a serious concern,
and gaining an agreement to end French involvement was one of Stratford's main aims.
However, the level of support in France for Scotland kept Stratford from approaching the
topic directly.
When Stratford sought to get final French agreement on the disposition of the
Agenais and the crusade, he found himself having to address the issue, as the French
made clear that the Scots had to be part of any agreement between Edward III and Philip.
The resulting breakdown in negotiations imperilled Philip's hoped-for crusade and set the
stage for a rapid degradation of relations between France and England. With Edward
unwilling to give up his Scottish adventure and the French having committed their
support to the restitution of David Bruce to his kingdom, Stratford had little choice but to
return to England in January •2 FultYies negotia'toN‘s 	 kkit loisk\op	 NNva-mhes
Pierre Tierlieu in England similarly failed to give Edward any peace, as they continued to
press the issue and arranged a delegation to Scotland and negotiations at York with a
similar Scottish mission. 3 The negotiations resulted in a truce being declared on 4 April
to last through Midsummer, and the allowance of four Scots to come to the parliament at
York on 26 May to further present their case.4
1 Baker, p 55; A brief but cogent description of the negotiations is given in War Cruel and Sharp, pp 87-96
2 Foedera, p915
3 Fordun, p 358; Wyntoun, p 405; Rot Scot, p 323
" Rot Scot, p 336; CCR 1333-7, p481; Foedera, p 904
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The truce through Midsummer was not a problem for Edward III and his plans; if
anything, it allowed him the time to arrange for a massive summer campaign to crush the
resurgent Bruce faction once and for all. No delays occurred in the planning of the
campaign while the truce was in effect. Commissions for array were sent out calling for
over 3,200 hobelars and 7,000 archers from England, and 7,500 foot from Wales. Ten
earls and 126 other magnates received summons. 5 In the end, 2768 men-at-arms, 3,630
mounted archers, and 7,020 foot would cross the border later that summer.6
That there was a truce did little to stop the warfare on the seas, with both sides
preparing or carrying out attacks on the other. Scottish pirates at the mouth of the Seine
took an English ship named the Little Lechevard; the resulting difficulties in gaining
recompense from the stolen cargo impounded by French authorities further soured
relations. 7 At the same time, all ships over forty tons were to be gathered to sail against
Scotland in the summer, while ships were ordered north both to block supplies from
Dumbarton in the west and to retake the Beaumondscogge in the east. 8 The English still
were far superior on the seas, and fully intended to use that advantage to block supplies
and support from reaching Scotland.
Meanwhile, David Strathbogie was proving to be a problematic convert to the
Scottish cause, quarrelling with Moray, Mowbray, and William Douglas and causing a
rift between them and Robert Stewart. 9 Between their internal dissent, reminiscent of
, that which had afflicted Balliol before his second ejection from Scotland, and the massive
forces at Edward's command, the Scots could do little but attempt to evade Edward's
5 Rot Scot, pp 328-33
6 See Ch. 8: The Army
7 CCR 1333-7, pp 462, 484, 620; CCR 1337-9, p 53; Foedera, pp 912-3
8 Dumbarton: Rot Scot, pp 340-1; Beaumondscogge: Rot Scot, pp 320, 322
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forces and hope for either external support or the end of the campaign and the return of
the mass of Edward's forces to England.
The two-pronged assault crossed the border on 12 July, with Edward III sweeping
north through Annandale and Galloway while Balliol took the eastern coastal route from
Berwick along the southern coast of the Forth. 1 ° While Balliol had demonstrated little
ability to gain more than the most lukewarm support in Scotland on his own, neither was
there much support in Scotland for fighting him when supported with a large English
army behind him. Neither force encountered much resistance until Balliol reached
Cumbernauld, where a lortalice' of David Strathbogie under the command of David
Marshal was assaulted and captured in the latter part of July.' 1 No other major resistance
was encountered before the two armies rendezvoused at Glasgow, where the two
Edwards chose to pursue their advantage and move on to Perth. 12 After taking advantage
of the English supremacy at sea to resupply from ships bringing supplies north from
Berwick at Airth, the army moved north to Perth by 7 August, where it devastated the
surrounding areas. 13 It also retook without a fight the castle of Cupar on 7 August with
the surrender of the Earl of Fife, who had returned to the Bruce camp after Ba 1334
ejection. 14
The armies of the two kings were not the only active military endeavours
operating in and around Scotland that summer. The large naval forces gathered for the
campaign not only resupplied the land forces at Airth, but also sacked both the abbey on
9 Fordttn, p 358; Wyntottn, p421
I ° Rogers suggests Inveravon near Falkirk for Edward III's stop at `Irewyn' on 15 July; it is far more likely
to be Irvine in Ayrshire. BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 202v; War Cruel and Sharp, p 99
I I The chronicles give differing dates for the actual capture, with Knighton claiming 23 July and
Bridlington 28 July. Knighton, p473, Bridlington, pp 122-3; Scalacronica, p 165
12 Wyntoun, p 412; Scalacronica, p 165
13 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 272r
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the isle of Inchcolm in the Firth of Forth and the town of Dundee. 15 In the west, the
expeditionary force from Ireland under John Darcy, the justiciar of Ireland attacked Bute,
though failed to take Rothesay Castle. 16 The overall effect was much as Edward had
intended: the Scots were overawed by the massive military force Edward had brought to
bear, and could do little more than strike at supply lines and any groups that strayed too
far from the main armies.17
At this they could be quite effective. One of Edward's continental allies, Guy,
Count of Namur, arrived in England too late to join the king before he entered Scotland.
Anxious to join the campaign as quickly as possible, Namur strengthened his party of a
hundred men-at-arms at Berwick with 117 foot archers and a smattering of mounted
archers and English knights before departing on 30 July for a quick march to the head of
the Forth where Edward's army was at the time. 18 Unfortunately for Guy, the passage of
Balliol's force along a similar route earlier in the month did not guarantee the security of
the region, especially with both the earls of Moray and March operating in the region.
Ambushed near Edinburgh, Guy's men were forced in a fierce fight to take refuge in the
remnants of Edinburgh Castle, which had been slighted under Robert Bruce and not
rebuilt or garrisoned. Reinforced by William Douglas, the Scots forced Namur to
surrender, promising £4,000 in ransom and his departure from the war.19
It had become apparent that further garrisons other than Roxburgh and Berwick
were a necessity to secure any permanent control over Scotland not enforced by the
14 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 239r
IS Pluscarden, p 278; Lanercost, p 282
16 PRO E101/19/16
17 Fordun, p 359; Wyntottn, p419; Scotichronicon, pp 110-113
18 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 239v; Scotichronicon, pp 112-3
19 Fordun, p 359; Wyntoun, p420; scotichronicon, pp 112-3; Lanercost, p 282; Scalacronica, p 165;
Pluscarden, pp 278-9
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immediate presence of an English army. The effectiveness of garrisons was further
highlighted when Moray's force was itself ambushed on its way to return Namur to
English lands. Men from the garrisons at Jedburgh and Roxburgh surprised the Scottish
party, forcing William Douglas to flee, killed his brother James, and captured Moray.2°
Though others such as Dunbar and Douglas remained in the field to keep fighting,
Moray's capture was a major coup for the English.
While there were setbacks such as that suffered by Guy of Namur, overall the
campaign was successful. Where the winter campaign had done little to demonstrate the
effectiveness of English arms, the summer efforts effectively cowed any resistance in the
immediate vicinity of the armies. The show of force also convinced those equivocal
lords in the Bruce camp to open negotiations with Edward III and Balliol to protect
themselves from another perceived change of fortune. The Earl of Fife changed sides for
the third time in nearly as many years, while David Strathbogie began to see the prudence
in returning to his earlier loyalties. This undoubtedly was helped by his conflict with
Moray and March. Using the offices of two Scottish Dominican Friars, Strathbogie
opened negotiations with Edward III on behalf of a large faction of Bruce supporters,
including Robert Stewart. 21
 Further negotiations carried out by Alexander and Geoffrey
Mowbray, Godfrey Ross, Eustace Lorraine and William Bullock led to an agreement for
the surrender of Strathbogie's group of recalcitrants on 18 August, after receiving several
guarantees. Not only would their lands, lives, and offices be protected, but the laws and
customs of Scotland were to be upheld, the Scottish church guaranteed its liberties, and
20 Scotichronicon, pp 112-3; Bridlington, pp 123-4; Melsa, p376; Fordun, p 359; Wyntoun, pp 420-1
21 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 272r; Avesbuty, p 298; Knighton, p 473; Bridlington, p 124; Scalacronica, p
165
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the officeholders Balliol appointed should in the main be Scots. 22
 Many of these men had
been placed in trusted positions by Balliol before and had changed sides either when their
interests had been threatened (Mowbray), when the opportunity for gain presented itself
(Ross), or when forced to in order to survive (Strathbogie). That these self-interested
men saw it expedient to return to Balliol says much as to the low morale amongst the
Bruce faction at the time.
As the campaign season was drawing to a close, the final efforts to secure the
gains of the summer were put into motion. Strathbogie's reward for bringing such a large
group of men back to the king's peace was to be appointed Balliol's lieutenant beyond
the Forth, a role he took to with particular harshness. 23 After overseeing once again the
rebuilding of Perth's fortifications, Balliol left on 23 September for a flying three-week
expedition through the Highlands along with several hundred troops from the English
army, including four earls and Henry Lancaster.24
Finally, Edward addressed the need to garrison the areas just brought under
control. Edinburgh would provide the safety not available to the count of Namur, as a
workforce of 116 men began work during Edward's stop there in the second week of
September.25
 A garrison of sixty men-at-arms and sixty wca-ms NV lekk. pka.ct
secure the area. 26 Cupar was held temporal* by Henry Ferrers before beg lumed
22 Avesbuty, p 298; Knighton, pp 473-5; Rot Scot, p 381; Wyntoun, p 421
23 Scotichronicon, pp 114-5; Scalacronica, p 166
24 The pay for the men-at-arms of the expedition ended on 11 Oct, though it may have ended by 7 Oct,
when William Clinton's archers left service. Rogers' date of 23 September is more likely than Nicholson's
31 August: not only would it make sense for the earl of Hereford's pay record, but it would have made
sense for retinues such as the men from Lichfield or Wells to join the expedition had it started on 31
August, as they were still in situ and receiving pay at this time. BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 236r-239r,
256v; War Cruel and Shaip, p 104; Nicholson, p222
25 Edward was in the vicinity of Edinburgh from 10 September to 27 September: CCR 1333-7, pp 439-442
26 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 249r
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to Balliol, while Eustace Maxwell, Edward Bohun and Henry Percy held the castles at
Caerlaverock, Loclunaben, and Jedburgh, respectively.
What all of this could not do was to bring to heel immediately those magnates
determined to carry on fighting regardless, specifically the Earl of March, Andrew
Murray, and William Douglas. 27 They avoided direct conflict with the royal forces,
taking the lessons of the successful ejections of Balliol at Annan and on the western
seaboard to heart along with the more obvious lessons of Halidon Hill and Dupplin Moor.
Gaining peace with these men would require a negotiated settlement with David Bruce.
The men newly returned to the king's peace were eminently suited to the role, and
Edward did not hesitate to use them. Alexander Mowbray and William Bullock were
sent on 17 October to arrange a truce with Andrew Murray to discuss a peace settlement,
and matters proceeded well enough for hostilities to cease temporarily on 22 October to
allow for full negotiations including French representatives, a truce extended several
times as the discussions continued.28
Both sides took the discussions seriously, as it was the first time that both sides
had met to attempt negotiations for each side of the conflict as a whole, rather than
individuals making piecemeal agreements to safeguard their own interests independently
of either claimant of the crown. William Montague, Robert Ufford, and Ralph Neville —
all bannerets of the household and major magnates in their own right in differing regions
of England represented Edward. 29 On the Scottish side, Andrew Murray, William
Douglas, William Keith, and Robert Lauder represented Bruce; of the leaders of the
27 Scotichronicon, pp 116-7
28 Rot Scot, pp 384-5
29 Montague and Ufford would be created Earls of Salisbury and Suffolk respectively in 1337, while
Neville was the pre-eminent lay landholder in the palatinate of Durham and arguably one of the two most
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Bruce faction, only Patrick Dunbar was missing. 30
 The two sides met at Bathgate in the
first week of November, with matters proceeding well enough to see the truce extended
several times as negotiations continued, from 26 November to 3 December to 9
December. 31
 Further evidence of the good faith the English were acting in came in the
appointment of Geoffrey le Scrope, Nicholas Beche and Richard Bintworth to join the
negotiations set for late November at Newcastle. 32
 All three had extensive legal
experience, and their appointment suggests that matters had progressed far enough to
consider specific proposals and legalities.
While this process of negotiation was beginning, the warfare in Scotland
continued north of the Forth, despite the truce that had been agreed on. Part of this was
due to the specific nature of the truce; agreed to by Edward III and the Bruce faction, it
was ambiguous as to whether it specifically included a truce between the two Scottish
factions. Acting on behalf of Balliol since his appointment as guardian north of the
Forth, David Strathbogie had been crushing resistance north of Perth with particular
brutality, according to various chroniclers. 33
 His chief target was Kildrummy, one of the
few holdouts for the Bruce faction throughout the war and held by Lady Christian Bruce,
the wife of Andrew Murray. Learning of the siege while in negotiations with Montague
and the others that first week of November, Murray successfully gained Montague's
acquiescence to an attempted rescue. 34
 Montague likely had little choice if he was to act
in good faith. If the truce did not apply to Balliol, then Murray was in his rights to
powerful of the far northern landlords, along with Henry Percy. All three were seen as specifically 'king's
men', without conflicting loyalties to confuse negotiations.
30 Foedera, p 926; Rot Scot, p 385-7
31 Rot Scot, p385-7; BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 239v for Montague's whereabouts.
32 Rot Scot, p 388
33 Scotichron icon, pp 114-7; Forchtn, p 359-60; Pluscarden, p 279
34 Forclun, pp 359-60
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attempt a relief effort. On the other hand, if the truce did apply to Balliol's men, then
Strathbogie was in violation of the truce and therefore outside of its protection.
Having assured himself that no English forces would be reinforcing Strathbogie
or intercepting his troops, Murray moved quickly to gather what forces he could for
Kildrummy's relief, arriving at the Dee in the last week of November. Bower describes
his force as eight hundred men from Lothian and the Borders; among them were Patrick
Dunbar, Alexander Ramsey, William Douglas, and the young William of Ross. 35 That
this was the largest force that could be arranged is striking, though the short period of
time to raise the troops possibly reduced the size of the force that could be gathered.
Strathbogie's force was larger, though not likely to be the 3,000 half-heartedly given by
Wyntoun.36
Strathbogie, being warned of the approach of the relief party, moved south the ten
miles from Kildrummy to Culblean Hill, where he could set up his forces to take full
advantage of the heights, yet strike the flank of any force attempting to move northwards
past him to Kildrummy. Rather than attack yet another Balliol force in a prepared
position on a high hill, Murray opted for another approach. The timely arrival of 300
men from the Kildrummy garrison not only gave a significant boost to the Scottish
numbers but also gave Murray useful advice from its commander, John Craig. Following
his advice, Murray's force circled to the south to attempt to approach Culblean from
Strathbogie's rear on 30 November. Thanks to his alert scouts, Strathbogie was able to
shift his forces to block the manoeuvre at the Burn of the Vat. However, when the
vanguard under Douglas halted, Strathbogie abandoned the tested tactic of allowing the
35 Scotichronicon, pp 116-7; Wyntoun, p 424; Lanercost, p 284. Ross was underage, continuing the
Scottish trend in this war of underage leaders rising to the fore.
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opposition to attack a defensive position, and instead ordered the charge, disordering his
forces and leaving them open to counterattack. While fully engaged with Douglas and
his countercharge, Strathbogie's force was flanked by the main body under Murray and
broken. Most of the force fled, but a small group including Strathbogie and Walter
Comyn were surrounded and died fighting.37
Culblean was not the defining moment for the Anglo-Scottish wars, nor was it the
turning point, as Rogers has pointed out. 38
 Its main effects were psychological; it gave a
needed boost to Scottish morale, and likely improved their negotiating position by
proving they were not a spent force on the verge of annihilation. The removal of David
Strathbogie was also of great benefit, in more ways than one. Not only did his death
remove one of the major supporters for the two Edwards, but it also removed one of the
more contentious players in the Balliol court. Considering Strathbogie's history in
creating feuds in both the Balliol and Bruce courts and his exceedingly harsh reputation
amongst the Scots, it may have been a relief for all concerned to have him no longer able
to cause division, or to be a stumbling block for reconciliation.
With the French beginning to take a much more active role diplomatically in the
conflict and the failure of the winter campaign of 1334-5, major gains in the summer of
1335 were necessary by Balliol and the English in order to avoid French intervention and
the exhaustion of English military resources. The campaign itself was highly successful
in eliminating resistance in the southern reaches of Scotland, and even managed to extend
Balliol's power even into the northern reaches of the country for a brief period. While
36 Wyntoun, p 422
37 A far more detailed description of events is found in Nicholson, pp 230-6; see also Scotichronicon, pp
116-7; Wyntoun, pp 422-7; Fordun, pp 359-360; Pluscarden, p 280; Knighton, p475; Melsa, p 376;
Lanercost, p 284; Scalacronica, p 166; Baker, p 57
108
1335: The Great Offensive and Culblean
many of the rebellious Bruce faction were willing to rejoin Balliol and the English, the
defeat of David Strathbogie at Culblean meant that the north would stay out of Balliol
hands and allow the Bruce faction to recover its position.
This is not to say that 1335 saw only fighting. It also saw the results of four years
of war on both sides, as negotiations opened up between the Bruce and Balliol supporters
to find a compromise to end the war, rather than a dictated peace after achieving military
supremacy. While much of this was due to the unique position of David Strathbogie
before his return to the Balliol fold, it does indicate a shift in the priorities and interests of
both parties. In particular, as the French began taking on an increasingly larger role in the
conflict and pursuing its own interests in regards to Gascony, the English focus would
shift ever more southwards. This would leave Scotland increasingly on the periphery of
Edward III's interests and less likely to see the investment of English soldiers or funds
made in 1333 or 1335.
38 War Cruel and Sharp, p 108
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The end of the 1335 campaigning season saw the Bruce faction pushed back
by the massive campaign forces of the English during the summer, but by no means
defeated. Andrew Murray had proven that Scottish arms could defeat a smaller
Disinherited force, even if the Scots did not have the resources to take on a major
campaigning army of the English. The following two years would see the rapid shift
by the English of resources away from Scotland towards the south, as France finally
committed to fighting the English on Scotland's behalf in 1336.
Though there were moves towards a negotiated settlement, including an
actual compromise agreement, the inability of either side to accept its terms meant
that the war would continue through 1338 and the beginning of major campaigning
in the Hundred Years' War. The English would content themselves with arranging a
far smaller but more professional force for both 1336 and 1337, as the Bruce faction
was still incapable of gathering a large army. Most importantly, the English forces
would be assigned to captains, rather than led by the king himself. Though he would
return to Scotland for hurried attacks in both 1336 and 1337, his attention would be
increasingly held in the south. The initiative would move permanently to the
increasingly successful Scots, with the English once again losing ground.
David Strathbogie's defeat at Culblean was not the seminal event that some
chroniclers and modern historians have made it out to be.' The rise in Scottish spirits
did not spur new military endeavours on the part of the Scots; instead, they returned
to the negotiations started in November. It is highly unlikely that Edward would
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have been willing to extend the truce for negotiations into December had the Scots
begun sieging the castles of Cupar and Lochindorb immediately after the battle as
indicated in certain chronicles. 2 The draft agreement worked out between the two
parties after Culblean by 25 January was not a punitive document: instead, it
attempted to balance the claims of Balliol and Bruce and find a middle ground to
accommodate both. This was greatly helped by Balliol's age, single status, and lack
of heirs. According to the agreement, Balliol would adopt Bruce as his heir, passing
Scotland onto the young David upon his death. In the meantime, Bruce would live at
the English court while Balliol lived, then would rule Scotland under the same terms
with Edward III as had Ballio1.3
Balliol would have lost relatively little with such an agreement: while the
chroniclers differ as to what would occur if he had a son, it was not that likely a
concern. David Bruce would have had much more to lose. His pretensions to rule
would have to be deferred for several years, and perhaps permanently if Balliol
produced a son. Once he did take the crown, he would be saddled with the
subordinate relationship with England from which his father had fought so hard to
free himself. He would also have to accept the permanent loss of the southern
counties and the largest sources of income available to the Scottish crown. The
biggest winner was Edward III, unsurprisingly; as his armies were the major lever in
the relationship between the three sides, he had by far the best negotiating position.
He would get to keep the southern counties of Scotland, formalise the subordinate
relationship of Scotland to England, and secure in some fashion the livelihood of his
brother-in-law. It would also end the massive drain on Edward's treasury in
•Nicholson, pp 230-6; see also Scotichronicon, pp 116-7; Wyntoun, pp 422-7; Fordun, pp 359-360;
Pluscarden, p 280
This is in contradiction to Rogers, p 108, though he gives the proper date for the siege on p 115; for
the chronicles, see Scotichronicon, pp 116-7; Fordun, p 360
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supporting the war and Philip VI of France's use of the ongoing war and his alliance
with Scotland to pressure Edward in Aquitaine.
When the Scottish envoys returned David Bruce's answer to the parliament at
Westminster in March 1336, the fragile movements towards peace ended abruptly.
The proposed agreement had been rejected out of hand. Whether or not the minor
had been persuaded by the French king or by his Scottish advisors is open to debate.4
However, in the end the main stumbling blocks to a negotiated peace were the
inability of Bruce to compromise Scottish sovereignty or of either side to release
contested lands and titles in order to facilitate a peace. The same difficulty that had
begun the war, the contestation of titles such as Angus and Atholl, was now partly
responsible for its continuance.
The failure to reach an agreement also sent Anglo-French relations into a
downward spiral, as the elimination of a possible peace settlement injected the
constant menace of French military action in aid of Scotland. The continuing war
saw the planned crusade abandoned in the same month as the Westminster
parliament; 5 the upcoming war would not be over freeing the Holy Land, but instead
for control of Gascony. Edward III was certainly aware of the French plans for
intervening militarily in Scotland, though both sides avoided armed conflict in
Gascony - for the moment. 6 While French ships had raided the south coast of
England in 1335, the threat now was of a much greater magnitude. Invasion forces
were planned by Philip VI for Scotland in May 1336 to support a strike by the Scots
Bridlington, p 127; Anonimalle, p 6; Knighton, p 477
4 French king: Knighton, p 477; Scottish advisors, or 'pride of the Scots', A/Joni/m[11e, p 6;
Bridlington, p 128. Rogers' description of Dunbar as easily restored to his lands after his submission
is inaccurate; his forfeited lands in Northumberland had been granted to Henry Percy, and his previous
betrayal of Edward Ill (as opposed to Balliop would have made him very suspect. Considering the
dire circumstances of 1335 for the Bruce cause and Dunbar's previous opportunistic behaviour, it
seems likely that he would have switched sides again given the capacity to do so.
5 Eugene Deprez, Les preliminaires de la guerre de Cent ans: La papculte, la France et l'Anzleterre
(1328-1342) (Paris, 1902), pp 410-3
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on northern England, while other troops would be landed at Portsmouth. 7 The two-
front war was about to begin.
The expiration of the last trucal extension on 6 May saw the immediate
resumption of conflict. The castle at Cupar was attacked by Dunbar, the earl of
Sutherland, and the inconstant earl of Fife, who once again made had made his
yearly change of allegiance. The garrison system set up the year before by Edward
III proved its worth, as the commander of the Edinburgh garrison, John Stirling, was
able to quickly cross the Forth and attack the besiegers by surprise, breaking the
siege and routing the Scots. 8 The widow of David Strathbogie was also besieged at
her dead husband's castle at Lochindorb by Andrew Murray, though she would have
to wait for relief somewhat longer than had the garrison at Cupar.9
For the first time in this war, Edward III did not lead the English forces in
person. Henry Lancaster was appointed captain of the English forces on 7 April
1336, 10
 bringing 100 of his men-at-arms and 70 mounted archers as his retinue while
leading an English army of 405 men-at-arms, 744 hobelars and archers and twenty
foot. In addition to Lancaster's force, Balliol operated his own army in the lowlands,
fighting with Andrew Murray's troops successfully near Stirling, though not in the
set-piece fashion of Halidon Hill, Dupplin Moor, or Culblean. 11
 There had been
other losses through the winter and spring; upon reaching Perth on 19 May, they
found the city burnt to the ground, necessitating the rebuilding of its fortifications yet
again.12
6 Rot Scot, p 404; Foedera, p 936
7 War Cruel and Sharp, p 113; Original Letters, pp 30-1
8 Anoninialle, p 6
9 Wyntoun, p 428; CDS, no. 1221
I ° Rot Scot, pp 414-5
II Original Letters, pp 32-3
12 Anoninialle, p 7; Scalacronica, p 166. Unfortunately, there is little information as to when the city
was attacked or what became of the garrison that Balliol would have left there after attempting to
fortify it during the 1335 campaign.
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While Edward III may have been willing to let Henry Lancaster run the war
for most of summer, he was not fully quit of the wish to participate personally. The
deteriorating situation with France gave him the opportunity, as rumours of French
intervention in order to strike at Balliol in Perth promised a chance to bring the Scots
to battle. I3
 Relying on speed rather than numbers, Edward dashed northwards to
reach Perth to take over command of the forces there before Murray and the French
could rendezvous and attack the town. He made the passage from Berwick to Perth
in only two days with a guard of 198 men-at-arms and 247 mounted archers,
stunning those at Perth with his unforeseen arrival on 28 June. I4
 The race north
certainly enhanced Edward's reputation, though it was probably a relief to know that
there was a strong garrison at Edinburgh to help avoid any incidents such as Guy of
Namur's capture the year before. The anticipated French force failed to appear,
threatening to render the entire dash anticlimactic.
Having made the madcap dash north, Edward was determined to make some
use of his presence, and chose to do so in an equally daring fashion. On 12 July
Edward left Perth with eight hundred men, half archers and half men-at-arms, in
order to relieve Catherine Beaumont, Strathbogie's widow, in Lochindorb. I5 The
force undoubtedly was fully mounted, and of a size sufficient to match any Scottish
force in the field without the burden of a heavy supply train or baggage. It could also
move quite rapidly when pushed by Edward; after a lazy start, Edward made twenty
miles through rough terrain to Blair Castle and thirty more miles after a day's rest at
Blair. I6
 An attempt to catch Murray unawares at Kincardine failed, despite Murray's
13 Knighton, p 477; Scalacronica, p 166; Bridlington, p 128; Lanercost, p 286
14 Drawn from BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 241r-242v, 259r; Foedera, pp 940-1; Scalacronica, p 166
describes the guard as '100 men-at-arms': see Army chapter
1 ' Original Letters, pp 33-9
16 Original Letters, p 35; BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 279r
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pause to finish Mass before retreating towards Ross. I7 Edward's other efforts were
far more successful. He reached Lochindorb on 15 July, just before the castle's
supplies ran out. Having relieved Lochindorb and Catherine Beaumont, Edward took
steps to make sure that its loyal garrison was supplied and that the local region was
not. Forres was burned, while Kinloss Abbey was stripped clean to resupply
Lochindorb. Edward's troops then proceeded eastward along the coast, burning
everything they could reach except for the town of Elgin, granted a reprieve due to
the church of the Holy Trinity in the town. The culmination of this destruction was
the burning of Aberdeen on 22 July, before Edward turned south to Dunnotar and
lands in English hands.
Though the chroniclers attribute the destruction of Aberdeen to revenge for
assaults on English sailors or the death of Thomas Roscelyn, I8 there were also more
practical reasons for destroying the town. Aberdeen was the last major port on the
eastern seaboard not in English hands, and was by far the best port available to the
Scots after the fall of Berwick. Until it could be rebuilt, the Scots would not be able
to support any fleets looking for harbour, nor ship any large amounts of wool to
Flanders — greatly reducing the economic capabilities of the region. Combined with
the general destruction of the countryside, the intent was much like that of the
Harrying of the North under William I: to destroy the economic ability of any
opposition to survive or support foreign intervention. It also served notice that
removing David Strathbogie did not make the northern reaches of Scotland immune
to the ravages of the war.
After his raid through the north, Edward further expanded his program of
creating garrisons and fortifications to hold on to English gains to include Fife and
17 Wyntoun, pp 429-30
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the northeast coast. Kinneff and Lauriston were added to the deceased Thomas
Roscelyn's former command at Dunnotar to try to hold the Kincardine coast, 19
 while
Perth was heavily fortified by shifting the expense of the work onto six abbeys in the
region. 2° Edward also guaranteed a proper defensive force by installing a garrison,
initially but briefly under Ralph Neville. 21
 The defence of Fife was shifted out of
royal control and onto various magnates. Henry Beaumont was assigned the castle
of St. Andrews, while Henry Ferrers received Leuchars; the major castle in Fife,
Cupar, was still held for Balliol by William Bullock. The last major link in the chain
between Berwick and Perth was Stirling, with Thomas Rokeby put in command.22
John of Eltham reinforced Lancaster's forces on 28 July, shortly before Edward
returned to Perth from his raid the next day. 23
 Matters were secure enough to allow
many of the forces in Scotland to disperse in late August and early September.
Edward's presence was soon required in the south, as matters with France had
gone from bad to worse during his absence. The English embassy sent to Paris in
July by the king's council during his absence made no progress, despite having broad
powers to make agreements in Edward's name. Instead, its members were bluntly
informed on 20 August that Philip VI intended to assist the Scots in all respects and
intended to invade Scotland in support of Bruce's forces and England itself for good
18 Roscelyn: Wyntoun, p 430; A nonimaIle, p 7. Sailors: Original Letters, p 37. See also Fordtm, pp
360-1; Scalacronica, p 166; Baker, pp 57-8
19 Scotichronicon, pp 126-7; Fordun, p 361. Rogers incorrectly identifies Lauriston with the town of
that name in Galloway; however, the castle is always mentioned in combination with Dunnotar and
Kinneff, and others have identified it as south of Kinneff. War Cruel and Sharp, p 119; Peter G. B.
McNeill and Hector L MacQueen (ed.), Atlas of Scottish History to 1707 (Scottish Medievalists and
Dept. of Geography, Univ of Edinburgh, 1996), p 105
29 St. Andrews, Dunfermline, Lindores, Balrnerino, Arbroath and Coupar Angus
21 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 250r-250v
22 Chroniclers report the castle being granted to William Montague, but only Thomas Rokeby is
mentioned in the wardrobe book regarding munitions and pay for the garrison beginning 25 October
1336: BL Cotton Nero C VII, fo. 249r; Generally, Scotichronicon, pp 122-3; Fordun, p 361
23 Original Letters, p 39; BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 240r. The letter from the queen states that
Eltham brought 400 men-at-arms and 7,000 hobelars and archers; however, pay records in the
wardrobe book show only 85 men at arms in Eltham's retinue and no other troops beginning pay for
several days either way from the beginning point of 28 July.
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measure. The period of diplomacy was over; the fight north of the border had spilled
over into what would prove a much larger conflict.
The clerk William Tickhill was sent to rush back to England, informing
Archbishop Stratford and the royal council in Northampton on 24 August before
flying north. The unsettled nature of Scotland prevented Tickhill from arriving at
Perth until the second week of September, making Edward's departure almost
immediate upon hearing the news. This exit was marred by the death of John of
Eltham on 13 September, which Scottish chroniclers attribute to the unlikely cause of
Edward killing John himself. 24 Accompanying Edward were many of the magnates
with retinues in Scotland; though most of their retinues remained in Scotland, their
presence was also required in the south. Stratford had called a parliament for
Nottingham on 23 September in the king's name to deal with the dire news, though
undoubtedly this was a decision Edward fully concurred with.25
By the time of the Nottingham council, French actions had underscored that
full hostilities had begun. French ships raided the port of Orton, Walford Roads, and
the Isle of Wight. 26 With such proof of the seriousness of the French threat, the
parliament was all too willing to grant Edward another tenth and fifteenth in tax on
the country and an increase in the wool subsidy despite having done so just a few
months previously in March. 27 Though no further clashes occurred with the French
that year, no one in England believed that anything but war was in the immediate
future.
24 Even more oddly, it was claimed Edward killed his brother because he had been burning lands in
western Scotland that had entered the king's peace; considering the indiscriminate burning of lands in
and out of the king's peace in previous years, it seems highly unlikely Edward would start taking such
violent exception to it now. Scotichronicon, pp 122-3; Fordun, p 361; Date of death: BL Cotton
Nero C VIII, fo. 240r. Curiously, Edward appears to have left the day aftter that recorded as John's
death: see the entry for William Kildsby, BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 242v
25 War Cruel and Sharp, pp 119-122; J Sumption, Trial By Battle v. 1 (London, 1990), pp 161-165;
BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 240r-242v; Foedera pp 944-5
26 CCR 1337-9, pp 43-5; Rot Scot, pp 450-3
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The Scots certainly had war on their mind. Andrew Murray wasted no time
whatsoever upon Edward's departure for Nottingham. In October he destroyed
Dunnotar, Kinneff, and Lauriston, and spent winter raiding through Gowrie, Angus,
and the Meams, along with destroying another fortress at Kinclaven at some point.
Though a number of magnate retinues and county levies were still in service through
November and even into December, they appear to have done little to disrupt
Murray's efforts. The disheartening truth was that, barring Lochindorb, the English
and Balliol had no support whatsoever north of Perth.28
In the south of Scotland matters were somewhat better, though this was a
matter of degree due to the increased activity on the part of the Scots. Edward
returned to the north for one last effort, leaving Newcastle on 14 October to make his
way to the remnants of Bothwell Castle with the remnants of Lancaster's force and
some reinforcements led by the earl of Arundel. Left unmolested by the Scots, he
remained there until 10 December overseeing its repair. 29
 During his absence the
Channel Islands were raided by the French, while diplomatic pressure was stepped
up by Philip VI ordering that Robert of Artois, whom Edward was harbouring, be
extradited to France, specifically tailoring the demand to be one from the King of
France to the Duke of Aquitaine, rather than as one king to another. As Robert was
not in Gascony, nor receiving harbour from Edward in any fashion as Duke of
Aquitaine, this demand placed Edward between accepting that his vassalage could be
extended to affect England or denying the petition and having Gascony declared
forfeit. 30
27 Anonimalle, p 8; Ormrod, The Reign of Edward III, pp 189-191
28 Scotichronicon, pp 124-5; BL Cotton Nero C VIII, passim
29 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 214r, 241r-244r, 259r-260r
30 War Cruel and Sharp, pp 123-4
118
1336-8: Diplomacy and Dissolution
Unsurprisingly, the new year brought little but bad news. The one bright note
was the creation of six of Edward's most ardent military supporters as earls of the
realm on 16 March 1337 during the Westminster parliament of that year. The men
represented a broad cross-section of political interests, and their appointment was
obviously meant to both secure their place in the political scene and to secure their
interests along the same line as Edward's. Foremost of all, they represented the
king's household. All four of the bannerets receiving robes and fees in 1336 were
made earls: William Montague became earl of Salisbury, Robert Ufford earl of
Suffolk, William Bohun earl of Northampton, and William Clinton earl of
Huntington. Bohun also represented the entrenched, older families in England, as his
older brother John was earl of Hereford. The two remaining earls created were also
major magnates. Henry Lancaster, son of the earl of Lancaster, became earl of
Derby, while Hugh Audley received the revived earldom of Gloucester. All were
heavily active in the Scottish wars and willing to support further military ventures on
the part of the king. Considering the war that was all but fully declared with France
and the constant fighting in Scotland, such men were desperately needed amongst the
highest ranking of the land.31
This one bright spot did not by any means make the year a positive one.
February saw the resumption of Scottish successes, as Murray successfully bypassed
Perth and began a rampage through Fife. The tower at Falkland was destroyed,
followed quickly by a three-week siege of St. Andrews including siege weaponry.
The castle surrendered on the last day in February, and was immediately slighted.
The castle at Leuchars had also been levelled at some point in February, leaving only
Cupar in English hands. In March Murray moved to Clydesdale and besieged
31 Baker, p 58; ScaMcronica, p 167; Anonimalle, p 9; The best work to date on this specific event and
the preceding events is J. Bothwell, 'Edward III, The English Peerage, and the 1337 Earls', in J.
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Bothwell, forcing it to surrender on terms. By the beginning of spring, the entirety of
the gains Edward had made in 1336 outside of Perth had already been lost. The
necessity of focusing on the French threat had permanently shifted the initiative to
the Scots. 32 For better or worse, English attention had become riveted on France.
February saw an attempt to seize the strategic town of Saint-Macaire in Aquitaine by
one of Philip VI's commanders. The parliament of March 1337 agreed to one last
diplomatic mission to avert war, though diplomatic efforts to gather allies in the Low
Countries had already begun. The mission failed utterly, as Philip VI had fully
committed himself to full war — a fact highlighted by the calling of the arrière-ban
throughout France on 30 Apri1.33
The English had not completely forgotten about Scotland, merely had put it on
the back burner. The Earl of Warwick, Thomas Beauchamp was appointed
commander of the army in Scotland on 25 March 1337, as Edward had no intention
of coming north to fight that year. Plans had been made to provide him with 580
men-at-arms and 4,000 archers, along with the right to call for reinforcements from
the northern counties should they be required. 34 The forces he was promised he
needed, as Murray had no intention of lessening the pressure. Stirling was besieged
in April 1337; though the siege was unsuccessful, it was worrisome enough to force
Edward to once again race north with reinforcements to lead an army to relieve the
castle at the beginning of June. Continuing his policy of not engaging sizeable
English forces, Murray withdrew before Edward's arrival, allowing Edward to reach
Stirling by 14 June unmolested. The king stayed in the region until the end of June,
Bothwell (ed.), The Age of Edward III (Woodbridge, 2001) pp 35-52
32 Scotichronicon, pp 124-127; Fordun, p 362; Bridlington, p 128; Lanercost, p 288; Wyntoun, p 435;
Melsa, p 378; Rot Scot, pp 483, 485
33 Sumption, Trial By Battle, pp 184, 196
34 Rot Scot pp 487, 488, 495; BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 245r-247r, 261r-264v; See Ch. 8: The
Army
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then hurriedly departed to deal with preparing for campaigning against France.35
Though he saved Stirling, there was not much else that could be done to halt the slide
downwards. The situation in Galloway became critical when Eustace Maxwell, an
early supporter of Balliol and Edward's sheriff of Dumfriesshire, switched sides.
Further rescue efforts were required in October, when the Scots raided Cumberland
and Edinburgh became Murray's newest target for besieging the following month.36
As much of Beauchamp's small army had disbanded in November, Edward was
forced to route troops that had been meant for an invasion of France that never
occurred northward. This force, including the earls of Arundel, Salisbury, and
Gloucester had over 750 men-at-arms, 2300 hobelars and horse archers, and 500
Welsh foot.37
After this force relieved Edinburgh without a fight, it turned eastward to
attempt to remove one of the largest thorns in the side of the English in southern
Scotland. The castle of Dunbar had been refurbished by the Earl of March in 1334,
under pressure from Edward. It now was serving as a centre of resistance under
Dunbar's wife, known as 'Black Agnes'. More importantly, its small port was
serving as an entry point for French supplies and money to enter the country. With
the loss of Fife except for the lone garrison at Cupar, English control of Scotland
north of the Forth consisted for all practical purposes only of Perth. Unless measures
could be taken to somehow stabilise Scotland south of the Forth, there were no
means by which Perth could be reliably relieved and reinforced except by sea. Such
a situation would leave the town isolated and essentially harmless while the Scots
Scotichronicon, pp 130-1; Fordun, p 362; Anonimalle, p 10; Scalacronica, p 167. Henry Pledour,
leading the king's bodyguard, saw his contingent begin receiving pay on 27 May and end on 29 June,
while certain of the garrisons' reinforcements on 14 June are listed as after the siege: BL Cotton Nero
C VIII, fos. 261r; 249v
36 Scotichronicon, pp 130-1; Fordun, p 362; Anonimalle, pp 10-12; Scalacronica, pp 167-8;
Lanercost,pp 305-6; Rot Scot, pp 499, 501-13
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continued to roll up the English garrisons. Montague and Arundel began their siege
of Dunbar on 13 January, complete with stone-throwers and a sow. 38 The siege did
not go well for the English. The sow was destroyed by a stonethrower in the castle;
and the attempts to starve out the garrison were partly set back by a daring blockade
run by Alexander Ramsey. Another attempt to subvert a gatekeeper nearly resulted in
Montague's capture, narrowly avoided by the actions of John Coupland, who would
later be the captor of David Bruce at Neville's Cross.39
In the end, the events in the south took precedence. Both the leadership and
the troop contingents of Montague, FitzAlan, and Audley were needed to try to
prosecute the war with France. Montague was ordered south with his entire army,
leaving Dunbar untaken and only a relatively few of the garrisons in Scotland still in
English hands. All but Perth had been lost north of the Forth; only Berwick,
Roxburgh, Edinburgh, and Stirling were in royal hands, while Lochmaben, Jedburgh,
and a scattering of smaller fortifications remained in English hands. The Scottish
chroniclers were entirely correct when they said the advent of war with France saved
their country, and it is striking how fragile the English military machine proved to be
when faced with enemies on two sides. 40
 It also aided the Scots greatly that France
was seen as the more important foe, leaving little interest in England for fighting in
the north when greater prizes loomed in the south.
37 A.E. Prince, 'The Strength of English Armies in the Reign of Edward Ill', EHR 183 (1931) pp 359-
60
38 Scotichronicon, pp 126-129; Scalacronica, p 168; Lanercost, p295; Wyntoun, pp 431-5;
Anonimalle, p 13; Forditn, pp 362-3
39 Details taken from Scotichronicon, pp 128-131
40 Fordun, p 363
122
The Army
8
The Army
Understanding why the Disinherited and the English were so successful in
battle during the 1330s requires a lengthy analysis of the composition of their armies.
It was their campaign forces that scored the major military successes of the war, from
Dupplin Moor until the failure of Montague at the siege of Dunbar Castle. These
armies were not based on the same tactical model as the campaign of 1327 or earlier
years. Instead, they employed new tactics, effectively using dismounted men-at-
arms and large numbers of archers to defeat numerically superior foes on more than
one occasion, as was shown in earlier chapters.
Several different factors have to be looked at to succeed in understanding the
success of the army. The first is the primary material that exists on the English
forces of the time, from chronicle accounts to financial records to commissions of
array. By examining the problems inherent in these documents and the limits that
places on what can be drawn from the material, we can be more certain about the
conclusions that can be made.
Second, the recruitment of the troops that make up the campaign forces will
be looked at, both in terms of numbers and in terms of their origins. By looking at the
type of troops requested and changes from year to year in those requests, conclusions
can be drawn about the success and acceptance of the new tactics appearing in the
1330s, the most dependable sources of manpower, and the changed aims of the
English for each campaign. Of major importance is the comparison between the
recruitment from older sources of manpower such as obligatory service and newer
methods such as contracts and mixed retinues.
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Third, the size and pay of each campaign force has to be calculated, from the
start of the campaign to the army's dispersal. This is necessary to understand the
tactical and strategic choices taken by the commanders in the field and the resources
they had at their disposal. An idea of the overall military strength of England can be
drawn from these numbers, as can an idea of what size forces the country could
maintain over a number of years of constant campaigning.
Last, the contributions of individuals have to be considered, particularly of
the magnates who provided retinues of men-at-arms and mounted archers. In
considering the origins of these men and the numbers they could provide,
conclusions can be drawn about the breadth of support for the war over time, the
limits of their recruiting power, and the sources of leadership that Edward III could
depend on for his military forces.
For ease of analysis, these questions are considered separately for the cavalry
and infantry. While there were trends towards the recruitment of mixed retinues and
a blurring of lines between cavalry and infantry due to the new tactics being
employed, the social origins and recruitment methods of the soldiers were different
for each category. These differences were significant enough that it makes little
sense not to consider them in the same way.
The Sources
Unfortunately, we have no surviving pay records or administrative materials
for Edward's reign before 1334 that would give us the evidence to estimate the
numbers on each campaign. Though we know of the occasional groups retained,
such as Henry Percy's guard of himself and another banneret, eleven knights, 47
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squires, and eighty hobelars beginning in June 1327, 1
 we do not have enough to craft
an overall picture solely from these sources.
The main evidence on the composition of the English forces in Scotland
during the Roxburgh campaign and the years immediately following comprises the
detailed pay lists and expenses recorded in the controller's copy of the wardrobe
book of Richard Ferriby. Through this we have much more information to work with
than we do for previous campaigns, such as the Halidon Hill campaign of 1333.
Unfortunately, the wardrobe book, while providing a wealth of information on names
of participating magnates and the numbers of troops that England could provide, has
its problems.2
The most glaring of these is the apparent lack of evidence of desertions
during the campaigns. The recorded payments to both men-at-arms and archers,
mounted and unmounted, are almost pristine in terms of the numbers receiving
wages and their serving out the full service recorded. While a number of entries do
record the occasional soldier as `vacatus', or not receiving wages due to being
absent, the rate is nowhere near what is usual for English armies campaigning in
Scotland. Edward I's Caerlaverock campaign in 1300, for instance, suffered. a forty-
percent loss of forces due to desertion in the month of July alone.3
By contrast, Ferriby's wardrobe book lists few if any such losses for the
Roxburgh and following campaigns. The reduction of troops with the king over time
was recorded as entire units being released from service, rather than widespread
attrition of manpower across the hoard. From the vadia hobelanun, sagittarioruni et
pedituin section of the wardrobe book for winter 1334-5, a total of 7 mounted archers
PRO E372/173, m. 10d
2 Andrew Ayton, Knights and Warhorses: Military Service and the English Aristocracy Under
Edward III (Woodbridge, 1994), pp 146-155 is the best discussion on this particularly annoying
difficulty.
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and 13 foot archers are `vacatus' in the pay records for fifteen days each on average
— this from a total of some 3400 archers under the king's command, in the midst of a
winter campaign noted for its brutal weather. 4 Edward certainly believed there was a
problem with desertion during this winter. Writs were sent to the sheriffs of seven
counties ordering the incarceration of deserters from the army as early as 16
November 1334, just as the army was heading into Scotland.5
The reasons for these discrepancies are unclear. Nicholson speculated that
the problems of desertion were either exaggerated by the king, or that the wardrobe
book concealed considerable peculation and graft. 6 Even if it is assumed that only
the levies from the northern shires would be prone to desertion, with the Welsh and
the archers from the magnates' retinues immune from leaving without permission, a
sizeable proportion of the armies throughout 1334-6 should have suffered noticeable
erosion. Unfortunately, this does not occur, or occurs in highly uneven fashion.
What absences do occur must be either 'with leave' vacancies or otherwise accepted
departures, rather than desertion. The wardrobe book does not specify whether the
absences are at the beginning, end, or middle of the service period, which would
seem to rule out illegal departure from the army.
A telling example of this can be found in the pay records of Henry Percy for
the 1337 campaign under Thomas Beauchamp, earl of Warwick. He is listed as
`infirmatus', or ill for nine days during the campaign. While the entry is unusual for
listing why Percy was not receiving pay for those days, it is otherwise comparable
1 Giber Quotidinnus Controtulatoris Garderobiae 1299-1300, ed. J. Topham eta! (1787), pp 245-57
4 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 252r-254v, passim; Bridlington, p 120
5 Rot Scot, p 293
6 Nicholson, p181
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with the other various entries regarding missing or absent men on the campaign,
including the one squire listed as absent for two days in the same entry as Percy's.7
It is unlikely that the crown would be paying the captains of contingents for
troops that were not with the army, even if obligated to do so by indenture. In
addition, the portion of the army collected through commissions of array in the shires
would have no such contractual agreement. It is also highly unlikely that Richard
Ferriby was so unfamiliar with military matters that he would pay the wages out of
hand without questioning if the men were actually with the army — he was the
recipient of several writs pertaining to wages and victuals for the army, and was
actually with the army during the 1335 summer offensive accompanied by six men-
at-arms. 8
There are surviving partial or company muster rolls from the period, and the
listed numbers of troops for companies differ, often widely, from the entries in the
account book. The most complete of these is the muster roll for Henry Lancaster's
campaign during summer 1336. 9 Andrew Ayton pointed out that Ralph Neville in
1336 is recorded as serving with 36 men-at-arms throughout the summer, but the
muster rolls indicate a fluctuating number of men-at-arms from thirty to 39 to twenty
actually with Neville at any point in time, and never the precise number listed in
Ferriby's book. 19 The existence of such musters eliminates the likelihood of the
contingent captains being responsible for the discrepancies.
The important factor in the discrepancies is the source of the material. With
the muster rolls, the importance is in noting the day-to-day numbers participating in
the campaign, and the number of men immediately available for military action. The
7 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 245r
8 CCR 1333-7, pp 448, 463, 538, 542, 553, 586; BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 239r
9 PRO E101/19/36
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account book, though appearing to be a single complete source, is meant for financial
accounting first and foremost. The exact number receiving pay does not matter
provided that the amounts recorded equal the actual sum of payments made to the
various contingent captains. The structure of the vadia guerre record supports this,
with initial entries for a campaign or a page of payments being heavily detailed,
listing all the information possible, and following entries containing only the
differing number of men and amounts paid. Take for instance a page from the
Roxburgh campaign. 11
 The initial entry gives all the relevant information for the
Earl of Warwick's service — his serving with the king in the Scottish war with 40
men-at-arms from 14 November in year 8 (1334) until 11 Feb year 9 (1335), etc., etc.
By the end of the page, only the individual being paid, their rank, the number of men,
and that they were being paid 'as before' is recorded for bannerets such as Giles
Baddlesmere and John Multon. This is in part a reflection of the fatigue involved in
recording several thousand men at once via hand-written records on parchment.
However, it also reflects the lack of necessity in having the precise, fully detailed
information recorded for each and every contingent, since this information is already
abridged and abbreviated.
This does limit the usefulness of the information in the wardrobe book.
However, with only partial or incomplete muster rolls existing, it still is our best
source of information for the military activities of 1334-7. Though day-by-day
numbers cannot be computed as they can for campaigns with the musters recorded,
the listings we do have provide reasonably accurate averages of the troops that were
available and participating in the war in Scotland. Difficulties only arise when the
abbreviation of the pay records changes the types of men serving. One example is
Andrew Ayton, Knights and Warhorses: Military Service and the English Aristocracy Under
Edward III, pp 152-153; BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 240r; PRO E101/19/36 (muster roll)
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John Tibitot in 1336, where 12 mounted archers are listed as providing the service of
four men-at-arms. I2 However, such cases seem relatively rare, and the advantages
provided by the internal consistency of the wardrobe book make up somewhat for
this.
Another difficulty is the various campaigning forces that did not receive the
king's wages or leave behind documentary evidence of their own. The best example
of this are those forces in Edward Balliol's pay. Though he received numerous
prests and payments from Edward and the exchequer throughout the wars, his
claimed title as King of Scotland meant that he could not accept wages in the same
fashion as any magnate of less than royal status could. Our best glimpses of those in
Balliol's company are when the English crown is providing them, as in the
expedition into the Highlands in 1335, or when Balliol fails to pay them their wages
and relies upon the English crown to do so as with Bartholomew Fanacourt in
1336. 13 Neither do we have anything but chronicle references to most other military
activity, such as David Strathbogie's.
Cavalry
The men-at-arms who served in the armies of Edward III have more in
common with those of Edward's father and grandfather than the archers who served
under each. Though there were some important alterations in how these men fought
on the battlefield, their origins as the elite of the land still remained the same. Many
of the names — Percy, Neville, Lestrange, Beauchamp, Umfraville, Baddlesmere
"BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 233v
12 Andrew Ayton, Knights and Warhorses: Militaty Service and the English Aristocracy Under
Edward III, p 153
1 3 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 236r-237v, 255r-256v (Expedition); 241r (Fanacourt)
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were the same, the sons and grandsons still carrying out the same roles on the
battlefield and on campaign. However, there were some sizeable differences
between the generations.
The reluctance of magnates to accept pay from the crown had long since
passed. 14 Those magnates who did participate in the war in the north had no
problems accepting wages from the crown, whether they were simple knights and
bannerets or important earls such as John Bohun, earl of Hereford, John Warenne,
earl of Surrey, or Thomas Beauchamp, earl of Warwick. Even the king's brother,
John of Eltham, accepted wages up until his death in September 1336.
Several factors account for this. One was the economic cost of equipping and
maintaining retinues to bring on campaign. Rising costs of equipment, mounts, and
supplies made it increasingly difficult to support 'private' forces in the fie)d. The
granting of prests, or advancements on future wages from the crown, is a good
indicator of economic necessity on the parts of magnates in order for them to carry
out their service. Edward III used them for several individuals to make sure their
retinues made it to campaign, much as Edward I had done. John Norwich, Edward
Monthermer, Peter Dounedale, Adam Well, and Thomas Hastangs all received £5
prests per twenty men-at-arms in 1335 for the summer campaign.' 5 Such prests were
not restricted to minor magnates or those with obvious financial woes. John St.
Albans's account from 1337-8 lists several prests to individuals such as Edward
Balliol, the king's uncle and earl Marshal Thomas Brotherton, the bishop of Carlisle,
and Richard Talbot. These prests ranged from the £50 given to Richard Talbot on 7
November 1338 to the £364 received by Thomas Brotherton on 29 July 1337.16
1 4 For reluctance, see M.C. Prestwich, Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English
Experience (New Haven, 1996), pp 97-99
BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 237r-237v
16 PRO E101/20/19
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Second was a sea change in the political attitude of the country, and of those
magnates who participated in Edward III's campaigns. His grandfather and father
had been opposed by magnates such as Roger Bigod, Earl of Norfolk and Thomas of
Lancaster — powerful nobles, seasoned to political infighting, and all too aware of
their personal rights, privileges, and position in opposition to the wishes of the
crown. They felt the need to defend themselves and their rights from the
encroachment of the crown. In practice, this meant serving militarily under the old
feudal terms, carrying out their unpaid service and paying their own way on
campaign. Accepting wages from the crown was tantamount to accepting a
subordination that an earl of the realm was not subject to. When novel terms of
service were put into place, they met with vociferous objection.
By the 1330s, the political situation had changed dramatically. The active
magnates in military service were not the old dragons of the previous generation,
barring John Warenne; they were a younger generation, of the same age as Edward
III. Rather than seeing the crown as the opposition, it was the fount of opportunity
held by a man of the same age and interests, capable in war, and more
accommodating than his predecessors. This was not a king to whom the magnates
were opposed vociferously while there were occasional disagreements, it was not
the intense conflict of the previous reign, and would not be until 1341. Taking wages
had become much more practical and acceptable, rather than the anathema it had
been to previous generations.
The rates of pay were standardised at the usual levels for the late thirteenth
and early fourteenth centuries in England. 17
 An earl or bishop would receive eight
shillings a day for his presence on campaign; a knight banneret, 4 shillings; a knight
bachelor, two shillings; and a squire or simple man-at-arms one shilling, or twelve
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pennies a day. Though noted separately as vexillatores or standard-bearers, the
individuals entrusted with the banners of St. Cuthbert, St. John of Beverley, and the
Virgin Mary from York received the same wages as those of equal rank elsewhere in
the army: 2s per day for the knight carrying St. Cuthbert's banner on campaign in
1335, while the two men-at-arms carrying the lesser banners from Beverley and York
received a shilling each.
The pay records in Ferriby's wardrobe book do not vary from this formula
except for during the Roxburgh campaign and the summer campaign of 1335.
Magnates during these campaigns were paid a lump sum of £100 per 20 men-W-anas
for one quarter's service, essentially 90 days. As Andrew Ayton pointed out, this
pay scale is not very favourable to the men receiving it; 18 though it provides roughly
for a banneret and 19 men-at-arms, most retinues maintained a 1:3 to 1:6 ratio of
knights earning 2s/day to men-at-arms earning is/day. Assuming even the latter
ratio, there would likely be three knights in a retinue of twenty, leaving the retinue
leader £13 lOs short per 20 men. 19 This assumes, of course, that the full wage is
passed on to the men in the retinue, and that they are not contracted with the retinue
leader giving him more favourable terms.
Gaining the manpower necessary to carry out Edward's campaigns often
depended upon the resources of a very small group of magnates. The bulk of the
men-at-arms for the Roxburgh campaign were provided for by only twelve men. Six
of these were earls, and one of these the brother of the king. The largest contingent
was not that of an earl: instead, it was the 120 men-at-arms of Henry Percy, carried
M.C. Prestwich, Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience, p 84
IS Andrew Ayton, Knights and Warhorses: Militaty Service and the English Aristocrac y Under
Edward III, p 104
19 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, passim
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over from his service holding custody of the March until 10 November 1334. John
of Eltham, the king's brother and Earl of Cornwall came close to matching this, with
100 men in his retinue. The other four earls were Richard FitzAlan (Arundel),
Thomas Beauchamp (Warwick), John de Vere (Oxford), and Gilbert Umfraville
(Angus). A large contingent from John Warenne (Surrey) also participated, though
the earl himself did not. The others had similar financial stature, if not perhaps the
titles. Ralph Neville, Steward of the Household and one of the most powerful of the
northern lords had sixty men in his retinue, partly from having just finished the same
duty as Percy in holding custody of the March, while Henry Lancaster, son of the
Earl of Lancaster, matched these numbers. Ebulo Lestrange and John Mowbray
were both northern lords, while James Audley was strong in the west. Overall, these
twelve men provided 664 of the 818 men-at-arms provided by the magnates. Most of
these men received £100 for each twenty men they provided or some fraction
thereof. Gilbert Umfraville and John Warenne received only 100 marks for each
twenty they provided; the difference was attributed to the titles each man held as
earls of Angus and Strathearn, respectively.20
 The reduction by a third is in line with
a similar pay modification for the mounted archers of several magnates, who saw
their pay reduced by a third upon entering Scotland from 6d/day per mounted archer
to 4d/day.
Most of the rest of the force was comprised of the royal household, though to
actually describe it as such is misleading. Many of those regularly receiving robes
and fees for serving with the household did participate in the campaign, with only
three bannerets and two knights not receiving pay at some point in the campaign.
Many, however, did not receive robes and fees, and appear to have had little enough
connection with the royal household other than to be in its pay for the campaign.
20 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 234r
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The most likely explanation is that these men and their small retinues were simply
included in the household lists as theirs would have been individual or small
contracts, rather than the large scale of the greater magnates. 21
 The one exception
was William Northwell, who acted as paymaster for a large contingent of 84 men-at-
arms, including Thomas Wake of Liddell, a major Disinherited lord in his own right.
Also notable among these were William L'English and John Brocaz, two squires of
the household who would regularly bring contingents equal to those of more
important household knights like Reginald Cobham and Thomas Bradeston
throughout the campaigns of the 1330s. 22
 These forty-nine listed groups provide
only half of that the major magnates contribute, totalling some 379 men. The largest
of these, barring Northwell's and the large conglomerate of individually named
household squires, were the eight of Maurice Berkeley and the seven of Reginald
Cobham, a number far below what the major magnates could each individually
gather.
The final group, and by far the smallest, were those men-at-arms provided
directly by the counties in response to the initial military summons. The three
ridings of Yorkshire provided 58 men between them. As the main focus of
recruitment in the counties was on hobelars and mounted archers rather than men-at-
arms, this turnout is unsurprising. This group was the only one to receive any real
number of reinforcements during the campaign, as 34 men-at-arms from
Nottinghamshire and Lincolnshire joined Edward in January, though they did so for
211  have chosen to follow Nicholson (Edward III and the Scots, pp 175-6) in creating this distinction;
though it is somewhat artificial, it makes sense considering that it is how they are organized in the
actual pay records and the somewhat fluid nature of membership in the household. For instance, Rhys
ap Gruffyd did not receive fees during the winter of 1334, but did receive robes. He was on the
campaign, but not grouped with the household for pay purposes as he was leading the contingent from
South Wales, though Walter Mauny was when serving in the same capacity with the men from
Merionydd . The general indication is that membership in the household does not follow any hard and
fast rule, when on campaign. BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 234r-235v (wages), 223r (fees), 225r
(robes)
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little more than a month. These certainly would have come thanks to the pointed and
threatening letters sent by Edward from Roxburgh complaining of desertions and the
failure of many to join the campaign despite earlier requests.23
Men-at-Arms Sources - Roxburgh Campaign,
	 Despite this, the number of
1334-5
men-at-arms gathered was a
5%
I. Counties	 standards of a winter campaign. A
62%	 58 men-at-arms
Welsh total of 1255 men-at-arms had been62 men-at-arrns
gathered by the end of November at
Roxburgh, a total not including the retinues of Balliol and others not receiving the
king's wages. 24 Another sixty-two men-at-arms and centenars were part of the
sizeable Welsh contribution to the campaign, with fully half of these originating from
North Wales. 25
 Combined with those arriving late such as Thomas Wake of
Blisworth, the total number of men-at-arms receiving pay was 1354 over the course
of the campaign. Unfortunately, the lump sums recorded for pay limit our
understanding of the makeup of the contingents; only John de Vere and John Grey of
Rotherfeld have the number of knights and bannerets in their contingents recorded
for the magnates. While the information for the household contingents is much more
complete, the small size and low rank of each retinue reduces the amount of
information we can draw from them. Of the 379 men in the household, 42 were
knights and 337 men-at-arms, giving a ratio of roughly 8:1 of men-at-arms to
kniglitc. This is likely to be at the high end of the typical ratio, as these contingent
22 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 2'35r
23 Rot Scot, pp 292-4, 302
24 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 233r-235v
25 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 254r-254v
• Magnates
818 men-at-arms4%	 respectable one, especially by the
ID Household
379 men-at-arms29%
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leaders were all of knight or lower rank, and would not have the financial resources
or personal rank to recruit as many of equal status as themselves.
Where many of Edward's Scottish campaigns after Halidon Hill would show
restraint in the number of troops assembled, the summer campaign of 1335 was an
exception. 26
 Sheer mass was obviously the aim, in an effort to crush all opposition
and forestall the growing French diplomatic interest in including Scotland as a factor
in Anglo-French relations. Particularly worth noting are the differences in retinue
sizes for those who participated in both this campaign and the earlier one to
Roxburgh; these differences give us an idea as to the differences between the number
of men these magnates could draw on reliably in any circumstances, such as
Roxburgh, and the largest numbers possible for these individuals to call on. These
changes are especially notable for the greatest magnates, as would be expected; their
greater overall resources allowed them to throw far more men into the field when
pressed than when trying to operate with retinues of sustainable size year after year.
Thomas Beauchamp brought forty men-at-arms with him to Roxburgh, but was able
to double the size of his retinue to 92 men-at-arms for the summer campaign. Henry
Lancaster managed a similar feat, increasing his retinue size from sixty to 113 men.
The largest increase by far is that from John Warenne, earl of Surrey. Despite
providing only forty men-at-arms in November 1334, Warenne was able to bring a
huge contingent of 242 men-at-arms, including himself, the Earl of Oxford, six
bannerets, and forty-seven knights in its number.27
26 Both the 1336 and 1337 campaigns would have only a small fraction of the men-at-arms and
infantry in comparison to the numbers gathered for 1335; see Appendices 1-2.
27 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 233v, 236r (Lancaster, Beauchamp); 234r, 326r (Warenne)
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Magnate	 Winter 1334 Summer 1335 °A increase
John Warenne	 40 242 505.0%
John of Eltham	 100 135 35.0%
Thomas Beauchamp	 40 92 130.0%
Richard FitzAlan	 80 106 32.5%
Gilbert Umfraville	 30 40 33.3%
Henry Lancaster	 60 113 88.3%
Ralph Neville	 60 85 41.7%
Henry Percy	 120 140 16.7%
Ebulo Lestrange	 40 60 50.0%
James Audley	 26 40 53.8%
John Mowbray	 40 43 7.5%
Anthony Lucy	 30 30 0.0%
Ranulph Dacre	 20 30 50.0%
Gilbert Talbot	 20 32 60.0%
Roger Swynnerton	 20 20 0.0%
Hugh Freyne	 20 28 40.0%
John Grey of Rotherfeld 14 20 42.9%
Totals	 760 1256 65.3%
242.6%
I Raw percentage change
2 Adjusted for atypical Warenne increase
Taken from BL Cotton Nero C VIII, 233f-239r
This difference between all-out effort and deliberate selection is less striking
for others, both on the higher and lower ends of the scale. Roger Swynnerton and
Anthony Lucy brought the exact same number to both campaigns; John Mowbray
could only scrape together an additional three knights, and the unfortunate John de
Vere, earl of Oxford had to join Warenne's retinue in order to appear at al1. 28 Still,
after discounting Warenne's highly exceptional increase in retinue size, the magnates
that participated in both the Roxburgh campaign and the Great Offensive were able
to increase their retinue size by just over forty percent.
28 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 233v, 236r-237r
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Of the magnates listed individually for the Roxburgh campaign, only Giles
Baddlesmere, Henry FitzHugh, and John Mutton did not participate the following
summer.
29
 The loss of their thirty knights was more than offset by the large number
of additional magnates and soldiers who signed onto the campaign, including the
large retinues of Hugh Audley, William Montague, Henry Beaumont, and William
Latimer. These four men brought 463 men-at-arms between them, and overall the
total from individual magnate contingents was 2242 men.
There was also a sizeable foreign contingent, which would echo the cross-
channel connections that Edward III would rely heavily upon during the initial stages
of the Hundred Years' War. The earl of Juliers brought a large contingent of 92
men-at-arms with him, along with 51 crossbowmen. Jean de Jens, a Savoyard who
had served during the Roxburgh campaign, also joined the king in 1335, though his
retinue consisted only of himself and two others. 3° Two other contingents were
described as coming from Germany, though this may have referred to the Low
Countries rather than to areas farther east. 31 These four contingents provided 119
men-at-arms to the campaign. While this is a relatively small proportion of the men-
at-arms in the army, it did mean the largest use of foreign troops since John of
Hainault and the lacklustre Weardale campaign.32
While the magnate contingents increased greatly in size and number, the
household contribution did not. Though a few managed to increase the size of their
contributions, such as Reginald Cobham and Maurice Berkeley, the household
actually shrunk in size, from 379 to 334 men-at-arms. This is not all that surprising;
29 Though we have no basis for comparison for John de Vere, due to the previously mentioned service
with John Warenne.
30 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 237v
31 One of these contingents includes a Dietrich Mauny, which suggests a connection to Walter Mauny
and Hainault.
92 Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, pp 20-21
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with the difficulties of a winter campaign, Edward III would have relied heavily
upon his household to provide whatever troops they could. The reduction is mainly
due to the removal of several contingents to a separate accounting category as
forinsec,	 or	 non-
4%	 1%	 household	 troops.
Fifty-four men-at-
arms are listed either
in this category or
other	 miscellaneous
entries, where in the previous winter they would have been included in the
household. The most explicit example of this was Robert Boswell, who received pay
for 10 men-at-arms in the winter campaign as part of the household but received pay
for seven men-at-arms in summer as a miscellaneous contingent not associated with
the household.33
In part, this may explain why Edward was so assiduous in cultivating the
careers and fortunes of his bannerets and other favourites. 34 Along with all of the
benefits that political allies may provide, he also was faced with the difficulties of a
limited manpower pool whose limit was about 350 men, excluding what his
bannerets and favoured men could bring with them on campaign. While in the long
term the solution to this problem was to expand permanently the household numbers,
it could be helped in the short term by increasing the financial and economic
wherewithal oF those already serving as household knights.
As usual, the counties provided little in the way of men-at-arms, with only
nineteen from Lancashire making an appearance. The Welsh contribution was also
BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 235r, 239v
Men-at-Arms Sources - The Great Offensive, 1335
• Magnates
2242 men
0 Household
334 men
• Forinsec
54 men
0 Foreign
119 men
• Counties
19 men
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much lower than during the winter campaign; what men-at-arms came with their
contingents acted as leaders and centenars, rather than as a separate mounted force.
Edward did not miss their minor absence; overall, he had 2768 men-at-arms at his
disposal, more than enough for both his force moving north from Carlisle and for
Balliol's force beginning their march up the east coast from Berwick. Balliol was
reinforced with the retinues of John Warenne, Richard FitzAlan, Gilbert Umfraville,
Ralph Neville, Henry Percy, Thomas Berkeley, and William Latimer, providing him
with 732 men-at-arms in addition to his own contingent. 35
 Such a move made sense:
it guaranteed that Balliol would have the force necessary to succeed in his sweep up
the eastern seaboard, without seriously weakening the force at Edward's command.
The choice of men to stay with Balliol also made sense; Warenne, Percy, and
Umfraville in particular were close to Balliol. Warenne and Umfraville had their
disputed earldoms, to which Balliol was the key, while Percy had his indenture for
life with Ballio1.36
Balliol would later make another independent sweep, this time a run through
the Highlands in late September. Sent to accompany him was a good-sized force, all
of experienced men. The four earls of Hereford, Buchan, Angus, and Warwick
brought their 258 men-at-arms, as did Henry Lancaster and his 113 men. Ralph
Neville, William Clinton and Robert Ufford represented the royal household, while
William Latimer and John Norwich rounded out the party. This gave Balliol 580
men-at-arms in addition to his own men, sufficient enough to manage his flying raid
without d ifficul ty.37
34 J. Bothwell, 'Edward III and the 'New Nobility': Largesse and Limitation in Fourteenth-Century
England', EHR, v 112 no. 449 (1997) pp 1111-1140
35 Scalacronica, p 165; Lanercost, p281; Bridlington, p 122
36 J.M.W. Bean, "The Percies and their Estates in Scotland", Archaeologia Aeliana, 4'h
 ser, 35 (1957),
pp 97-8
37 Cotton Nero C VIII fos. 236r-237v
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The third English army to strike Scotland that year was the expeditionary
force from Ireland under the justiciar of Ireland, John Darcy. The expectations of
how many men-at-arms could serve was high; 600 were requested, though not
without extensive efforts to include Irish bishops and native leaders in order to reach
this tota1. 38
 Though this number was not reached, the results were respectable. By
26 August, 485 men-at-arms were part of the force meant to overrun the Clyde
estuary, one-third of whom were provided by Maurice FitzThomas, earl of Desmond.
Their service was short, running only through 15 September, though 114 men
including Darcy, Desmond and Thomas Wogan stayed on through 14 October.
The armies after 1335 differed in several respects from those before. The
experiment with paying lump sums per quarter per twenty men was abandoned; from
this point, wages were computed at the standard daily rates. More importantly, the
move away from direct royal command of the fight in Scotland altered the number of
men-at-arms required. Instead of the king commanding, a `capitaneus' with the same
powers of enforcement as the king over the army was commissioned to serve in his
stead. While sizeable forces were still needed and assigned to Henry Lancaster in
1336 and Thomas Beauchamp in 1337, the level of resources being put towards
Scotland had definitely been reduced.
Lancaster's responsibilities in 1336 were to secure the lowland areas as far
north as Perth, alongside Edward Balliol, who once again we know was operating in
the area, but have no pay records for. 39
 The resumption of computing pay by days
served rather than in lump sums gives us a clearer picture of how the force changed
over time, though the abridgement of the original pay records in the wardrobe book
18 Rot Scot pp 340-3, E101/19/16; see also R. Nicholson, 'An Irish Expedition to Scotland in 1335',
IHR vol 13 no. 51 (1963), pp 197-211
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limits this. Still, we can gather a general idea of the numbers under Lancaster's
command. By 21 May, two days after reaching the remnants of Perth, Lancaster had
446 men-at-arms under his command, half of whom were provided by himself,
Thomas Beauchamp, and Henry Percy. The army's cavalry core was essentially the
retinues of a few key supporters of the king, most of whom already had ample reason
to be fighting in Scotland to begin with. Percy and Ughtred had previously made
indentures with Balliol. Umfraville and Beaumont had their earldoms to defend,
while William Bohun had Annandale. Neville was serving out an indenture with
Percy, though his northern interests would have pushed him to serve, much like
Ranulph Dacre. 4° In
total, there were four
earls,
	 twelve
bannerets, and sixty-
eight knights among
the	 450	 under
Lancaster.
This	 would
increase to 718 men-
at-arms by 28 June
with the arrival of 198 men-at-arms as part of the king's party in its race north to
Perth. The king's guard were mostly members of the household, though it included
Henry Ferrers, one of the Disinherited, and John Grey of Rotherfeld. Montague,
Robert Ufford, and Thomas Bradeston were recorded separately as individual
39 Original Letters, pp 32-3
40 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 240v-241r
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magnates; Walter Mauny and 151 other members of the extended household were
recorded in their own section of the vadia guerre, as was usual.'"
It is uncertain how many men-at-arms accompanied the king north in his
chevauchee. The Queen's letter describing the event claims four hundred men-at-
arms went with him,42
 and it seems likely that the entire royal household including
William Bohun and Ralph Neville would have gone north. This only accounts for
roughly 290 men, leaving 150 in addition to Bohun and Neville's contingents to be
drawn out of Lancaster's troops. Henry Percy was recorded as losing horses at
Elgin; if his entire contingent of 74 men-at-arms had gone with him, it would have
made up the bulk of the remainder necessary to fulfil the 400 mentioned. Further
precision is difficult, though some individuals can be named;43
 what seems likely is
that Lancaster would have not been on the chevauchee, instead commanding the
rump of the forces left supporting Balliol at Perth. Further reinforcements were few
and far between, though Montague's contingent would balloon from the six with
which he began the journey from Newcastle on 14 June to a height of 58 in mid-
August, before slowly being reduced to 47 by 8 October. The only other sizeable
addition to the forces in the north was the retinue of John of Eltham on 28 July.44
It is questionable how many troops John of Eltham brought north with him to
Perth in 1336, especially the 400 men-at-arms and 7000 hobelars and archers
mentioned in the Queen's letter. The wardrobe pay records record no other retinues
coming under pay at the same time as John on 28 July, and only the five retinues of
41 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 241r-242v, 243v-244r; Scalacronica, p 166 describes the king's guard
as '100 men at arms', about half that listed as receiving pay as part of the king's household or as
accompanying the king north. However, if one discounts the lists of squires other than the retinues of
William L'English and John Brocaz, the total comes to 95, about that suggested by Grey. The 100
may also have been a conscious echoing of the 100 men-at-arms that Guy of Namur had with him
during his similar rush north the previous year.
42 Original Letters, pp 33-9
43 Details of horse losses and valuations can be found in John Houton's horse valuations: E101 19 36,
discussed in A. Ayton, Knights and Warhorses (1994), pp 63-4
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William Guilford, Giles Beauchamp, William Stury, Walter Facomberge, and John
Molyns enter service in July at all. Additionally, no contingents from any of the
counties begin receiving pay in July, and the contingent from six counties starting on
5 August is likely to mostly be a remnant from a similar multiple-county force that
immediately precedes it. This date of 5 August also makes it further unlikely to be a
new force, as one would expect it to have been entered into the books on a date far
closer than the nine days separating it from Eltham's. On 28 July seven separate
counties are recorded as having contingents, 45
 and the strength of these continues to
be recorded through August. Their presence makes it more unlikely that further
large contingents were being drawn from the northern counties, or that they would
not be recorded in the pay records if they were. The most likely explanation for
John's large force described both by the Queen's letter and by the chroniclers is his
meeting and merging with Lancaster's force in the field; all that we can be certain of
is the eighty-five men-at-arms recorded by Ferriby.46
The urgency of the September parliament at Nottingham stripped Edward and
many of the contingent leaders from the force at Nottingham for a month, though it
did not drastically reduce the number of men available. The loss of several
contingents in September, including that of John of Eltham after his death, was partly
counterbalanced by further reinforcement by at least forty of the king's household in
August. 17 September, three days after Edward's departure for the south, saw 690
men-at-arms still receiving the king's wages. Some contingents amongst the
magnates also suffered a reduction: Lancaster's men-at-arms were cut in half to fifty
in early September, Beauchamp went from 74 to 57, and Percy saw a reduction from
44 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 240r
45 Westmorland, Cumberland, Northumberland, the palatinate of Durham, Yorkshire, Derby, and
Lincoln.
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74 to 46, among others. 47 The reductions came after much of the region, particularly
Fife, had been secured and the fortifications assigned to various magnates with
Edward at the time in Perth.
October saw the last military effort on the part of the English, with Edward
returning to take control of the remnants of Bothwell Castle and begin its renovation.
The sixty-nine men-at-arms from the magnate retinues that had gone home were
replaced with seventeen more from the royal household and thirty-five from seven
magnate contingents including Richard FitzAlan, earl of Arunde1. 48 As Murray was
focusing his attention on destroying the garrisons at Dunnotar, Kirmeff, and
Lauriston at the time, the English were left unmolested during Edward's stay there
until 10 December. Several household members such as Robert Ufford and Walter
Mauny provided 45 men to guard supply shipments to the castle. Oddly, Ferriby's
wardrobe book specifically states that Ufford received pay for serving in person with
these men, despite his being at Westminster to be created earl of Suffolk. 49 They
remained until March 1337, when the castle was surrendered on terms to Andrew
Murray as his next siege after his successful reduction of Fife.5°
The campaign of 1337 has been closely analysed by N.B. Lewis due to the
move away from dependence on obligatory summons to provide the men-at-arms for
the campaign to a more voluntary system of contracted troops. 51
 Rather than
46 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 240r-244r; 259r-260r; Original Letters, p 39; Scotichronicon, pp 122-
3; Fordun, p 361
47 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 240r, 240v
48 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 243r
49 The wardrobe book shows Ufford being paid through 24 March, though he was created earl on 16
March. Handbook of British Chronology, ed. E.B. Fryde, D.E. Greenway, S. Porter & I.Roy, 3 rd ed
(RHS, 1986), p 483
50 Anonimalle, pp 9; BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 241v-242r
51 The list of speculative contingents to serve in 1337 is PRO E101 15 17, reprinted as Appendix I in
N.B. Lewis, 'The recruitment and organization of a contract army, May to November 1337', BIHR 37
(1964), pp 1-19
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depending upon using the specific and limited obligations owed to him by his
vassals, Edward became more reliant on mutually agreed contracts with magnates to
provide troops in return for pay.
Command as `capitaneus et ductor' was granted to Thomas Beauchamp on 25
March granting him wide powers to call on levies from the lands north of the Trent if
necessary and to control all English forces in Scotland during his tenure, with
Thomas Uflete assigned as his sole paymaster. 52
 The number of men-at-arms that
could participate on the campaign was anticipated by the list of solders available for
the war drawn up after an assembly at York in April; though the list simply names
contingent leaders and the number that they could bring to the war, it shows an
increasing sophistication in the crown's preparations for the war and in its
recruitment. As Lewis notes, this would have provided a force of 580 men-at-arms
to the earl of Warwick, a number roughly comparable to the manpower available to
Lancaster. 53
 Most were northern lords, though the household continued to provide a
fair-sized component despite the planned absence of the king. This is unsurprising:
the northern lords had the most investment in the king's success in Scotland, while
the king in turn was sure to place a sizeable portion of his military power into
securing his gains as long as they were not required elsewhere.
The resulting number of men-at-arms headed north with Beauchamp was
rather different in size and composition than the provisional list drawn up at York.
Many who had promised contingents did not actually go on campaign, while few
except for Robert Clifford and Ralph Hastings actually provided the exact number
promised. The largest contingents, unsurprisingly, were provided by those with
northern stakes or by Beauchamp himself Warwick provided 63 men-at-arms at the
52 Rot Scot, p 488
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beginning of the campaign in May, while the Disinherited lords Umfraville and
Wake managed 71 men between them in their contingents. Northern English
interests were anchored by Henry Percy's 40 men-at-arms and Ralph Neville's 33.54
In total, fourteen contingents provided 285 men-at-arms, just under half the original
speculations. Of these, 207 belonged to the five men listed above: for an army meant
to prosecute the interests of the crown in Scotland, it was dependent on an
extraordinarily narrow base to provide its relatively low manpower.
Matters did improve in June, as the existing retinues were augmented by new
troops and further contingents arrived to bolster the army's numbers. The most
important of these were accompanying the king, who had rushed north in order to
break the siege of Stirling. 55
 Two of Edward's new earls, William Bohun and Hugh
Audley, brought retinues of 59 and 36 men-at-arms while Walter Mauny, Henry
Ferrers, and a number of other household members had their own contingents. Other
major contingents not with the king included 44 men from John Kirkby, bishop of
Carlisle, and the Disinherited lord John Mowbray. Several of the existing
contingents expanded noticeably, with Beauchamp doubling the size of his
contingent and Percy and Neville each increasing their retinues to about fifty men.
By the time of the king's arrival at Stirling on 14 June, the force in Scotland had
swelled to 633 men-at-arms. Not only was the number in the realm of the initial
numbers planned for, it also raised it to the low end of the forces commanded by
53 Lewis, 'The recruitment and organization of a contract army, May to November 1337', p 9; for
Lancaster, see above
5 BL Cotton Nero C VIII fo. 245r
55 Lewis' statement that 'The force seems, in spite of its palpable defects, to have discharged its main
task of beating off Scotch attack as at Stirling and Edinburgh' does not seem to coincide with the
military events of 1337. For news to have reached Edward III in the south and for him to make his
rushed trip north without Beauchamp having relieved Stirling suggests that Beauchamp had neither
the manpower nor the reputation with the Scots to force them to raise the siege; the need to send
Arundel and Salisbury north to rescue Edinburgh in November carries much the same implication,
though it came at the very end of Beauchamp's term in Scotland. Similarly, the defection of Eustace
Maxwell to the Bruce camp and the consequent raids on Cumberland imply a breakdown of control
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Lancaster the previous year. Somewhere around 450 men-at-arms, along with the
appropriate archers, appears to have been the threshold number for an army to
succeed in its mission in Scotland: certainly, the siege of Stirling did not break until
after the king's arrival, and had been ongoing since June.56
The king's participation in northern matters was brief: having dealt with the
acute crisis, he immediately departed for the south, with a good portion of the army
doing the same. Eight of the smaller contingents from Beauchamp's army including
the banneret John Darcy left service in June, as did Hugh Audley and most of the
household that had come north with Edward III except for William Bohun and John
Molyns. 57 By 1 July, the number of men-at-arms had shrunk to 460 men, a number
that would remain roughly steady through August, thanks in part to 46 arrivals being
paid under the aegis of John St. Albans, Uflete's replacement as paymaster of the
army, and another 43 provided directly from Derbyshire, Nottinghamshire,
Lincolnshire, and Northumberland. 58 Ferriby's wardrobe book ends at 30 August,
but does record pay beyond that date for several contingents: seven men-at-arms
under William Kellesy, John St. Albans' controller, St. Albans's own three, and the
tailings of the men who had arrived under St. Albans in August carry on to the end of
November and Beauchamp's tenure. Unfortunately, Beauchamp's own contingent
and several others are not recorded in such detail by Ferriby.59
north of the border. Lewis, 'The recruitment and organization of a contract army, May to November
1337', p 13; see also below
56 Scotichronicon, pp 130-1; Fordun, p 362; Anonitnalle, p 10; Scalacronica, p 167
)7 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 245v-246v
58 Rot Scot, p 497; BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 247r, 262r-262v
59 Further, see PRO E101 388 5, mm. 12 and 13
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Infantry
For the men-at-arms on campaign, the traditional competing sources of
supply were from the retinues of magnates and those serving as part of the
household. The counties provided very little towards the total, only one or two
dozen at most during years of heavy recruitment. 60 Where the counties had been key
was in providing the infantry and light troops that were the bulk of English armies at
any time. Until Edward III's time, they were also essentially the only source of non-
cavalry troops, at least in any large numbers. The 1300 campaign to take
Caerlaverock was mostly dependent on troops from Yorkshire, Lancashire, and
several other northern counties, with the only other sizeable contributions coming
from various Scottish garrisons and the guards for the royal wardrobe. 61 This
reliance on the counties altered under Edward III as a large part of the infantry
soldiers began to be provided not through the commissions of array or the counties
but from the recruitment of archers directly into the retinues that magnates were
contracting to provide to the crown.62
Several factors help to account for this change. The largest was the
increasing tendency to recruit a larger percentage of mounted archers, rather than
simple foot soldiers. Though both fought on foot and superficially had the same
function on the battlefield, their equipment and the economic divide that it
represented meant that the nature of the army would change as the proportions
making it up altered. There was little concern as to how the infantry was armed
60 As mentioned earlier, 58 were provided for the Roxburgh campaign, while all 19 appeared for the
'Great Offensive' of 1335. While the twenties and hundreds provided by the counties often were
armoured cavalry, I have chosen to group them with the men they led rather than separate them from
those they fought with.
61 Liber Quotidianus Conti-oatlatoris Garderobiae 1299-1300, ed. J. Topham et al (1787), passim
62 See appendix 2 for specific numbers.
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during Edward I's time; weapons were provided by the localities, and the quantity of
soldiers was the crown's concern far more than the quality of those troops. 63 This
apathy had disappeared as the utility of a mostly mounted force had become more
and more apparent, and as the victories at Dupplin Moor and Halidon Hill
demonstrated how a smaller body of higher-quality troops were far more effective
than reliance on masses of low-quality soldiers to crush the enemy. By the Hundred
Years' War, this would extend as far as stockpiling large numbers of arrows and
bows at the Tower for later use.64
The campaigns being carried out in Scotland emphasised the need for
mobility. Some, such as Edward III's hurried chevauchae through northern Scotland
in 1336, could not have been done without the speed an entirely mounted force could
provide.
Another factor in the movement away from reliance upon the counties was
the expanding use of contracts to provide troops of any type for the royal armies, not
simply of one category or another. If a magnate had the wherewithal to recruit
several men-at-arms to carry out a contract with the crown, they certainly could
recruit the far less expensive mounted archers to accompany them. The pools of
manpower that each type of soldier came from were quite different: where the men-
at-arms came from the upper echelons of society, the mounted archer was still drawn
from the commons, though not from as wide a pool as had been the case under
Edward I. The increasing costs of equipment, particularly in the horse of the
mounted archer, reduced the pool of men who could afford the necessary items and
increased the costs on the localities for providing the proper equipment for those sent
to war. Where it had cost as little as 5s 6d to equip a soldier for the village of
63 M.C. Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance Under Edward I (Aldershot, 1972), p 105
64 H.J. Hewitt, The Organisation of War under Edward III (Manchester, 1966), pp 63-71
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Launditch in 1295, by 1338 it was costing the men of Hatfield £1 1 is 8d to equip
each hobelar they sent to the wars, most of which was the cost of their mounts.65
The infantry of Edward III's Scottish wars were recruited through three
methods. Troops could be called upon by the crown directly from the counties,
either in levies or arrays. Alternatively, the magnates who would be serving on
campaign either via contract or obligation could be asked to carry out the recruitment
of troops as well, to be included within their retinues. The last was to find others
willing to serve for other reasons than simple pay in the armies; the usual example of
this was the participation of criminals in the fighting.
The least significant is the recruitment of felons and criminals to serve in the
army in return for being pardoned of their crimes upon the completion of the
campaign. This practice was not a popular one, for several reasons. The pardoning
of criminal elements in return for a relatively short spell of military service reduced
the effectiveness of the justice system in the shires, in providing an alternative
method for offenders to pay for the consequences of their malfeasance. 66
 This
problem was exacerbated during periods of recurring campaigns, such as under
Edward I from 1296-1305 and under Edward III from the Halidon Hill campaign
until the beginning of hostilities with France. With an army almost guaranteed to be
heading north every year, criminals could expect that even if they were caught, they
could avoid the punishment due them through judicial proceedings by serving in the
army. The deterrence factor of punishment was therefore heavily reduced, especially
for such crimes as homicide and manslaughter where the guilty felon had already
65 J.R.S. Maddicott, The English Peasantry and the Demands of the Crown 1294-1341 (Past and
Present Supplement, 1975), pp 39-40
66 R.W. Kauper, War, Justice and Public Order: England and France in the Later Middle Ages
(Oxford, 1988), pp 126-7
151
The Army
engaged in violent actions. As Hewitt has pointed out, numerous petitions linked the
pardons directly to the upsurge in crime carried out by returned felons.67
Once the felons had been pardoned, they usually returned to the towns and
villages from which they originated. This created great difficulties in many cases.
For instance, in August 1333 letters close were sent to the sheriffs of England
instructing them to announce the forfeiture of the pardons issued for service to any of
the pardoned criminals who broke the king's peace or made illicit gatherings. A
similar letter a month later to the sheriff of York ordered him to associate with a
'discreet and lawful man' to find out the names of such men who were re-embarking
on a life of crime and arrest them, using the posse comitatus if necessary. 68
 The
pardoning of such men did little to deter them from their previous pursuits; if
anything, it gave them the means to continue carrying on as before.
The existence of such writs was problematic in itself. Felons would attempt
to use pardons for previous service for crimes committed later. Some criminals even
claimed to have been pardoned for service, despite never having served in any
campaign; Richard Willoughby and others of the king's bench were instructed not to
pardon men claiming pardons from service unless the service could be proven.69
That several writs had to be issued regarding pardoned criminals, those claiming to
be pardoned, and their activities indicates that enough men served under such
conditions that their existence was known, if not commonplace, and that they
returned in sufficient numbers to cause an increase in lawlessness.
It would be an error to say that those seeking pardons made up any significant
portion of the armies that marched into Scotland. Even on campaigns with small
armies, such as the Roxburgh campaign, criminals made up a tiny portion of the
67 H.J. Hewitt, The Organization of War Under Edward III 1338-62 (Manchester, 1958), p 174
68 CCR 1333-7, pp 129, 173
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troops involved: only three percent of the troops with Edward that winter were
felons. The assumption was that their desertion rates would be lower, due to the
nature of their service, and that they would be more accustomed to the rigours of the
expected conflict and its violence. This, added to the possibility of drawing
numbers from another source than the usual ones at the call of the crown, made such
recruitment worthwhile to the crown, despite the drawbacks to law enforcement and
the peace of the realm.
There are two instances of felons receiving pay in Ferriby's wardrobe book.
The first is during the Roxburgh campaign in the winter of 1334. Two hundred
felons overseen by two centenars took up pay on 4 November 1334 for 100 days,
leaving service on 9 February the next year. Of these, 160 were foot archers, the
balance being paid as hobelars. 7° The following summer, 171 men served as foot
archers, though only for 35 days through August and early September. 71
 No mention
is made of further service for pardons in the rest of Ferriby's book, or in Norwell's
wardrobe book for 1338-1340. The combination of smaller forces recruited more via
contract than traditional methods and the problems caused by returning pardonees is
the likely explanation for the end of this practice.
The second major method for recruiting troops was the use of the connections
and recruiting abilities of the magnates who would be on the campaign to recruit
archers for their own retinues. Much as the nobility and gentry were being
contracted with to provide set numbers of men-at-arms for periods of service, so too
were they agreeing to provide the services of archers.
These were invariably mounted; of the numerous collections of archers
provided by individual captains, only Arnold Garcy, a household squire, and William
69 CCR 1333-7, p 158
70 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 254r
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Norwell provided foot archers in addition to their mounted contingents. 72 As the
archers would dismount for combat and form up as infantry rather than fight on
horseback, their mounts were much less costly than the coursers and destriers used
by the men-at-arms. Where a good courser could be evaluated at £10, an archer's
hackney could be purchased for roughly 20s.73
This method was the most advantageous for the crown, both due to its
simplicity and its results. Household manpower and resources were not being tied up
in collecting this pool of soldiers, as it was the responsibility of the individual
magnates with whom the crown was entering the contracts and agreements to find
the men and bring them to the campaign. Further, the crown was not having to
concern itself with the equipment and mounting of the archers. In agreeing to
provide a set number of troops of a certain type of quality, the individual retinue
leaders were also taking on the responsibility to have the troops they were providing
match the specifications set by the crown. Beyond contractual obligations, the
presence of these men as part of a magnate's retinue meant that his personal
reputation was reflected in their preparedness, and not to be neglected.
Prince noted a tendency to recruit mounted archers in equal numbers to the
men-at-arms that were brought by magnates in their retinues during Edward III's
reign. 74
 This does hold true for a number of bannerets and knights in the Scottish
wars. For example, Ebulo LeStrange brought 40 men-at-arms and 40 mounted
archers, while Roger Swynnerton brought 20 men-at-arms and 25 mounted archers
on the Roxburgh campaign. 75
 While the suggestion of such a trend exists in the
71 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 258r
72 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 253v
73 Andrew Ayton, Knights and Warhorses: Military Service and the English Aristocracy Under
Edward HI, p 15,48
74 A.E. Prince, 'The Strength of English Armies in the Reign of Edward III' EHR 183 (1931), p355
73 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 233v, 253r
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records, it should not be overstressed. The procedures and customs surrounding the
recruitment of archers were just beginning to be formed, and had none of the solidity
apparent to us in hindsight. This can be seen by comparison with the summer
campaign in 1335. Ebulo Lestrange did bring the same number of eighty men to
service, but Roger Swynnerton had only 5 mounted archers in the retinue for the
summer, reducing his men by twenty.
There is a consistency to the number of men that each lord could bring from
year to year, though the regularity of service could affect the pool of manpower
available to each individual. James Audley nearly doubled the men he recruited
between the winter of 1334 and the summer of 1335 from 61 to 104. However, the
proportion of men-at-arms to mounted archers remained roughly the same, dropping
from roughly 3:4 to 2:3 men-at-arms to archers.
This pool of manpower was limited in size, however. Some of the
participants of the Roxburgh campaign were able to increase the size of their men-at-
arms contingents, yet had to accept large reductions in the number of mounted
archers they could provide. Richard FitzAlan, earl of Arundel, increased the number
of men-at-arms from eighty to 106, yet reduced his mounted archer contingent from
seventy to 24. The earls of Warwick and Angus each lost three-fifths of their archers,
while Henry Percy's contingent dropped from fifty to thirty men. Whether an
individual's retinue of archers grew or shrank for the summer campaign does not
appear to be dependent upon region.
The rest of the mounted archers and the vast bulk of the foot archers were
recruited through commissioners of array. Commissions were extended to numerous
individuals, nearly always professional soldiers, to recruit specific quotas of able
men from the available troops in specified areas. These areas could be large units,
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like the counties specified in the commissions given for the 1335 offensive, or
smaller, more specific parcels such as the wapentakes and liberties of Yorkshire two
years earlier. 76 No obvious pattern exists for which method was used: the
determination appears to have been made afresh each year.
Comparable to the commissions in England were those given for the raising
of Welsh troops. Rather than having to work within a county structure with various
liberties and exceptions to the king's writ, the commissions issued to Welsh arrayers
were via the lands of various magnates in Wales, or the administrative units of the
Principality. An example comes from the levies for the summer campaign of 1335.
The commissions for troops were issued to magnates, specifying them both by their
accustomed English titles and by the specific lordships that they held in Wales for
example, Henry of Lancaster was addressed as 'Lord of Kidwelly and Cranwethlan
in Wales'. Such writs were sent to Lancaster, William Montague, John Charlton, the
earls of Warenne, Hereford and Arundel, Roger Grey of Rotherfield, Fulk FitzWarin,
William la Zouche, Gilbert Talbot, Hugh Audley, John Mowbray, and Ebulo
LeStrange. Further writs were issued to royal officials and trusted men for crown
lands in Wales, such as Rhys ap Gruffydd in South Wales, Hugh Tyrel in Radnor and
Cary, and Gruffydd Vechan in Flintshire.77
These commissions usually did not run to the towns and cities of the various
counties; often as part of their charters towns were granted the right to be excepted
from the county levy, or to have a set quota of the county levy that they themselves
would carry nut the array for. 78 Twenty-eight towns received specific requests for
76 Rot Scot, pp 328-9; pp 242-3
77 Rot Scot, pp 330-2, 338-9
78 A.E. Prince, 'The Army and Navy', in The English Government at Work, 1327-1336, ed J.F.
Willard and W.A. Morris (Cambridge, MA; 1940), pp 363-4
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mounted archers for the 1335 campaign from Edward; of these, nine sent troops, with
the others paying fines in order to be exempt from the levy.79
The use of commissions of array was certainly not a novel approach to
recruiting archers and foot soldiers, having been used heavily by both Edward I and
II. Nor can the specification of smaller administrative units for recruitment purposes
be considered a new development. What is notable is the continuation of the trend of
the previous two reigns in specifying more and more intently numbers of troops of
specific quality and type. Rather than asking for several hundred generic men from
various counties, Edward and his chancery were requesting detailed numbers of
specialised troops such as hobelars and mounted infantry. This is in sharp contrast
to Edward I's reign, when the quality of the infantry recruited was not nearly so
pressing an issue for the crown. 80
 Though the use of commissions of array would
diminish with the growth of contract armies and indentured troops in the Hundred
Years' War, they were still the pre-eminent and most dependable method for the
collection of the large mass of infantry necessary for English military efforts.
Infantry rates of pay were standardised, much like that of the cavalry. A foot
archer (sagittarius ad pedum) received two pennies a day, while a mounted archer
(sagittarius ad equum) received twice that amount. Normally, no difference is made
in pay between service north or south of the border. The Roxburgh campaign is an
exception, with the king's council agreeing to pay magnates 6d per day for mounted
archers while in 'peaceful lands' (terra pacis) and 4d per day while in Scotland
itself. 81 Presumably, this reflects an assumption that the forces will supplement their
wages by living off the land while in 'enemy' territory and the difficulties in
recruiting soldiers for a winter campaign.
79 Rot Scot, p 339; BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 256r
SO M.C. Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance, p 105
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There were the occasional exceptions to this. The king's bodyguard,
commanded by John Ward, John Stanford, and Henry Pledour, ranged from one
hundred to two hundred mounted archers in strength and was recruited from
Cheshire. They were paid 6d per day, as a reflection of the importance of their duty
and of their elite status. 82 On occasion troops received less per man than the going
rate: the 1,031 mounted archers from Cumberland and Westmorland who fought in
Scotland in August 1335 only received 3d per day for their services. 83 Other
exceptions occurred throughout the period, most notably during the Roxburgh
campaign and 1337 campaigns.
Hobelars were also heavily used on campaign, though differentiating them
from the mounted archers is difficult at best from the financial sources. Several of
the entries in the wardrobe books group them indiscriminately with the mounted
archers and the vintenars, as they receive the same level of pay (4d/day). 84
Importantly, few hobelars are mentioned as part of any magnate's retinue. They
were raised from the county musters and from the various lands in Wales, areas with
writs from the crown determining the numbers recruited there. Where there is a
tendency to distinguish them from mounted archers, it is often to grant them a
slightly more favourable rate of pay, at 6d/day. The 1335 expedition from Ireland
paid its hobelars 6d/day, while the twelve hobelars in John Houton's contingent in
1336 received 6d/day and the 30 mounted archers with him only received 4d/day.85
Granting the extra pay to the hobelars makes sense: while the mounted archer is most
likely to fight on foot, with their mount not immediately involved in the fighting, the
81 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 252v-253v
82 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 252r, 255r, 259r, 261r
83 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 258r
84 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 252v-259v passim
85 E101 19/16, m. 6; BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 259v
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hobelar engages in close combat, where the quality of the horse is far more important
and the horse itself at far more risk of injury or death.
Unusually for the Scottish campaigns, the magnates and the royal household
were the main source of mounted archers at Edward III's disposal during the winter
campaign of 1334-5. 86
 Later years would see a dramatic rise in the number of
infantry being provided by the counties through commissions of array, but this
campaign would be far more dependent upon the contributions of individual
magnates for both its heavy cavalry and its infantry components.
There is no direct correspondence between the number of men-at-arms that
were in individual retinues and the number of mounted archers; where some
magnates were able to provide far more archers than men-at-arms, others were able
to offer far less for the infantry. Henry Lancaster provided 100 mounted archers,
well in excess of the sixty men-at-arms he brought, while Gilbert Umfraville and
John Multon provided eighty and twenty mounted archers each, in comparison with
their thirty and ten men-at-arms, respectively. William Bohun provided sixty
archers, though any contribution he may have made of men-at-arms is missing from
the wardrobe book. By contrast, others provided far fewer archers. Henry Percy
only provided fifty in comparison with his 120 men-at-arms, while Ralph Neville
provided forty archers and sixty men-at-arms. Several did follow the oft-quoted
trend of providing equal numbers of both: Thomas Beauchamp provided forty of
each, as did John Warenne and Ebulo Lestrange. Others approximated this, such as
Roger Swynnerton's twenty men-at-arms and twenty-five mounted archers, and
Richard FitzAlan's eighty men-at-arms and seventy mounted archers.
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The twelve magnates who provided the largest portion of men-at-arms also
provided the largest part of the mounted archers, despite two of these, Anthony Lucy
and John Mowbray, not recorded as providing archers at all. 512 were provided by
the ten remaining men, making up 36% of the total force: by comparison, the
twelve's contribution to the men-at-arms was 53% of the total number. The other
magnates provided only a further 216 men, similar in scope to their contributions to
the cavalry.
As mentioned earlier, this campaign differed from most in how the mounted
archers were paid. While in England, many of the magnate retinues were paid 6d per
day, dropping to 4d per day while in Scotland. Several retinues do not, though this
can be explained by the retinues already being in Scotland, or as defending their own
lands. Gilbert Umfraville and John Warenne only receive 4d/day for their troops, as
they held the Scottish earldoms of Angus and Strathearn. Henry Percy and Ralph
Neville were already operating in the area as custodians of the March, while William
Tynedale and William Pressen were both northern men and in close proximity to the
fighting. In addition, Henry Percy at this point held Jedburgh, just to the south.87
The royal household was also exempted from the favourable rates of pay, receiving
only 4d/day per archer except in the case of Thomas Wake of Blisworth, the king's
standard-bearer, and William Norwell, the king's cofferer, who were paid the same
as the majority of magnate retinues. 88
 This included not only Neville, but also
William Bohun and his sixty archers, though the latter may have had his brother's
acquisition of Lochmaben counted against him.89
86 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 252r-254v
87 Rot Scot, p 280; CCR 1333-7, p 327
88 BL Cotton Nero C VIII fo. 253v
89 BL Cotton Nero C VIII fo. 253v; for Lochrnaben, see Rot Scot, p 280; CCR 1333-7, p 327
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Where there are major differences from the patterns seen in contributions to
the men-at-arms is in the number of mounted archers provided by the royal
household. Foremost among these are the 100 men employed as members of the
royal bodyguard under John Ward and 55 men from Cheshire under John Daneport.
While the household's strength in men-at-arms was essentially dependent on the
retinues of the relatively small collection of men it directly retained as household
knights, it had no difficulty in hiring a sizeable body of archers to bolster its strength.
It relied on fewer of its knights to provide mounted archers. Where there were forty-
nine separate retinues included in household numbers, only ten add additional
numbers to the household's archer strength, and nine in relatively little numbers.
Only William Norwell's collection of over 100 diverse archers is of any size, and
reflects the inclusion of individual recruits under a single heading rather than any
personal ability of Norwell to recruit such a large body in his own right. Even
considering the lack of secondary contributions from the household knights to the
number of mounted archers, the 424 archers provided match the household's
contribution percentage-wise that it made to the men-at-arms.
These percentages would be surprisingly high, were it not for the small
numbers of mounted
archers from the
counties serving with
the army. When the
army moved into
Scotland in November,
only 256 of the 1408 were from the counties, despite the far higher numbers
requested in the commissions of array granted in November. Of these, 42 were
161
The Army
criminals serving for pardons. Nearly all were from Yorkshire, and were a far cry
from the 1,050 initially demanded from its three Ridings. 99
 The failure of the
counties to provide the demanded soldiers was a great irritation to Edward III, who
would devote a great deal of his winter to lambasting his officials for their failure to
provide the numbers he felt were necessary.91
Yorkshire was somewhat more successful in providing foot soldiers, though
the numbers were the same small fraction of what had initially been requested. Of
the 5,310 footmen requested from the county, only 952 are recorded receiving pay by
17 November. 92
 In addition to the normal foot soldiers were 100 `armate provided
by the city of York, probably heavily armed foot soldiers: these men received double
the usual pay, earning 4d per day. The remainder of the 1117 foot were provided by
four contingents: 124 from the Forest of Dean, 160 felons seeking pardons, 40
volunteers under the aegis of William Norwell, and a single archer under Arnold
Garcy, a squire of the king's household. 93
 The Forest of Dean was singled out for
troops as it was also being asked to provide miners to assist the campaign: 25 began
receiving pay on 29 October, and all but one continued in service until 4 February,
when both miners and foot departed royal service. 94
 The large number of Welshmen
who were recruited for the campaign doubled the number of foot. Wales was
considered a prime recruiting ground, and a dependable source of men. Four
separate contingents were recruited from North Wales, South Wales, Merionydd, and
the lands of Radnor and Cary, under Roger Corbet, Rhys ap Gruffydd, Walter
90 Rot Scot, pp 287-8
91 Rot Scot, pp 289-91
92 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 253v-254r
93 Garcy is listed as receiving robes for winter 1334 from the wardrobe: BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo.
225v
94 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 254r
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Mauny, and Hugh Tyrel. They would provide 906 additional foot, 35 hobelars, and a
small contingent of 25 hobelars.95
Overall, by 24 November there were 1408 English mounted archers, 1117
foot, 100 `armati' from York, and 906 Welsh foot, for a total of 3,531 infantry at
Edward III's disposal. Though these numbers are comparable to the armies sent to
Scotland in 1336 and 1337, in 1334 it was not yet accepted that a much smaller army
than that which took Berwick could operate successfully against the supporters of
David Bruce. Considering the length of the supply line to Dundarg if the army were
to march north and the need to detach troops to defend it, this caution had some
validity. The time of year certainly boded ill for venturing north, as the weather
would interfere with shipping supplies and both food and fodder would be in short
supply. As it was, Edward III made a reputation for himself by sharing the hardship
of the wait at Berwick with his troops.96
In addition to the soldiers were the workmen who had to put the slighted
castle back into usable form. Richard Goushill, a master mason, is recorded as
receiving pay for 55 masons, ranging in pay from his own 8d/day to a journeyman's
4d/day for working through winter from 7 November to 1 February. In addition,
there was another mason for a short fifteen days and 106 various helpers, ranging
from highly skilled men earning 6d/day down to a more standard 2d/day. 35
carpenters earning from 3d to 6d a day were also employed, along with three smiths
and 4 tilers. The cost of their wages would total £189 5s 9d.97
Further reinforcements were paltry and much delayed: 120 hobelars from
Durham received pay for nineteen days of December, before returning home along
with 131 of the 331 Derbyshire foot who had arrived at the same time. January saw
95 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 254v-254r
96 Knighton, p 472
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46 mounted archers and 187 foot arrive from Lancashire and Nottinghamshire, and
185 mounted archers from Lincolnshire begin receiving pay on 19 February just in
time to disband all of four days later. Despite Edward's calls for reinforcements,
only 368 mounted troops and 518 foot made their way north over three months' time.
While the 26% increase in mounted archers and 46% increase in foot soldiers from
England may have been helpful, the numbers were by no means capable of giving
Edward the means to move northwards, and likely would have barely offset the
desertions that a winter campaign must have suffered, even if not reflected in the pay
records of the wardrobe book. Given Edward's strenuous efforts to gain more troops
and the poor results, it is unsurprising that he chose to disband his forces in February.
The Roxburgh campaign was unique for the 1330s in the balance of the
infantry being provided by either magnate contingents or by the royal household.
The campaigns of the next three years would see the household element disappear
entirely from the makeup of the infantry, with only the royal bodyguard being
recorded. The focus between different sources of manpower would move away from
the household versus the magnates to being between the magnates and the counties,
as the latter took on its more traditional role as the primary recruiting ground for the
infantry. The one constant would be the role of the lands in Wales, which always
provided a sizeable body of troops.
The 'Great Offensive' of 1335 is the one example in the 1330s for which we
have pay records of a campaign that attempts to draw on as many men from England
as is practical. 98 The other likely candidate for this type of campaign was the 1333
campaign leading to Halidon Hill, for which we have no payroll surviving. The
97 BL Cotton Nero C VIII fo. 254v
98 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 255r-258v; see appendix, 'Troop Numbers Summer 1335'
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requests sent out on 27 March called for over 2,500 hobelars and 7,000 archers. The
crown also undoubtedly expected that large numbers of the 137 magnates who also
received summons for service would also bring mounted archers, much as those who
attended the winter campaign had. 99
 The intent was without a doubt to make up for
the deficiencies of the winter campaign, and the planning that began immediately
after Edward's return from Scotland reflects this.
The counties to all intents and purposes had failed to provide the winter
campaign the manpower that was traditionally their place to provide within the
English military machine of the fourteenth century. The relatively new innovation of
magnates providing large numbers of archers via contract had filled the breach, but
had its limitations in being the aggregate of the individual capacities of those coming
under contract to provide soldiers. As the numbers of archers required far
outstripped that of the number of men-at-arms required, this gap had to be filled by
the counties.
The limitations to magnate resources come into sharp focus when looking at
the contributions of those who had participated in both the winter 1334 and summer
1335 campaigns. Most saw the numbers under their command drastically reduced.
Most of those who provided over forty mounted archers during the winter cut their
contributions by at least forty percent. John Warenne, John of Eltham, Thomas
Beauchamp, and Richard FitzAlan each contributed 24 men, though they had given
40 men in winter except for the 70 provided by the earl of Arundel. Gilbert
Umfraville also reduced his contingent by forty percent, providing 48 instead of 80.
The regularity of the numbers suggests some conscious action to set them, though for
others the pattern does not hold. Roger Swynnerton reduced his contribution to five
mounted archers. William Bohun cut his 60 in half to 30 for the summer; Henry
99 Rot Scot, pp 328-9, 332-3
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Percy reduced his contingent from 50 to 20, while Ebulo Lestrange lost only one
archer from the winter campaign's 40 archers. On the other hand, James Audley and
Hugh Freyne increased the numbers they contributed, with James providing 64
instead of 35 and Hugh providing 30 rather than 13.
The household element essentially disappeared from the list of mounted
archers for the campaign. While the royal bodyguard was still employed and had
162 men in its company, only John Brocaz and his 27 men came from any member
of the household under banneret rank. The household was certainly on the campaign
in strength, with nearly every member receiving fees and robes participating in
person; however, this strength did not extend to providing any sizeable number of
mounted archers. This is not all that surprising; much of the household would have
been men of relatively little means compared to the magnates, and with the extensive
preparations and large quotas of troops being demanded from the counties, there
would have been far less need for the household to attempt to make up the
difference.
While the contributions of the winter veterans may have dropped, the loss of
depth in the contingents was made up for in breadth by the inclusion of a large
number of new contingent leaders. John Bohun, earl of Hereford contributed 29
archers, though the future earls William Montague and Hugh Audley would both
contribute	 larger
contingents of 40 and
56 mounted archers
respectively.	 Other
large	 contingents
included the 40 men of
Northern
Counties	 Towns
811 men
	 120 men
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William Clinton, the 33 men of John Leyburn, and the 34 men of Anthony Lucy.
The largest of the new contingents were not from major magnates, but were instead
from northerners recruiting in their local regions. Robert Manners, the constable of
Norham Castle brought 54 men, while the Northumbrians Robert Ogle and Thomas
Featherstonehaugh brought 126 and 60 men, respectively. Fifteen new contingents
were added, providing 675 of the 1206 mounted archers coming from the magnates
and the household.
The counties had failed to provide anything close to their normal proportion
of the English army during the Roxburgh campaign; that failure was not to reoccur in
June 1335. Fifteen counties and the three separate Ridings of Yorkshire sent troops,
from as far afield as southern counties such as Sussex and Kent and western counties
such as Dorset, Wiltshire, and Gloucestershire. While most of the armies that
entered Scotland in the 1330s were made up of troops from the northern counties,100
the makeup of the summer 1335 force was national in scope, mobilising all of the
resources available to Edward III. The northern bias was still reflected in the
makeup of the force: the largest number of mounted archers came from Lancaster,
Durham, and Derbyshire, while in August Westmoreland and Cumberland would
provide reinforcements dwarfing the contribution of any other county. The
contribution of the three Ridings of Yorkshire would be somewhat reduced, with 162
mounted archers instead of the 221 that served over the New Year. The largest
contributions from southern counties were the 76 from Northamptonshire and the 60
and 67 from Dorset and Wiltshire; the other five that contributed troops' ° I managed
only a paltry 119 between them.
100 The most southern county to send contingents in 1336 was Shropshire, while in 1337 Derby and
Nottingham were the most southerly: BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 259v, 262r
101 Middlesex, Buckinghamshire, Somerset, Gloucestershire, Shropshire.
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Northern counties would provide 811 of the campaign's initial force of
mounted archers, while the southern counties only contributed 322. 102
 This total was
augmented by the levy of mounted archers on several towns throughout England.
Twenty-seven towns were ordered to provide hobelars and mounted archers, while
York was asked for its usual 100 c armati'. The results were not nearly as sizeable as
the	 initial	 request
102 I have counted Shropshire and Northamptonshire as southern counties, and Staffordshire as
northern.
Mounted Archer Contribution by County, July 1335
would suggest: the six
towns of Wells,
Gloucester, Ludlow,
Lichfield,
Northampton,	 and
Pontefract	 each
provided 10 mounted
archers	 and	 their
equipment, while the
city of Lincoln sent sixty mounted archers under John Aldham. This is partly
because several towns such as Nottingham and Canterbury paid fines to be excepted
from the levy. 1 ° 3 Another forty-seven archers are recorded from diverse parts, giving
a total of 1300 mounted archers not provided by magnates. Though this represents
only 52% of the total number, it was an immense improvement over the winter totals.
This contribution was even greater when Edward's army was reinforced in August
1115 by 835 mounted archers from Cumberland and 202 from Westmorland. These
later additions, were they to be included in the charts, would have the northern
counties providing 52% of all mounted infantry on the campaign. Though the
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numbers from the initial portion of the campaign show the magnates and the counties
providing roughly equal portions of the mounted strength of the infantry, it fails to
account for the large proportion of the country that paid fines or were otherwise
exempt from providing troops. Though a certain part of Northumberland's available
soldiers must have been on campaign with Robert Manners, Robert Ogle, or Thomas
Featherstonehaugh, the county as a whole had not been tapped: this pattern is
duplicated over several counties and towns.
retinues of William Montague and William, Count of Juliers provided any foot, and
the 111 men they provided barely accounts for two percent of the total numbers.
Even smaller were the foot provided by the towns of Beverley and Doncaster,
numbering only 33 men. Surprisingly, the southern counties provided a larger
portion of the overall total than they did in mounted archers, the opposite of what
would be expected if travel distance to the campaign was the only consideration.
Several of the southern counties such as Gloucestershire which had only had a token
number of mounted archers equalled the contributions made by the northern counties
and each of the Yorkshire Ridings, providing about 200 soldiers each. Admittedly,
some such as Surrey or Middlesex were restricted to only 39 men, but the overall
impression is far more favourable for their contribution to the total number of foot
1 ° 3 CPR 1334-8, pp 131-3; Rot Scot, p 338 specifically for Nottingham and Canterbury.
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than it was for the mounted archers. The total number from the south was 1457 men,
71% of the 2046 provided by the north.
One reason why the south likely contributed far fewer mounted archers than
the north was the militarization of the north since 1296 and the beginning of
hostilities with Scotland.'" The north had suffered repeated attacks and raids by
Scots as well as repeated and regular demands by the crown for military service
throughout the early part of the fourteenth century, particularly in the decade
immediately preceding the Truce of Bishopthorpe in 1323. The south on the other
hand had been relatively free of strife since the end of Edward I's Welsh campaigns,
barring the occasional upset. Because of the military pressures on the north, the
move towards more effective, albeit more expensive, mounted archers and hobelars
would have been hastened, making more troops of this type available while the lack
of strife in the south would allow for more localities to pay fines for exemption from
the commissions of array.
The Welsh contribution in 1335 was immense, providing the largest portion
of the foot soldiers in the army, though very little for the mounted archer contingent.
Separate requests had been made totalling 45 men-at-arms and over 3800 foot from
the lands of fifteen Marcher lords, including such prominent men as the earls of
Arundel and Surrey, Henry Lancaster, William Montague, Hugh Audley, William la
Zouche, and John Mowbray. 1 ° 5
 Those receiving pay in Ferriby's wardrobe book
were grouped into six contingents. The two largest were those from the royal lands
in North Wales and South Wales, each providing just over one thousand foot and just
under one hundred officers and standard-bearers. The smallest were those from
Camois and the earl of Arundel's lands, each providing just over 100 foot soldiers
104 C. McNamee, The Wars of the Bruces: Scotland, England and Ireland, 1306-1328 (East Linton,
1997), pp 140-157
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including their officers. The officers assigned to lead each group were mentioned for
only three of the contingents, all of whom were members of the household: Rhys ap
Gruffydd had his usual position as the leader of the South Wales contingent, the
were likely hobelars due to their pay of 4d per day. Overall, Wales provided 3085
soldiers, 2990 of which fought as foot soldiers, 87 as horse, and the remaining eight
being 3 chaplains, 3 doctors, and two heralds or criers (proclamatores). 106
Taking into account all of these separate groups, the English crown managed
to put 10,780 infantry into the field of which 3,630 were molinted and 7,D2D were
foot. This does not take into account the eleven messengers under William Dale and
John Waltham, or the royal servants and valets, who numbered over 200. 107 Nor
does it take into account the following of Edward Balliol or any of his adherents not
receiving wages from the English crown. For much of the campaign, many of these
troops would not have been in the same location, thanks to several being split off
105 Rot Scot, pp 338-9
l °6 BL Cotton Nero C VIII fo. 258v
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from the main body to accompany Balliol up the eastern seaboard as mentioned
previously. It is unlikely that the retinues of the seven magnates (Surrey, Arundel,
Angus, Neville, Percy, Berkeley, and Latimer) were the only ones to accompany
Balliol north, as the listed archers under pay would only have provided 128 men, a
far cry from the necessary archers to balance the 732 men-at-arms those same
retinues provided. However, neither the chronicles that identify the magnates
accompanying Balliol nor the wardrobe book identify which retinues or county
contingents may have been part of this force. That there were more archers seems
likely as Balliol's force did take the fortalice of Cumbernauld, suggesting a more
balanced force than one meant solely for raiding.1°8
The force that Balliol took with him into the Highlands was probably light on
infantry, relying on speed and engaging forces in skirmishing rather than set-piece
battles like Dupplin Moor or Halidon Hill. Of the ten retinues that accompanied
Balliol, only three had archers with them. Though John Bohun, earl of Hereford also
had mounted archers as part of his retinue, their early release on 11 September makes
it unlikely that they accompanied him until the end of the chevauchee on 6
October. 1 °9 Much like Balliol's previous independent force, the 112 archers were
outnumbered at better than 5:1 by the men-at-arms; unlike the previous march, we
have no evidence of any siege action undertaken en route.
The plans for the number of infantry to be part of the Irish expedition against
Rothesay were as optimistic as those for the men-at-arms in the same campaign.
Fifteen hundred bobelars and six thousand foot were requested: in the end, the entire
expedition did not quite reach the numbers requested of hobelars, let alone the entire
107 BL Cotton Nero C VIII fo. 255r
108 Knighton, p 473; Bridlington, pp 122-3; Scalacronica, p 165
109 BL Cotton Nero C VIII fos. 255r-255v
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force."° As with the men-at-arms, the earls of Desmond and Ormond provided the
bulk of the soldiers who had embarked at Dublin. The 198 hobelars that the two
provided made up seventy percent of the light horse and their 411 infantry provided
57% of the foot soldiers. Though none could match either earl in providing light
cavalry forces, several could manage the same number of foot as Ormond's 64.
Walter Bermingham provided 100 foot soldiers, Robert Tuit managed 80, and John
Darcy, the justiciar, paid for 60 to cross with him. The total of 283 hobelars and 715
infantry made the force tiny even by the standards of Thomas Beauchamp's force in
1337, but it proved effective in convincing John of the Isles to enlist in the Balliol
cause the next year despite their failure to take Rothesay.1"
English military activities in Scotland after 1335 no longer depended on large
numbers but focused instead upon speed and mobility. Financial restrictions
combined with the general unwillingness of the Scots to engage any English force of
more than a few hundred made mass armies largely irrelevant and unnecessary.
This, combined with the threat from France, meant that the force under Lancaster in
1336 would be considerable smaller than that of previous years."2
Lancaster's force more closely resembled the traditional makeup of an
English army, far more dependent upon its county-supplied troops of archers for the
infantry component than upon the magnates who made up the bulk of the men-at-
arms. The largest magnate retinue unsurprisingly was the 70 mounted archers of
Henry himself, though Henry Percy nearly matched him with 60 men. Including the
11 ° Rot Scot, pp 340-3; PRO E101/19/16; see also Nicholson, 'An Irish Expedition to Scotland in
1335', pp 197-211
III CDS, no. 1182
112 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 259r-260r
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collection recorded under the paymaster John of Houton, ten magnates had provided
391 mounted archers by the second day after the small army had reached Perth.
The numbers were not atypical for the participants: of the ten retinues
recorded as being in Scotland in May, five had had their leaders participating with
similar numbers in previous campaigns. Lancaster had provided one hundred
mounted archers for the winter campaign in 1334, though he was not recorded as
having any in the 1335 summer campaign. 113 Percy had had 50 with him at
Roxburgh, though only 20 the following campaign; Neville's 32 matched well with
the 41) he had retained in 1334. Thomas Beauchamp had the same for both Roxburgh
and 1336 as well, and Anthony Lucy's 28 was just a shade below the 34 he provided
to the summer campaign of the previous year.114
What was atypical were the soldiers that came north with Edward III in June
1336 on his hearing rumours of a French landing. The mounted archers
accompanying him were from only two sources: his own bodyguard of 61 men under
John Stanford, and the 189 mounted archers brought by William Montague. Both
were very different from previous numbers: Stanford's predecessor John Ward had
led 100 and 162 men in the royal bodyguard, while Montague had only mustered 40
men the year before. 115 As Edward's presence in the north had been wholly
unexpected, the best explanation is that both groups were recruited in a hurry, and
that Montague was prevailed upon to provide the maximum number of men possible.
Few of the magnates' mounted archers stayed in service beyond August: only
the king's bodyguard and the retinues of Montague, John Tibetot, and John Houton
remained in service beyond September 1, while the archers of Anthony Lucy and
John Denholm had departed in July. Their presence was likely deemed unnecessary
113 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 252v
114 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 255v
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as Perth had been secured, Edward's chevauchee had successfully smashed through
Moray, Buchan and Angus, and a sizeable number of archers was still in service
from the counties. Though the magnates and household had provided 578 mounted
archers at their peak, they would never provide nearly as large a percentage of the
army as they had in the previous two campaigns: the counties provided 1,658 for the
same period. The only time that the contributions were equal would be a very brief
period at the beginning of October during Edward's attempt to rebuild Bothwell.
Unlike previous years, the wardrobe book conflated the separate contingents
from York and the Midland counties into a single entry. With the king not leading
the campaign force himself for the year, immediate financial responsibility for
Lancaster's force fell not on the wardrobe itself but on John Houton, one of the
king's clerks acting as paymaster. The combination of the county contingents into
one entry likely reflects the summation of the information from Houton's muster roll
and recorded expenses, especially as individual leaders are identified for each of the
counties so combined.'16
The listing of several different periods of service for the York and Midlands
contingent allows us to get some idea of the wastage that contingents could suffer
over time. It is difficult to tell whether there were any reinforcements that arrived to
bolster this group: while the dates are contiguous, the particular leaders named in
each entry vary. While certain names such as Peter Neville of Lincoln and Thomas
Leek of York recur enough to give us confidence that this is essentially the same unit
all the way through the record, some caution should be taken as to how rigid its
makeup was.
115 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 259r, 252r, 255r (Ward), 255v (Montague)
116 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 259v; see also Houton's horse evaluations, PRO E101 19 36
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The initial period shown, from 1 May to 5 August, encompasses most of the
major action of the campaign. In that period Lancaster moved with Balliol north to
Perth, skirmishing with Andrew Murray's men, and then were joined by Edward III
for his chevauchee. Some of the county's archers may have accompanied the king
north: the queen's letter describing the action states he had 400 archers with him,
though only 247 would have been available from the men that he and Montague had
brought north with them. 117 Percy and Neville were likely accompanying the king,
providing another 90; even with these men, the king would have been short some
sixty men.
The first period was not only the most active, but also the longest: it is no
surprise that the force suffered a forty percent drop in numbers during the first three
months. This appears to be standard: as discussed elsewhere, forty percent in three
months was the wastage rate for both Edward I's Caerlaverock campaign and the
likely rate of loss for Edward III's
campaign against Berwick. 118
 The
rate of loss probably was higher:
the sudden inclusion of 606 foot
soldiers and three counties in the
pay records suggests the arrival of
reinforcements. However, August
follows the same trend in the
shrinkage nf the unit, losing fifty-five men at about the same rate as the losses
suffered in the previous three months. There is a sudden spike in the number of
losses with the loss of 125 men by 5 September, but the timing coincides with an
117 Original Letters, pp 33-9
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across-the-board reduction in the number of men-at-arms within the army.' 19 Those
who stayed must either have been reinforced or a more professional core, as their
numbers did not drop before the Bothwell campaign got underway. After this point
the need for troops tails off, before the final disbandment on 21 November.
While the early part of the campaign had been dependent upon York and the
Midlands for most of its manpower, the move to rebuild Bothwell was mainly
supported by the 825 mounted archers from Westmorland and Cumberland who
entered service on 25 October. I2° Their participation makes sense: Bothwell in many
ways was an opportunistic venture, with Edward III taking advantage of a narrow
window to advance matters in Scotland after military action versus France was likely
to occur that year. The proximity to the target of the campaign and the short time to
plan would have made the border counties the best place to look to for providing the
necessary infantry.
The counties also provided a smattering of foot soldiers to Lancaster, but
their numbers were highly reduced from those of previous years. Only the twenty
foot employed by Robert Holm were even with the army when it arrived at Perth in
May: until August, the only addition to this were the leader and 50 Welsh foot
brought by Montague. I21
 On 6 August 606 foot appeared in the county pay record,
but saw little campaigning: after 27 August, only 45 were still under pay. Some
minor additions were made to shore up numbers in September and October, in
particular the 245 who arrived with the Cumberland and Westmoreland contingents
to help secure Bothwell. This only brings the foot up to 478 men by 25 October.
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Three relatively small Welsh contingents also served during this late period in
the campaign season, with their usual concentration on foot rather than mounted
archers. Between the groups from North Wales, South Wales, and Powys, the Welsh
contributed 590 troops, of whom two were 'horse', 34 officers, ten standard-bearers,
and five ancillary support — two doctors, two criers, and a chaplain. Of these, the one
hundred men from Powys received pay for only six days, from 5 November through
10 November. Those from North and South Wales served from 18 and 22 October
through mid-December.
The impression given by the fluctuating numbers and their small stature is
that foot soldiers were increasingly seen as ineffective for fighting in Scotland. Even
at the later high water mark of 25 October, the 967 foot were dwarfed by the 1,794
mounted archers serving at the same point. While Wales was still being used as a
recruiting ground for foot, the English counties had shifted to providing both in equal
measure, with the mounted archers being preferred.
While the forces under Thomas Beauchamp in 1337 have been called a
'contract army', the label is something of a misnomer, as the bulk infantry
component of the army was raised via the standard demands of the counties, rather
than via contract. I22 The speculative list drawn up in York in April 1337 specified a
round figure of 4,000 archers from the counties; 123
 this translated to requests for
3200 archers and 240 hobelars from the counties on 20 March. 124 Unfortunately, a
large gap from mid-June to mid-August exists in the pay records of the county
122 Lewis himself notes that the avoidance of compulsion was in regards to the heavy cavalry: Lewis,
'The recruitment and organization of a contract army, May to November 1337', p 5
123 PRO E101/15/17
124 As opposed to the 3500 archers and 40 hobelars named by Lewis, p 10; Rot Scot, pp 486-7
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contributions, making it hard to fully account for the infantry numbers on the
campaign.
Most of the mounted archers provided by personal retinues were those in
Beauchamp's own retinue: of the 259 mounted archers in service from magnates on
11 May, 173 were in Beauchamp's pay. Unlike previous years, the magnates
provided little in the way of archers; part of this may have been due to archers not
being requested at the time that the speculative list was drawn up at York, and part
may be due to the very narrow group of men participating in the army that summer.
The only other sizeable retinues were the 36 men of John Darcy and Henry Percy's
24 men. 125 This would not change noticeably for the rest of the campaign, as the
king's reinforcements in June brought only 73 mounted archers including the royal
bodyguard.126
As mentioned, the gaps in the recorded pay for the counties make it difficult
to compute totals over time. I27 However, even these incomplete totals show why
Edward III found it necessary to come north in order to break the siege at Stirling.
On 11 May, four days after Beauchamp started receiving pay, only thirty four men
from Yorkshire under Richard Normanville were receiving wages: this number
would not significantly improve until 154 archers from Lancashire and 528 hobelars
and mounted archers from Westmorland and Cumberland began taking pay on 26
125 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 261r
176 B L Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 261r-261v
127 Lewis has a number of errors in appendix 3 of his article on the 1337 campaign: Cumberland
provided 502 hobelars from 1-7 September, not 52, and 134 from 6-14 Nov., not 185;
Northumberland also provided 50 hobelars, 5 vintenars and 3 leaders for 25 August-18 September in
addition to 103 horse archers, and 2 vintenars and 40 mounted archers for 19-26 September, not 118
horse archers; Yorkshire provided 8 leaders, 712 mounted archers, 49 vintenars, and 231 foot, rather
than the unspecified 992 foot for 15 August-18 September; Nottinghamshire provided 1 leader, 4
vintenars, 51 mounted archers and 29 foot rather than the unspecified 84 foot for 15 August 18
September; and Derbyshire provided 1 leader, 4 vintenars, 63 horse archers and 25 foot rather than 92
unspecified foot for 15 August 18 September.
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and 30 May. 128
 Though there were 638 foot under pay at the same period, it is
unlikely that Beauchamp felt he could lift the siege with 1216 men. By June 4 the
situation had drastically improved with the counties providing 1152 hobelars, 413
mounted archers and 1865 foot, I29
 giving Edward 3430 infantry with which to relieve
Stirling - a force larger than Lancaster's at any point in 1336. The presence of so
many hobelars, rather than mounted archers, is unusual compared to the previous
years, where mounted archers were by far the norm. A clear distinction is made
between hobelars and mounted archers in this campaign, as hobelars received 4d/day
while mounted archers were paid at a lower rate of 3d/day.
The next reliable date for pay records of the county contingents is mid-
August, after a two-month gap. 1308 mounted archers, 7 hobelars, and 614 foot are
recorded for 15 August; the implication is that efforts were taken to make sure
Beauchamp had the necessary number of men to carry out his role. It may be that
these represent entirely new contingents, rather than continuations of those from
June: nearly every contingent alters its makeup from being mostly hobelars to
mounted infantry by August, with the unit from Durham recorded as having the
seven hobelars in addition to its mounted infantry component. Further, the men from
Westmorland and Cumberland who begin service on 1 September are recorded as
hobelars. If these are in fact new contingents, the best explanation for the gap in the
records would be that Edward III dismissed the county contributions immediately
after assuring Stirling was relieved, and were then later recalled. This seems
unlikely, as it would have left Beauchamp with only enough forces to act as an
inflated custodian of the March, rather than having a true army to engage any
Scottish forces.
128 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 262r
129 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 261r-263r
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Most contingents continued service into September, where much of the force
began returning home. By 19 September, only 644 hobelars and mounted archers
remained in service, most of whom would dissipate in October. A force of 821
mounted troops appears between 6 and 14 November, undoubtedly to help relieve
Edinburgh when it came under siege by Andrew Murray.
Despite the limitations of the sources that are available, a good picture of the
English armies of the 1330s can be drawn from the records. The army throughout the
wars could be considered a northern army, rather than one reflecting England as a
whole. The infantry were drawn mainly from northern counties, due to their
proximity and their experience in fighting the Scots, while the magnates most willing
to bring retinues tended to be northern lords or those with claims on portions of
Scotland. The heavy cavalry was provided by a mix of members of the royal
household and the retinues of a relatively small number of magnates. Even the
greatest of the latter was willing to serve for pay, as increasing military costs and a
changed political climate no longer made refusing the king's wages acceptable. The
infantry were drawn from a combination of magnate retinues and contingents drawn
from the counties through commissions of array. The archers in magnate retinues
were invariably mounted, keeping with the new innovations being developed at this
time, while the percentage of mounted archers provided by the counties increased
dramatically as their utility was increasingly recognised.
The nature of recruitment changed during the last two years of the war to
shift away from large armies towards smaller forces that could still outnumber any
opposition that the Scots could raise. Though the process was still not complete
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before 1337, an increasing proportion of the army was being provided through
contracts with magnates to provide mixed retinues due to the quality of the troops
they could provide. This trend would only accelerate in years to come, but had not
yet come to provide the majority of the army's personnel.
Not only had the tactics of the army altered by 1337, so had its composition.
Where the army of 1327 resembled any of those from the reigns of Edward I or II,
the forces Beauchamp and Lancaster in 1336-7 led into Scotland were very different
in the proportion of mounted troops and the expected roles in battle of each part of
their armies. The means by which their forces were recruited had not yet undergone
major change, but a new emphasis on quality rather than mass meant that far more
was possible with a force the size of Beauchamp's or Lancaster's than would have
been under the same size force in the time of Edward I. These changes would prove
to be effective not only against the Scots in the 1330s, but against the far greater
military power of France in the war to follow.
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The Garrisons
The major difficulty that Edward III faced in Scotland was not defeating the
Scottish armies that could take the field against him. Dupplin Moor and Halidon Hill
had proven that the English forces could defeat the Scots in the field, and England's
relative wealth in both men and money gave Edward a definite edge in his
campaigns. Taking the land was not nearly so difficult as holding the land after the
withdrawal of the campaign forces for the year or garnering the local support
necessary to dispense with external military action as the main method of possession.
To try to gain local support and provide a local military presence, Edward III
instituted a series of garrisons at key points in Scotland to respond quickly to raids
and prevent attacks by Bruce supporters on the territory held by the English after
Halidon Hill. While the campaign armies had a major impact for a certain period
each year, it was the garrisons that provided the year-round presence and the most
obvious sign that the English meant to stay in Scotland.
As garrisons were meant to exert control over a locality, each one had its own
unique history, requiring that they be considered on a region by region basis. Without
this, it would be difficult to understand why some such as Edinburgh or Cupar found
themselves under regular attack, while others such as Stirling rarely received any
attention from either side during the wars. There are however four constants to
garrisons regardless of location that have to be addressed. The first is the logic
behind gan-isons, and the reasons for pursuing them as a strategy of exerting control
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over territory instead of other means. Second is the set of weaknesses garrisons
suffer that can make them ineffective in achieving their goals. Third is the need to
rebuild the castles that house the garrisons and the list of supplies and workers
necessary to carry out the work. The last is the size to the garrison, and whether any
pattern exists across all of the English garrisons in Scotland.
The cost of keeping a large campaign army in the field year-round was
simply too prohibitive to be considered seriously by the English crown. Keeping a
single banneret, leading nine knights, ninety men-at-arms, and two thousand
mounted archers in the field would cost the crown £38 18s 8d per day — or £14,210
13s 4d for an entire 365-day year. Another telling figure: Richard Ferriby listed the
cost of the men-at-arms and archers for the massive 1335 campaign as £25,402 6s
19d. 1 If such a small force as that given above would cost as much as three-fifths of
the largest army Edward III fielded in Scotland, it becomes immediately apparent
that the financial burden would be prohibitively high.
This theoretical force of two thousand men was also not considered large
enough for campaigning during the early years of the war; Edward was unwilling to
move any farther into Scotland than Roxburgh with a force twice this size during his
New Year campaign at the start of 1335, while demanding one of the largest armies
of his reign for the summer campaign that followed. It was seen as large enough in
the later stages, but was not nearly as effective as was needed. Lancaster's force of
sixteen hundred men managed its goals in 1336, but did not do more than regain old
ground, while Thomas Beauchamp's intended force of twelve hundred did nothing to
BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 239v, 258v
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break the siege at Stirling begun in April 1337 until the king and reinforcements
arrived in June.2
Even if the costs of keeping a large campaigning body in the field could be
supported, other difficulties would present themselves. While the English campaign
forces in Scotland could overmatch any opposition they faced, they could only be in
one location at a time when massed. Without a significant pool of local support, any
regions taken by the army would be vulnerable once the campaigners had moved on.
The Scots were also aware of the disparity between their forces and the English, and
for the most part avoided direct large-scale conflict after Halidon Hill. Instead,
numerous small-scale actions were taken, making it difficult for the English to pin
down their opponents and finish off the opposition.
Logistical support for the army would be another major difficulty. A mobile
campaign army would have no set base for supplies, requiring the English crown to
arrange a system of transporting supplies from its depots in northern England such as
Newcastle and Carlisle to the forces in Scotland as they proceeded around the
country. While the English crown had large-scale experience since the time of
Edward I in arranging such logistical support, it still was unable to guarantee
delivery at all times. 3
 Purveyances were unpopular, pay for the victuals taken was
often slow, and arranging for the transport of supplies north was problematic at best.4
The general English response to this difficulty in retaining its campaigning
gains was to establish garrisons at key points such as castles and towns through the
lands under their control. The advantages of the system were numerous. They
provided a strong point for defensive purposes, either behind castle walls or the
2 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 245r-247r, 261r-264v
3 For a detailed description of supply efforts under Edward I, see M. Prestwich, War, Politics and
Finance Under Edward 1 (Aldershot, 1972), pp 114-136
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fortification of a town. These fortifications also provided a location for the safe
storage of supplies, protected from the incidental and small-scale raids on supply
trains that were a common tactic of the Scots. They provided an administrative
centre for the sheriffs appointed to oversee the new English counties and a base for
the soldiers who enforced that oversight over the local region.
Though the costs for the soldiers were the same per day as those in a
campaigning army, their breakdown into smaller units spread over a number of
garrisons allowed for the more effective use of each soldier rather than piling up
largely redundant troops in one location. These forces also provided the ability to
respond rapidly to any Scottish attacks, blunting large-scale efforts and blocking
small-scale actions. While it was relatively easy for the Scots to avoid large
campaign armies in the areas with which they were familiar, it was much more
difficult to avoid engagement with garrison forces based in the area and with
increasing familiarity with the local geography. Once in place, the garrisons could
also provide mutual support to one another when they came under attack. The best
example of this was the rescue of Cupar Castle in 1336. Upon receiving word that
the earls of March, Sutherland, and Fife had placed Cupar under siege, the constable
of Edinburgh Castle, John Stirling, led his garrison across the Firth of Forth in
support of the defenders of Cupar. Mistaking Stirling's force for the advance force
of a major English army, the besiegers fled.5
The necessity for garrisons and strong points throughout the new English
lands is best shown by the capture and parole of Guy, Count of Namur, in 1335.
Having failed to reach Berwick in time to join Edward III's massive campaign of that
year, Guy decided to cut overland to Stirling in an attempt to outpace the English
4 See J.R.S. Maddicott, The English Peasanuy and the Demands of the Crown 1294-1341 (Past and
Present Supplement, 1975), pp 15-34
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army and join with the main body there. His retinue was sizeable; seven knights and
fifty-seven men-at-arms later received payment from the English crown. 6 At
Berwick, an additional 123 archers joined Guy's company as guides.
Despite having a force of over two hundred men, Namur was ambushed near
Edinburgh and forced to take refuge in the ruins of the castle there. At that time, no
effort had been made to rebuild the castle or provide a garrison for it. The lack of a
defended strong point in the region proved crucial, as the Scottish troops under the
earls of Moray and March were able to force Guy's surrender at Edinburgh. As a
result, they secured the promise of £4000 in ransom and Namur's removal from the
war. The same episode also provides evidence of the key role garrisons could play
when in place. While escorting Namur and his party to the English border in order to
release them, the Scots were themselves engaged by a force from Roxburgh or
Jedburgh. Sir James Douglas was killed and the Earl of Moray captured by the
garrison's troops.
In addition to the forces assigned to specific castles, the custodians of the
Scottish March were also paid to maintain sizeable retinues. While not an army by
any means, these forces could be used to supplement the strength of the garrisons in
the region or to deal with localized unrest and rebellion. Henry Percy and Ralph
Neville spent much of the time between campaigns keeping custody of the march,
complete with the men to back up their authority: the two had 181 men-at-arms and
160 mounted archers between them holding custody of the march for the September
and October before the 1334 Roxburgh campaign, and joined John of Eltham during
his brief spell guarding the march in February and March of 1335 with 221 men-at-
Anonimalle, p 6
6 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 239v; see also Nicholson, pp 212-4
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arms in tota1. 7
 The royal household often had a significant involvement in these
activities. Forty-one of Eltham's force were from the household itself, and the
following winter Montague's force of 117 men-at-arms on the border would be
entirely from the household and its contingents except for Henry Percy and his
thirty.8
Few of these assignments lasted for long periods, and they were normally
either the prelude to a season's campaign or a measure to prevent immediate
counterattack after the withdrawal of the royal campaign forces at the end of the
year. Unlike the garrisons or the campaign armies, the forces engaged to protect the
march were predominantly men-at-arms, suggesting that they were intended to
stiffen local levies called up in defense rather than operating as an independent force.
In theory, this should have made it possible for the local custodians to defeat the
small forces of the Scots and retain each year's advances. In practice, they were far
less successful. Even small forces like these could be costly. Richard Talbot served
with six knights, 37 men-at-arms, and 40 mounted archers from 15 August to 30
November 1337, at a cost of £394 4s• 9
 Percy and Neville's force in 1334 cost £647
5s, and Eltham's group £560 1 1 s 2d. Montague's force in winter 1335 earned
another £983 5s in wages.
This tactic of deploying garrisons in what was effectively hostile territory was
by no means a new one. Edward I had used it successfully in Wales with his ring of
fortifications such as Harlech, Caernarfon, Aberconwy, and Beaumaris, and had
attempted it to a lesser extent in Scotland with Berwick. Stirling, and other castles.1°
Also, most of the fortifications used as bases in Scotland had already been built by
7
BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 233r
8 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 236v, 237v-238v
9 PRO E101/20 18
188
The Garrisons
the Scots before the beginning of the wars, unlike in Wales where several of Edward
I's castles were built from the ground up. In general, the maintenance of castles and
their garrisons was a successful means of control for both Scots and English, except
where the numerical advantages held by the English made maintaining the strong
points far more costly than their removal. As a result, the Scots under the Bruces
rarely attempted to take castles and strengthen them to withstand English attacks.
Instead, they demolished them to the best of their ability, eliminating their military
usefulness. The one notable exception to this policy of fortification destruction was
Berwick, due to its economic importance."
While garrisons were key to maintaining a semblance of English control over
the southern counties of Scotland, they were by no means a guarantee that the region
under their control would be free of threat. If anything, the castles and towns that
garrisons were based in found themselves acting as lightning rods, foci for the
attacks of the Scots. With a few exceptions Dunbar, Dumbarton, Lochleven,
Kildrummy, Loch Doon and Urquhart — the Scots tended to revert to their old tactics
of eliminating strong points. Having a greater familiarity of the local geography and
populace, the Scots were more effective in the open, rather than holding onto
fortifications that attracted English besieging forces and tied down their troops where
the superior numbers the English could field could have major effect.
The English had the opposite problem. Without the static defenses and
locations to base their troops, they had no way to maintain local control, nor the
regional ties that would allow them to operate safely or effectively without that
bulwark. With their ability to field superior numbers, they in theory could afford the
io M.C.Prestwich, 'Colonial Scotland: The English in Scotland under Edward l', Scotland and
England 1286-1815, ed. R.A. Mason (Edinburgh, 1987), pp 11-14 in particular
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manpower to defend their fortresses adequately while waiting for relief from other
supporting forces. Unfortunately, this theory often broke down in reality. Superior
numbers had to be gathered to be effective, and they had to reach the besieged in
time to have an effect. If the forces available were inadequate for the task of
reaching outlying garrisons under threat, then those outposts would have little option
but surrender. The classic example of this was seen in the winter of 1334. Henry
Beaumont, the Earl of Buchan and one of the linchpins of the English/Balliol efforts
in Scotland, was besieged in Dundarg Castle, the central fortress of his earldom in
the north of Scotland. I2 In hopes of relieving Henry and restoring the balance of
power in the north, Edward III attempted to carry out a winter campaign to reassert
control and to rebuild the fortifications necessary for that control's maintenance.
Unfortunately for Edward and Henry, the troops gathered were considered by
Edward insufficient for the task, and failed to progress farther into Scotland than the
border fortress of Roxburgh. Unable to relieve Henry, Edward was forced to content
himself with rebuilding the border fortress while Beaumont was forced to surrender
and a major centre of English support was eliminated.
Other garrisons suffered similar fates for different reasons, such as Thomas
Ughtred's command at Perth in 1339. Here, the problem was not defeat inflicted by
Scottish arms; rather, the final blow was delivered by English logistical difficulties.
Many of the supplies required for the garrisons north of the Tweed could not be
provided for locally, due either to lack of security or the relative poverty of the
region These had to be brought north via governmental support and shippin g, or
through independent merchant activity - an unreliable method at best. The English
11 A. Tuck, 'A medieval tax haven: Berwick upon Tweed and the English crown, 1333-1461', in R.
Britnell and J. Hatcher (eds.), Progress and Problems in Medieval England: Essays in Honour of
Edward Miller (Cambridge, 1996), pp 148-167
12 Fordun, p 357; Me/so, pp 372-3; Bridlington, p 120
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government and the officials in charge of supplying Perth did not carry through in
delivering the necessary supplies, despite indentures specifically providing for the
victualling and reprovisioning of Ughtred's forces. 13 Without either the proper
military or logistical support, no outpost could be expected to survive on its own.
One of the most crucial elements in supplying the castles in Scotland was the
steady flow of wages to the defending English forces. Garrison pay was calculated
along the same lines as a field army, with earls receiving 8s/day, bannerets 4s/day,
knights 2s/day, men-at-arms is/day, mounted archers 4d/day, and foot 2d/day.
Maintaining these payments was a necessity, as a failure to provide the garrisons
with pay risked losing them due to desertion on the part of the garrison. Pay was
often doled out in the form of provisions, rather than as direct cash payments. As the
purpose of the pay was to provide sustenance to the troops rather than in addition to
the same, it made a certain sense to simply arrange and provide for the victuals that
the soldiers would be consuming rather than have to make the parallel arrangements
to transport both specie and supplies to garrisons that could not in one fashion or
another be supported by the local surroundings. One example is that of Guy Ferrers'
men in 1337. While serving under contract in the garrison at Perth, Guy and fifteen
men-at-arms received two baskets of barley, two of malt, and two tuns of wine in lieu
of £12 6s 8d of the £101 owed them as wages for three months' service.14
This method of pay was also attractive to the crown due to the alternative it
provided from emptying the king's coffers. The provisions used could be purveyed
from various sources and sent north, with payment promised later. This allowed for
the necessary materials to be sent north without the instant production of the
necessary silver to pay for the goods. Also, this meant that the goods could be paid
13 A. Ayton, 'Sir Thomas Ughtred and the Edwardian Military Revolution' in The Age of Edward Ill,
ed. J. Bothwell (Woodbridge, 2001) pp 121-2
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for out of the exchequer in England, without the risk of transporting the silver into
hostile territory. There was reason for this concern, as the Scots targeted supply
columns. I5 To guarantee that the supplies and pay got through, an escort was
required, driving up the costs of maintaining the garrisons. Thomas Rokeby paid for
40 men-at-arms and 40 mounted archers to escort supplies to Stirling after the lifting
of the siege there in 1337 at a cost of £40, while Robert Ufford and a number of the
household did the same for Bothwell immediately preceding its fal1.16
As mentioned previously, most of the strong points usable by the English had
been slighted during Edward II's reign. The Bruce strategy of eliminating
fortifications in the southern part of Scotland had removed the bases for the year-
round forces necessary for the English to maintain their control over the occupied
portions of the south. The amount of effort required to rebuild these fortresses was
sizeable, as were the expenses incurred in doing so. Numerous specialists had to be
brought to the site, often from England, along with their assistants and helpers.
Carpenters were needed to create the scaffolding men would use to build the wall,
along with building secondary structures both for the work on the fortifications and
for the continued maintenance of the castle and its garrison. Masons were required
for shaping the stone that would make up the structure of many of the castles and for
supervising their erection. Thatchers were needed to roof the buildings constructed
by the carpenters and masons. Smiths had to be on hand to maintain the tools being
used by the other workmen on site and to create new ones to replace those broken or
rendered useless by the work. Additionally, the smiths were necessary to keep the
14 PRO E101/21/16
15 Scotichronicon, pp 138-9 as an example
16 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 249v, 241v-242r
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garrisons the castles were meant for in fighting shape, repairing equipment and
making basic items such as horseshoes and nails.
They were all needed in great numbers, and received payment commensurate
with their personal skills. For instance, the eighteen master masons (cementarii)
engaged in rebuilding the destroyed castle at Roxburgh received 6d per day, while
the thirteen less-experienced masons employed only received 4d. The master
carpenters (carpentarii) and smiths (fabrii) received similar wages, though the
journeymen were paid 5d per day. The various helpers for all of these individuals
(operarii) received 3d.17
Materials of all sorts also had to be purchased and transported to the sites
undergoing construction and repair, often in great quantities. Even relatively simple
efforts to strengthen a strong point, such as the erection of a wooden palisade, would
require great amounts of materials in the way of lumber, nails, and other goods.
More complicated, durable structures, such as complex stone walls and buildings,
were correspondingly more complex in their requirements and their needs. Timber
had to be harvested and brought to the site, where it had to be shaped by carpenters
to the requirements of the building. Stone was even more difficult, often requiring
the location of a nearby source of stone and arrangements made for the quarrying of
suitable blocks to be then carried to the building site for use. Baskets of lime were
required for the mortar used to cement stone blocks together, and nails were needed
for timber buildings. Sea-coal was needed for burning, and raw iron was a necessary
material far the smiths to be able to work their trade.
Like most commodities, these could be available at widely differing prices.
Chalders of lime (celdrae calcis) could range from the 4s 6d paid by William Felton
at Roxburgh in the first part of 1335 to the 20d paid per basket at Stirling by Thomas
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Rokeby later in the year. Stones' weight in iron (petrae ferris) that cost 10d per
stone at Edinburgh for both Thomas Roscelyn and John Stirling cost half that amount
at Stirling for Thomas Rokeby. IS Lead had a similar value, with John Swanlond
paying 51/2d per stone for the 640 stones consumed by the building works at Berwick
during his tenure.19
Berwick
The key garrison holding
the southeast of Scotland was, as
always, Berwick. With its
importance as a supply depot, river
crossing, population centre, and
port for Tweeddale and Lothian, Berwick had to be securely under English control,
with the necessary force to extend that control outside of the town walls into the
surrounding region.
Before the advent of the wars between England and Scotland in 1296,
Berwick had been the largest town in Scotland, and the richest. Situated on the north
bank of the Tweed River at its mouth, it was the most southerly of Scotland's eastern
seaboard ports, in closest proximity to the seaborne traders of England and the
Continent, especially Flanders. Combined with being the focal point of Tweeddale
and Lothian, the richest farming and pasturage area in Scotland, this would allow the
merchants of Berwick unparalleled opportunity compared to other Scottish ports for
successful trade. The lifeblood of the town was the shipment overseas of the
17 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 248v
18 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 249r-249v
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region's greatest cash crop, wool. In particular, Berwick could rely on being the
main port for shipping the products of four major abbeys in the border region
Dryburgh, Jedburgh, Kelso, and Melrose. 2° The average export of wool per year for
the port was over 1800 sacks from 1327-33, nearly one-third of Scotland's total
output, while its customs revenue of £640 a year was the largest single source of
income for the Scottish crown.21
Its position also made it the perfect jump-off point for any military
adventures north or south of the border. In Scottish hands, Berwick provided a
strong point for leaping into Northumberland, along with a port suitable for the
shipment of supplies from the Continent. In English hands, it provided a perfect
storage depot and point for reinforcement of any forces in Scotland. With its
position on the north bank, its control by the English would allow forces to strike out
into Scotland without concern for an enemy force attempting to hold the crossings of
the Tweed against them, as well as remove the concern which a strong garrison that
could threaten supply lines could cause. In addition, it would allow the storage of
victuals much closer to where they were needed. Without control of Berwick, the
English had to rely on Newcastle-upon-Tyne as their supply dump, with no other
suitable ports closer to the border.
Due to this military and economic importance, Berwick was certain to suffer
repeated attack from both sides during any conflict. The wars began in 1296 with
Edward I taking Berwick by storm, immediately securing its use for supplies and
shipping. The garrison in place in Berwick during the next few years appears to have
19 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 248v
20 A. Tuck, 'A medieval tax haven: Berwick upon Tweed and the English crown, 1333-1461', in R.
Britnell and J. Hatcher (eds.), Progress and Problems in Medieval England: Essays in Honour of
Edward Miller (Cambridge, 1996), pp 151-3
21 James Campbell, 'England, Scotland and the Hundred Years War', in The Wars of Edward III, ed.
Clifford Rogers (Woodbridge, 1999) p 206
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been massive by later standards — 741 men from the Berwick garrison were sent to
join Edward during his 1300 campaign in Galloway. 22 Considering that a suitable
number of men must have been left behind to maintain control of Berwick, it only
highlights the importance with which the town was held.
English control would be maintained for two decades, but would finally be
lost in 1318 when Berwick was taken by treachery and returned to Scottish hands,
despite an unsuccessful attempt to besiege the town by the English the next year.23
Tellingly, the decision was made to repair the defenses of Berwick and garrison it,
rather than carry out the normal Bruce policy of demolishing border fortifications
after capturing them from the English. The importance of its port for the economic
livelihood of both the region and the Scottish crown was simply too great, and the
town was of a size that simply eliminating the castle would not remove its value as a
defensive site, unlike inland sites such as Roxburgh.
Due to these factors, Berwick became the focus of Edward III's military
power upon the expulsion of Edward Balliol from Scotland after the attack at Annan
on 16 December 1332. 24
 Balliol fled to England and secured Edward III's support
both for funding his efforts to raise an army of his own to regain control in Scotland
and for bringing English forces north. This allowed for Balliol to cross the border trt
late February or early March of 1333 and begin the actual siege of Berwick in earnest
by mid-March, with English naval support.25 Opposing this force was Patrick
Dunbar, earl of March, who held Berwick Castle, while the town was under the
cormnand of Alexander Seton.26
22 Liber Quotidianus Controtulatoris Garderobiae 1299-1300, ed. J. Topham et al (1787), p 253
23 G.W.S. Barrow, Robert Bruce & the Community of the Realm of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1988), PP
238-9
24 Lanercost, pp 270-1
Lanercost, p 272
26 Scotichronica, pp 88-9
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By 18 May, Edward III had joined the siege with sufficient force for the
besiegers to make an assault on the town that day and another two days later, albeit
unsuccessfully. The pressure of continued assaults through June, dwindling hope of
relief, and a fire sparked by an attempt to burn English ships attacking the town led
to a brief truce, followed shortly thereafter by another assault and negotiation for a
further truce. 27 A fifteen-day period was agreed on, with the surrender of twelve
hostages and the agreed surrender of the town and castle should they not be relieved
by 11 July. An attempt to relieve the town by crossing into England and then into
Berwick via the fort to the south of Berwick was partially successful in moving
reinforcements and victuals into the town, but disagreements over whether the exact
requirements of the truce indenture had been fulfilled led to Edward III hanging
Thomas Seton, the son of the town's commander. 28 The severity of the act led to
renewed negotiation, with William Keith, the leader of the relieving party, having
taken over as warden of the town. The resulting agreement led to the engagement at
Halidon Hill, the destruction of the Scottish army, and the following capitulation of
the town to Edward III on 20 July 1333.
Keeping a strong garrison at Berwick would seem especially important
during the period immediately after Halidon Hill and the cession of much of southern
Scotland to the English, as control had to be extended from Berwick outward into the
new lands. Unfortunately, the wardrobe books before Richard Ferriby's tenure as
keeper of the wardrobe have not survived. Other documents indicate that a large
garrison was not put into place at Berwick, though the garrison was certainly not
neglected with James Pipe providing 65 men-at-arms and 60 mounted archers.29
Henry Percy was given the custody of the town and castle, while William Burnton
27 Bridlington, p 112
28 Scalacronica, p 163; Bridlington, p 113
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was appointed mayor, Robert Tughale became chamberlain of the town and Thomas
Bamburgh its chancellor.30
The risings in 1334 necessitated a change in plan, as Balliol rapidly lost
control of most of Scotland and military action was again required. Berwick's
immediate security was dependent upon developing a network of fortifications to
control an ever-widening region. As new garrisons were put into place, the
immediate area of conflict would (in theory) move away from Berwick and lessen
the need for Berwick to have a sizeable garrison. However, until that time, a large
force was a necessity.
The chamberlain of Berwick, John Burghdon paid for a strong garrison of
eighteen 'armed men' (homines armati) and 140 hobelars and watchmen (vigilitores)
from 22 September 1334 until 8 February 1335. This seventy-day period was used
twice more, with Burghdon followed by Henry Ferrers, Hugh Freyne and Thomas
Lathom receiving pay for sixty men-at-arms and 224 hobelars and watchmen until
mid-April. At this point, Henry Ferrers and Thomas Lathom were replaced by
Nicholas Cantilupe, who along with Freyne served until 28 June overseeing the same
number of men.31
The increase in the number of men in the garrison of Berwick in mid-
February coincides with the failure of Edward's winter campaign to achieve much
beyond securing the slighted castle at Roxburgh and beginning a rapid rebuilding of
the site. Though the king left his brother John of Eltham in custody of the Marches
with some 250 men, the lack of any truly effective field army in the region required
an increase in the number of those protecting what garrisons the English had
29 PRO E431385
30 Lanercost, p275; Anonimalle, p 1; Rot Scot, p256
31 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 248r
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secured. 32
 This was especially made clear by the earl of March's return to the
Scottish side of the war, placing Berwick at risk due to Dunbar's strength in the
south and his recently rebuilt castle at Dunbar, just up the coast.33
With the arrival of summer and the 'Great Offensive' launched by Edward in
full swing, the garrison could afford a reduction in its size, paring away twenty men-
at-arms and eighty hobelars and watchmen for the rest of the summer. The
garrison's participation in the events of the summer appears minimal, barring the
count of Namur augmenting his party with one hundred twenty-odd men before
heading north on his ill-fated attempt to join Edward III at Perth.34
With Anthony Lucy receiving the custody of Berwick on 20 October 1335,
the garrison was further reduced, probably in reaction to the success of the year's
campaigns and the establishment of garrisons farther north at Edinburgh, Perth, and
other locations in the central and northern regions. Fifty men-at-arms and 60
hobelars received pay through the next two years until 30 August 1337, while 48
watchmen were employed 'on the walls' until 14 December 1337. 35 This appears to
have been more of a 'standard' garrison, as opposed to a reflection of the state of
affairs in the region; many garrisons seemed to hold at sixty men-at-arms and a
similar number of mounted archers. 36
 It certainly does not take into account Dunbar,
which remained untaken at this time.
The payments for work at Berwick during this period were recorded slightly
differently than at the other outlying garrisons in Scotland. While normally the
constable of the castle was responsible for the payments made to the workers
32 Rot Scot, p318; BL Cotton Nero C VIII. fos. 233r-5r, 252v
33 Lanercost, p 278; Scalacronica, p 165; Anonimalle, p 2
34 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 258r
35 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 248r
36 For instance, Roxburgh in 1335 had 60 men-at-arms and 80 hobelars mounted archers, while
Edinburgh in 1335 had 60 men-at-arms and 57 archers; BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 248v, 249r
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working on the structures, the royal clerk John Swanlond is recorded as supervising
operations at Berwick in 1337. 37 The work was relatively minor, though only in
comparison with other castles during the wars £30 was expended for various
supplies such as boards, nails, ten baskets of lime, 640 stones of lead and the wages
for two masons and four workmen over seven months that year. Having John
Swanlond responsible for the works at Berwick would seem unusual were it the only
record of its type, but other pay records indicate that he was active in the building
work at various castles as a paymaster and supervisor. He received 2s per day in the
Edinburgh pay record for supervising the operations at that castle and all the other
castles in Scotland from 2 November 1335 through 30 August 1337. 38 It should be
noted that Swanlond was not the only one to receive money for building expenses:
John Crabbe received 100s from Thomas Burgh for work on the town before
December 1137.39
It is worth noting the effects of the wars upon Berwick's major attraction to
the English crown: the money which the customs of the town added to the coffers of
its sovereign. The Scottish king before the onset of the wars received over six
hundred pounds a year from the customs of Berwick as previously mentioned.
However, between 23 September 1334 and 12 October 1335, the chamberlain John
Burghdon only received £134 14s lid in customs.4° Considering that in the same
period of time, nearly £2000 was spent maintaining the garrison of the town, it is
easy to see that maintaining the English footholds in Scotland was a costly affair.
Future years would still see Berwick being garrisoned by troops, as the
English hold in Scotland eroded. For example, in 1339 Richard Talbot was
37 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 249v
38 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 249r
39 CDS, no. 1251
40 CCR 1333-7, p 559
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contracted as constable of Berwick, with four knights, sixty men-at-arms, and thirty-
one hobelars as the town's garrison. 41 Unlike most of Scotland, Berwick would not
fall prey to the Scots for some time, only being taken in 1355, and immediately
retaken the next January.42
Roxburgh
Berwick's position as the main port for Lothian and southeastern Scotland as
a whole required several difficulties to be resolved. The region immediately
surrounding Berwick had to be secured in English hands, to allow for the wool and
other goods being shipped in and out of Lothian to be brought to the port safely, and
the revenues from the same made available for taxation. Similarly, control had to be
exerted over the hinterlands that provided the supplies for the town and the goods for
shipment out to the Continent.
Roxburgh's position at the head of the
Cadsle
to control the passage of commerce and troops from Berwick and the east coast to
Galloway and the rest of southwestern Scotland, either through Teviotdale or along
41 PRO E101/22/9
42 War, Cruel and Sharp, p 335
43 Peter G.B. McNeill, Hector L. MacQueen (eds.), Atlas of Scottish Histou to 1707 (Scottish
Medievalists and Dept, of Geography, Univ. of Edinburgh, 1996), p 238
Tweed Valley and at the mouth of Teviotdale
was of prime importance to this latter
consideration. 43 The bridge connecting
Roxburgh to Kelso Abbey was one of the major
crossing points of the Tweed. A sufficiently
large garrison based at Roxburgh would be able
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Ettrick Water. This would also allow for control over the wool production of
Tweeddale and Teviotdale, ensuring its passage through Berwick and securing the
trade necessary for Berwick's prosperity.
Along with the control of passage from east to west, Roxburgh also could
exert considerable control over the passage of troops from north to south, or vice
versa. Berwick alone could not control troops moving south, as the main fords used
by Scottish raiders tended to be farther inland, such as those at Norham or Wark-on-
Tweed. With both Berwick and Roxburgh in English hands and effectively
garrisoned, any Scottish forces in southern Lothian could be intercepted or harassed
by local English troops, with the general effect of keeping the conflict north of the
Tweed in Scotland, rather than spilling over into the north of England.
The strategic and tactical importance of the position was not lost on either
side. In October 1332, Edward Balliol took up residence in Roxburgh after a
successful campaign in support of his Galloway partisans after Dupplin Moor.
Seeing an opportunity, Scottish forces under Andrew Murray attempted to break the
bridge over the Tweed while Balliol was visiting Kelso Abbey, on the southern side
of the Tweed. A sharp encounter ensued between Balliol's alert troops and the
Scots, resulting in the capture of Murray and John Crabbe, whose expertise in
military engineering would henceforth serve the English cause.44
Roxburgh would be the focus of a much larger scale action in the winter of
1334-5, with the breakdown of relations between Balliol's supporters allowing a
resurgence of Bruce support. As part of Edward III's winter campaign to restore
Balliol to his kingdom and to cement control of southern Scotland in English-aligned
hands, Edward marched a small army from Newcastle to Roxburgh. The intent was
to provide protection for a large workforce to rebuild the slighted castle at Roxburgh,
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render it habitable, and allow for a permanent, protected garrison to be put in place.
Though the relief of Dundarg Castle in Buchan had been in Edward's mind as well,
only this southern portion of his campaign was actually carried out.
William Felton took command of Roxburgh's garrison on 2 February 1335,
after Edward's withdrawal to England to plan for the summer campaign. Sixty men-
at-arms and eighty hobelars joined him until 14 October, when the garrison was
reduced to thirty-six men-at-arms and forty hobelars through August of the next
year.45
 This is roughly the same period that the garrison at Berwick was reduced as
well, reflecting the change of the focal point of the crown to regions farther north. It
may have been nothing more than a cost-cutting measure, as the garrison had already
cost £1196 12d to that point. Even so, another £1839 4d in wages would accrue
before the end of Ferriby's records, without adding the costs of the extensive
building work that Edward III had initiated. Efforts to assure the specific supply of
victuals to Roxburgh were also taken; the merchant William Melchbourn received a
writ ordering payment to him of £12 8s for 31 quarters of wheat delivered for the
garrison. 46
The rebuilding at Roxburgh required large amounts of materials to be shipped
in, along with workers from England to carry out the construction. Thirty-two
masons, twenty-three workers, two carpenters, and a smith were employed on
reconstructing the defenses from 2 February 1335 through January of the next year,
at rates of pay ranging from 6d per day for the master craftsmen to 3d for the lowliest
worker.47
 403 baskets of lime and ten baskets of sea-coal costing £94 9d were
purchased over the same period, along with various other materials. In total, £854
44 Lanercost, p 270; Scalacronica, p 161
4' BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 248v
46 CCR 1333-7, p 376
47 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 248v
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strategic point for both sides throughout the war, with
heavy significance both in military and in political
terms. Much as Berwick was the focal point that led
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17s 3d was spent on construction costs between 1334 and 30 August 1337. Though
the castle appears to have been restored enough to house William Felton's garrison
after the departure of Edward III, work continued on for years afterwards. Four
masons, six workmen, and a smith were still employed working on the fabric of the
fortress through 1340, with over one hundred quarters of lime and several pounds
worth of tools being purchased for their work.48
The garrison's southern position meant that it stayed outside the main thrust
of military action through most of the 1330s. The most notable incident was the
capture of the earl of Moray in 1335, on his way to return the count of Namur to
England. The castle would stay in English hands only a few years after the siege of
Dunbar, falling victim to Alexander Ramsey on 30 March l342.49
Perth
the central portion of Scotland between the Firth of Forth and the Grampians, much
-IS PRO E101/22/40
4')
	 p 365
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as Berwick served as the major port for the southern portion of Scotland and
Aberdeen for the north. 5° Perth was also the closest major urban centre to the abbey
of Scone, the traditional location for the coronation of the kings of Scotland.
The town played an important part in the proceeding conflict, even before any
hostilities had taken place. The magnates in Scotland had met there on 2 August
1332 in order to select a successor to the position of Guardian following the death of
Thomas Randolph, earl of Moray. 51 Shortly afterward during the aftermath of
Dupplin Moor, Balliol and his adherents occupied the town, followed in turn by a
brief and half-hearted siege under the Earl of March, Patrick Dunbar. The defences
of the town at this time appear to have been either negligible or in need of
strengthening, as several chroniclers relate how the Disinherited immediately began
building ditches and palisades in expectation of Dunbar's siege. 52 The siege,
however, came to little, as Dunbar withdrew soon afterward from lack of provisions.
Balliol was crowned king of Scotland on 24 September, shortly thereafter heading
south to support his partisans in Galloway under Eustace Maxwell who were fighting
the Earl of March and other Bruce supporters. Duncan, the earl of Fife and recently
come into Balliol's peace, was left in command of a small garrison.
The next three years would see the town change hands more than once again,
depending on the fortunes of the overall war. The town was recaptured by the Scots
on 7 October, with Simon Fraser and Robert Keith taking the Earl of Fife prisoner
and leveling what fortifications remained. 53
 Fortunes turned again with the aftermath
of Halidon Hill, and Balliol taking up residence for the rest of the year at Perth. As
50 R.M. Spearman, 'The Medieval Townscape of Perth', in M. Lynch et al. (eds.) The Scottish
Medieval Town (Edinburgh, 1991), pp 42-59; Peter G.B. McNeill, Hector L. MacQueen (eds.), Atlas
of Scottish Histoty to 1707 (Scottish Medievalists and Dept. of Geography, Univ. of Edinburgh,
1996), p 238
51 Scalacronica, p 159
52 Scalacronica, p 160; Wyntoun, p 389; Bridlington, p 107
53 Fordun, pp 355-6, Wyntoun , p 394; Scotichronicon, pp 82-3
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Balliol once again fled to Berwick in the face of a general uprising in support of the
Bruces in September 1334, much of the surrounding area was lost to his control, with
Rogers stating 'only Galloway east of the Cree and parts of Buchan... remaining
loyal to him.' 54 However, a certain degree of control must have been maintained, as
John Stirling, while Balliol's sheriff of Perth, was able to gather enough forces to
carry out a siege of Loch Leven 'in mid-lent 1335', albeit unsuccessfully.55
Edward's winter campaign at Roxburgh did not make it farther north than the border
region, so would have had little or no effect on the control of the area surrounding
Perth. It is highly unlikely that Stirling could have attempted to take an inland
fortress so close to Perth without Perth being in friendly hands.
The summer of 1335 saw the 'Great Offensive' smash its way through
Scotland to reach Perth, certainly by 7 August when Edward III ordered the purchase
of two hackneys for the speedy return of two friars who had come to treat for peace
from the earl of Atholl, who had joined the Scots during the preceding year. 56 The
town remained the focus of campaigning activities for the summer, with Edward's
forces making a great demonstration of power by devastating the local area. Edward
Balliol also used it as the initial base for making a foray into the Highlands with a
small force including such as the earls of Warwick, Angus, Buchan, Henry of
Lancaster, Ralph Neville, and several others. 57
 Though most of the forces had
returned by September, the military activity through much of the year signaled an
end to the precarious nature of the garrison for a short span of time. The truce
)4 War, Cruel and Sharp, p 81
55 Scotichronicon, pp 98-99
56 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 272r
57 BL Cotton Nero C VIII,fos. 236r-237r, 255r-256v
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granted on 22 October for three weeks after two months of initial negotiations further
reduced the conflict, as did its various extensions.58
The failure of a negotiated settlement during the winter of 1336 meant an end
to the lull, with the town apparently being burned once again sometime before 19
May, requiring the rebuilding of fortifications once again. 59 After his chevauchee
into the north, Edward ordered the rebuilding of the walls of Perth in stone, charging
the costs to the six monasteries at St. Andrews, Dunfermline, Lindores, Balmerino,
Arbroath and Coupar Angus. 60
 Some chronicles claim Thomas Ughtred was placed
in charge of Perth at this time: however, he only began receiving wages according to
the wardrobe book on 12 March 1337.61
A decision must have been made by Edward to garrison Perth with English
troops at this time, however, as the wardrobe book of Robert Ferriby records a large
contingent of 337 mounted archers, hobelars, and foot under Ralph Neville as being
in place on 25 August 1336. 62
 Though this force was reduced to 176 mounted
archers and hobelars and 148 foot when the responsibility for their pay was passed to
John Padbury.
 on 13 October, it was larger than any other garrison in Scotland at the
time. The garrison was further reinforced by several magnate contingents joining the
garrison through October and November of the same year. The largest contingents
were provided by the earl of Hereford, Humphrey Bohun, who sent under Thomas
Ludlow 30 men-at-arms. Similar numbers came with Ralph Stafford and Robert
Morley, while John Leyburn, John Willoughby, Adam Well, William Ros of
Helmsley, Thomas Wake of Liddell, and Robert Colville all provided contingents of
roughly ten men-at arms each.
58 Rot Scot, pp 384-387
59 Anonimalle, p 7
60 Scotichronicon, pp 122-123
61 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 250v
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None of these men, with the exception of Ralph Neville, participated in the
summer campaigns of 1336. 63
 Several had been associated with one another in the
past, and were familiar with each other's methods. For instance, Adam Well and
John Willoughby were appointed along with the household knight William Frank to
arrest the bandit Robert Breton in Lincolnshire in September 1336, while John
Mowbray had witnessed the confirmation of an indenture between Robert Morley
and Queen Isabella the previous year. 64 Mowbray, Wake, Bohun, Well, and Neville
had all been in previous campaigns, while Colville had been on the Scottish side until
captured just before Halidon Hi11.65
Overall, the garrison at the end of the year saw 156 men-at-arms and another
36 mounted archers defending Perth in addition to the force under Padbury's
administration and any forces of Edward Balliol's resident yet not receiving n>yal
pay. 66 A further 43 men-at-arms joined the garrison at the end of January, when John
Mowbray's contingent arrived under the command of Robert Halsham and Edward
Balliol retained Henry Haneryngton and his contingent of 28 men.
The sheer size of the garrison in relation to any other in Scotland indicated
both the importance attached to holding Perth and maintaining it under the
permanent control of Edward III and Balliol, and the recognition that the previous
measures taken to hold the town had been wholly inadequate to assure its possession.
Similarly, the importance of the individuals contracted to hold the town was far more
than the usual English garrison. While some of the men receiving the custody of
62 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 250r-251r
63 Robert Morley, for instance, had been on pilgrimage to Santiago: CPR 1334-8, p 162
64 CPR 1334-8, pp 129, 362
65 Lanercost, p272; Scalacronica, p 162; Rot Pan, p 182
66 The notations for the garrisons at Perth are unusual in the wardrobe book as no other garrison has
individual retinues recorded; the usual format is to record the commander of the garrison and the total
number of troops in his care for the listed period of time. The rank of the individuals in question and
the existence of a separate 'command' for the garrison likely necessitated the alteration from the
norm.
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garrisons were of major importance — Anthony Lucy at Berwick, for instance, or the
banneret Thomas Roscelyn at Edinburgh and Dunnotar — most were men with strong
connections with the royal household and who made their living through military
service to others, rather than magnates of the land with their own power base
independent of the king. Perth, on the other hand, had several important magnates
contracted to provide garrison forces for its defense.
In March of 1337, the garrison was further strengthened by thirty men with
the arrival of Guy Ferrers, though this was counterbalanced by the loss of John
Leyburn, the first of the magnates in the garrison to depart. More important was the
arrival of the new commander of the garrison, Thomas Ughtred. 67 Having been
involved in the conflict in service to both Edward Balliol and Edward III, he seemed
a good choice to keep a permanent hold on the town. Commensurate with his status
as the holder of the most important town inside the truncated Scotland, he received
pay for an immense garrison — 40 men-at-arms, 100 hobelars and 100 archers, easily
eclipsing all the forces in the garrison, barring those men taking pay from John
Aslagby, John Padbury's successor. 68
 Considering Aslagby's status as a clerk and
paymaster, these forces would have devolved to Ughtred's immediate command as
well. Ughtred's personal retinue was also far larger than any other royal garrison in
Scotland, where sixty men-at-arms and sixty mounted archers was the rough rule of
thumb.
Most of those in place at Perth over the winter of 1336-7 left in May, either to
return south or to engage in fighting elsewhere in Scotland. Thomas Wake of
Liddell, William Ros of Helmsley and John Mowbray all contracted with the crown
67 For Ughtred's overall career, see Ayton, 'Sir Thomas Ughtred and the Edwardian Military
Revolution', pp 107-132
68 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 250v
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to be part of Thomas Beauchamp's force in the summer of 1337. 69
 Of those
previously employed in the garrison, only Ralph Stafford, Adam Well, Robert
Morley, and Henry Haneryngton stayed beyond mid-June and the renewal of Thomas
Ughtred's command of the garrison.
The costs of maintaining these forces was considerable. Thomas Ughtred's
retinue alone cost over £560 to maintain for just under one hundred days, while the
lengthy stays by Ralph Stafford and Robert Morley saw them owed hundreds of
pounds in wages as well. All told, the forces held at Perth from its garrisoning by
Edward in August 1336 until the completion of Thomas Ughtred's second contract as
keeper of the town would cost the household £5813 9s 4d. 7° Those in the garrison
received other considerations as well. Ralph Stafford, for instance, received a pardon
on 6 Oct 1337 of £260 owed to the exchequer in consideration for his services in
Scotland, while John Mowbray had received similar relief seven months before.71
Though these gifts and pardons were not made solely for serving in Perth's garrison,
the presence of these men in Scotland having not served in the previous year's
summer campaigns would have contributed greatly towards Edward's willingness to
grant them.
The garrison at Perth continued under Ughtred's direction until June 1339,
when the town came under siege by a force led by Robert Stewart, then Guardian of
Scotland. Amongst others participating in the siege according to chroniclers were 'a
great multitude' of troops from France brought by William Douglas and William
Bullock, formerly the governor of Cupar Castle which had fallen the month before.72
The town came under heavy attack, including mining by the Earl of Ross. After two
69 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 245r-245v
70 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 250r-251r
71 CPR 1334-8, pp 427, 529
72 viz. 'A great multitude', Anoininalle, p 14; Bullock: Scotichronicon, p 141
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months, despite having made arrangements for the proper resupply of the town in his
indenture for its command, Ughtred was forced to make arrangements for Perth's
surrender after the necessary supplies to withstand the siege failed to be sent from
England by the crown.73 On 17 August, due to 'lack of victuals', the garrison was
surrendered to the Scots.
Dunnotar, Lauriston, Kinneff
These three castles were situated along the North Sea coast between the Dee
and the North Esk rivers. They lay along the southern coastal route leading to
Aberdeen, and were necessary strongholds for trying to secure effective control of
coastal Scotland north of the Firth of Forth and to hold on to the earldom of Angus,
the lordship claimed by one of the key figures of the Disinherited, Gilbert
Umfraville.
Kinneff and Lauriston do not figure
prominently in the records of the time, either in
chronicle or administrative form; the wardrobe books
for the period do not mention either location, while the
chronicles of the time mention them but briefly along
with Dunnotar. 74 Clifford Rogers erroneously
identifies Lauriston with Laurieston, in Galloway; the
73 Anonimalle, p 14; Scotichronicon, pp 140-4; Ayton, 'Sir Thomas Ughtred and the Edwardian
Military Revolution', pp 121-2
74 A typical example is Scotichronicon, p 123: 'When therefore the king of England had in a hostile
manner reduced with fire and sword everything beyond the mountains that was against him, he went
back to the town of Perth, after fortifying the strongholds of Dunnottar, Kinneff, and Lauriston.'
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sheer distance from Edward's activities in the north of Scotland and Laurenston's
mention in the same breath as Kinneff and Dunnotar make it highly unlikely that
they are one and the same.75
Dunnotar figures more prominently in the administrative records, as its costs
are entered as part of the wardrobe accounts during its brief sojourn in English hands.
Thomas Roscelyn, previously keeper of Edinburgh Castle, began receiving pay on 1
May 1336 as keeper of Dunnotar, along with sixty men-at arms and 100 mounted
archers. The crown made sure that the resources to secure the castle were available:
Roscelyn received 250 marks by the king's order from the abbey of St. Edmunds,
John Wodehouse, the keeper of the hanaper of chancery, and the bankers of the Bardi
during April and May. 76 It seems likely that Dunnotar was in a state of disrepair
similar to that of many castles in Scotland. Accompanying Roscelyn's troops were
eleven masons, carpenters, and smiths.
It is unlikely that the entire garrison was in place before mid-June; unusually
for a munitiones pay record in the wardrobe book, eight ships are also listed as
receiving wages for conducting the men, horses, arms, and victuals for the castle
from the port of Lynn from 1 May until 11 June. The ships must have been well-
prepared and equipped: their pay amounted to £123 10s, for the 42 days, averaging
out to roughly twenty-eight sailors per vessel at the usual pay rates for the period.77
To put this into perspective, the largest ship used in the 1335 expedition from Ireland
into western Scotland — the Trinity from Hampton - employed forty-two sailors
during the summer, while several only employed seven or eight.78
75 For Clifford Rogers' identification of Lauriston, see War, Cruel and Sharp, p 119
76 CCR 1333-7, pp 560, 563, 576
77 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 251r
78 PRO E101/19/16
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Unfortunately for the garrison and for Thomas Roscelyn in particular,
Dunnotar's position at the furthest extent of English control made it vulnerable to
counter-attack. The Anonimalle chronicler tells of Edward III putting Aberdeen to
the torch during his 1336 campaign in revenge for Roseelyn's death at their hands.79
The garrison itself does not appear to have been destroyed at this time; though
Edward III is described by chroniclers as fortifying the castle during his chevauchee
in July 1336, the pay records in the wardrobe carry through to July and then ceases°
It is unlikely that having made a successful raid through northern Scotland that
Edward would willingly withdraw troops from regions he felt he controlled. This
control did not last for any period of time: the Scoticln-onicon tells of Andrew
Murray destroying the three outlying garrisons in October 1336 before retreating to
the 'very safe places in Angus'.81
The destruction of the three fortresses laid the way open for operations
further south. Perth became the thin edge of the wedge, exposed as the only garrison
north of the Firth of Tay in effective English hands. It also freed Moray and others
to move southwards, bypassing Perth and entering Fife and areas closer to the
heartland of English/Balliol control.
Edinburgh, Dunbar
;
•
.	 .
Edinburgh
-;
\
Dunbar
Edinburgh at this time did not
hold	 near the	 importance	 militarily
that it would gain in later periods as
•
79 Anonimalle, p 7
8 ° BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 251r
81 Scotichronicon, pp 124-5
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the capital of Scotland. In fact, the castle itself was a ruined shell when hostilities
erupted in 1332, and did not feature in the conflict at all as a fortification or point of
conflict until 1335. It did however feature prominently as the scene of several
parliaments and treaty negotiations before this point. After the failure of the
Weardale campaign to engage the Scottish raiders that had ranged into
Northumberland and the palatinate of Durham, Isabella and Mortimer engaged in
negotiations with Robert the Bruce for a permanent peace. Contrary to previous
practices, the English sent a delegation north of the border to finish negotiating the
treaty after initial discussions at York, arriving by 10 March 1328. Similarly, a
parliament called by Bruce met at Edinburgh on 28 February to discuss the peace and
other matters. 82 By 20 March, they had fleshed out the treaty so derisively referred
to as 'The Shameful Peace'.
The next parliament Edinburgh would see would also be to ratify agreements
between England and Scotland, though of a very different nature, and between very
different rulers. Called by Edward Balliol after the victory of Halidon Hill, the
purpose of the Parliament that met during February 1334 was to ratify the agreement
between Edward III and Balliol that granted much of southern Scotland to Edward III
as a permanent annexation to England in exchange for his aid in regaining Scotland
for Balliol after his ejection at Christmas 1332. By 12 February 1334, Edward had
all that he wanted: letters patent from Edward Balliol essentially agreeing to the
conventions drawn up at Roxburgh the year before, albeit without specifying the
lands that would be given over. 83 That Edinburgh would be included in the lands
ceded by letters patent on 12 July 1334 makes this event rather ironic.84
82 For a concise discussion of the mission to Edinburgh, see E.L.G. Stones, 'The English Mission to
Edinburgh in 1328', SHR 28 (1949), pp 121-32
83 Foedera, p 878
84 Foedera, p 888
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Though Edinburgh was seen as a natural venue for these parliaments, no
effort appears to have been taken before 1335 to repair the ruined fortress at the
crown of the rock spur that dominated the town. Much like Roxburgh, neither side
saw it worthwhile to reconstruct the fortifications despite the town being the local
centre of control. For the Bruce supporters, it provided a strong point for the English
to concentrate on and then use against them, while the English considered it to be too
expensive to rebuild as long as there were no major threats militarily in the area.
Two separate events in 1335 would rapidly change this way of thinking.
The first was the capture of the Count of Namur in the ruins of the castle at
Edinburgh, as previously mentioned. Forces led by the earl of Moray attacked
Namur and his contingent at Burgh Muir, eventually forcing the men from the Low
Countries to flee after being reinforced by William Douglas and men from the
Pentland Hills. Fighting their way through Edinburgh town, Namur and his men
were cornered in the remnants of the castle, which had been demolished 'for fear of
the English'. The only means available to block the rents in the walls were with the
bodies of slain horses and men. 85 Despite these efforts, Namur was forced to
capitulate the next morning.
To have a high-ranking ally ambushed and taken from the remains of what
had been the major English garrison in the area under Edward I was a highly
embarrassing situation, all the more so for highlighting the complacency which so
often dogged the English military effort in Scotland. What made it even more
embarrassing was the certain knowledge that the area could be threatened, due to the
second major event to have occurred that year. The failure of the Roxburgh
campaign to achieve any major gains north of the Tweed, combined with other
grievances, led to the reversion of Patrick Dunbar, earl of March, to the Bruce camp.
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By February 1335, his lands had been declared forfeit and granted to various
supporters of Edward III' s.86
Dunbar's particular importance was twofold: he was one of the most
important magnates in Scotland both before and after the beginning of the conflict,
and was the magnate with the greatest base of support in Lothian and southeastern
Scotland — those areas that the English were expecting to incorporate permanently
into England as recompense for their support of Edward Balliol in achieving a
permanent hold on the Scottish crown. Initially he had been a strong Bruce
supporter, with a knack for survival: Dunbar commanded the southern half of the
Scottish forces during the invasion by the Disinherited, and so missed the massacre
at Dupplin Moor. He chose not to continue a lengthy siege of the Disinherited at
Perth, and instead headed southwards with his forces, allowing them to break up and
using the remainder to punish Eustace Maxwell and the other supporters of Balliol in
Galloway. His command of the castle at Berwick led to his surrender on terms to
Edward III after Halidon Hill and his entering into Edward's service, rather
lucratively.
Such service was not unknown to the earls of March; Patrick's father had
been a supporter of Edward I, and the battle of Dunbar in 1296 was precipitated by
the need to take back his castle from the earls of Mar, Ross, and Menteith, who had
captured the castle with inside help. 87
 The castle had been in ruinous state since
Robert I; now that the southern counties were to be English, Patrick was free to
rebuild the castle and make it defensible again. 88 By the time of earl Patrick's return
85 Scotichronicon, pp 110-3
86 Scalacronica, pp 164-5; Wyntonn, pp 421-2; Lanercost, p 278; CDS, nos. 1142, 1145, 1146
87 M.C. Prestwich, Edward I (New Haven, 1998), p 471
88	 •Nicholson follows Scalacronica, p 144 in thinking that Patrick sought Edward Ill's permission to
rebuild Dunbar: Nicholson, p 144; this is contradicted by the Scottish chronicler Bower, who says
'Under pressure from the king of England the earl rebuilt the castle of Dunbar (which had earlier been
demolished) at great expense to himself': Scotichronicon, pp 92-3
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to the Scottish fold, it was again defensible. Its position along the coast midway
between Berwick and Edinburgh's port at Leith allowed it to be a threat to any land
traffic between the two towns, along with providing a possible landing point for any
foreign traders or aid. In addition, the earl's ability to call support from large
sections of Lothian greatly reduced the confidence of English control of the region as
a whole. To have failed to properly guard against this new threat was a serious
failure to adjust to changes in circumstances. Though the main campaign force in
1335 had passed through the region without trouble, smaller forces could be
vulnerable, as Namur's fate showed.
Once the 1335 offensive had been concluded, Edinburgh began receiving the
same level of attention that had been given to Roxburgh the previous winter. Edward
made arrangements with Edward Balliol's former sheriff of Perth, John Stirling, to
take command of the garrison with forty men-at-arms and forty hobelars or mounted
archers, formalizing the arrangement by 13 October. As was usual with these
arrangements, Stirling was also appointed sheriff of the county as well, with the
capacity to receive rebels into the king's peace.89
In the meantime, Thomas Roscelyn took custody of Edinburgh castle on 8
September 1335 with sixty men-at-arms and fifty-seven archers, 36 of whom were
mounted. 90 Stirling did not take over responsibility for the garrison until 2
November of the same year. Considering that Edward III himself was at or near
Edinburgh from 10 September until 27 September, Roscelyn could have done little
more than put into motion the efforts to man and repair the castle while Stirling made
arrangements to take up the permanent posting. 91
 The garrison was essentially
unaffected by this rapid changeover of command, maintaining its same forces
89 PRO E101/19/24; Rot Scot, p 382
9° BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 249r
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through Stirling's tenure until 30 August 1337, though the archers are referred to as
hobelars in later pay entries in the wardrobe books of the time. The account for John
Stirling lists sixty-seven men-at-arms from Scotland, England, and `Alemannia'
(likely the Low Countries) and 71 hobelars and archers for 1335-6, and eighty-five
named men-at-arms and 64 hobelars and archers in 1335-7. 92 A janitor and two
watchmen were also employed under Stirling as per his agreement with the crown,
receiving 6d and 4d per day, respectively. While Nicholson states that Edward had
to be convinced of the necessity of a garrison half again the size agreed to in their
indenture, the existence of the larger garrison under Roscelyn's brief tenure with the
king himself in the region argues otherwise.93
Edinburgh required extensive rebuilding, much as Roxburgh had done. After
Namur's unfortunate capture at the indefensible ruins of the castle, forty-seven
masons, eight carpenters, and sixty-one workmen were put to work in September and
October 1335 to return the castle to operation during Thomas Roscelyn's tenure
there, at a cost of over £100 for the two months. Work continued under John Stirling,
where twenty-nine masons and seven carpenters received pay through 1336 under the
supervision of the royal clerk John Swanlond. The amount of materials required was
similar to Roxburgh, with 322 baskets of lime, 108 stones of iron, 107 horsecarts of
sea-coal, and 830 boards being imported for use in the construction. Overall, the
garrison and construction work consumed £4766 11s between 8 September 1335 and
30 August 1337.94
Stirling did not always have an easy time during his tenure as warden; a
petition at the end of 1335 accuses Thomas Burgh, Edward's chancellor in Scotland,
91 CCR 1333-7, pp 439-442
92 CDS, appendix iv, pp 362-3
93 Nicholson, p 226
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of failing to pay Stirling his proper wage as a banneret, warden of Edinburgh castle,
and sheriff of the Lothians, along with disallowing many of the expenses he
incurred. 95 Considering the financial losses that the garrisons must have been
incurring, it is unsurprising that disputes over expenses would be occurring.
Unfortunately, such disputes weakened the garrisons by denying them necessary
resources and placed them at risk from attack.
Edinburgh came under siege by Andrew Murray on 1 November 1337, and
was sufficiently threatened that Edward III had to send forces under the earls of
Salisbury, Arundel, and Gloucester north to disrupt the Scottish attack. They initially
had been earmarked for campaigning in Flanders but had not crossed the channel due
to delays in gathering troops and financial difficulties relating to the wool scheme of
1337. 96 Murray broke off the siege, the last of his career, leaving Montague and
FitzAlan free to turn eastwards to attempt to take Dunbar. That the castle had been
left unmolested until this point seems odd, unless the overall tactics undertaken by
the English are considered. The only siege of any duration undertaken before
Dunbar was that of Berwick, the single most lucrative target in Scotland. Sieges
such as John Stirling's attempt to take Loch Leven in 1334 and Strathbogie's siege of
Kildrummy in 1335 were undertaken not by English royal forces, but by men
operating on behalf of Balliol. The fall of Lochmaben in the south also follows this
pattern. The Irish expedition in 1335 did attempt to take Rothesay, but failed.
Fortifications that we do know of were attacked by English forces, such as
Cumberriauld or the tower at Oxnam, were small affairs, not requiring great numbers
of siege equipment or even more importantly, time. Edward avoided attacking
94 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 249r: this figure includes 2s per day for John Swanlond's wages from 2
November 1335 to 30 August 1337. See also CDS, no. 1186, appendix iv pp 347-363
95 CDS, no. 1194
96 Sumption, Trial By Battle, pp 212-3
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Kildrummy during his chevauchee north in 1336, and Cupar never required an
English army to besiege it, being surrendered twice by the earl of Fife in 1333 and
1335. Dumbarton, Urquhart, and Loch Doon were never attacked, according to
chronicle sources. Dunbar itself was an available option for attack any time after
early 1335; that it took three years before a siege was attempted shows how little the
English were willing to spend the time and effort on siege warfare unless backed
with massive royal force.
Why this should be is uncertain. It should not have been from lack of
engineering skill, for the best of the engineers in Scottish service at the beginning of
the war, John Crabbe, had been a squire of Edward III's household since his capture
by Walter Mauny in 1332. Nor was it from lack of equipment, since they had no
difficulty at Berwick in this regard, and it seems ludicrous that matters should change
so drastically after 1333. Numbers should not have been a consideration, as both
Balliol supporters in Scotland and English magnates such as Edward Bohun were
carrying out sieges on their own with far smaller numbers than the royal armies
Edward III could provide. The Scottish tendency to raze any fortifications they took
may provide a clue. Since their general policy was to destroy fortifications outside
of those few that provided refuge, the focus of their strength was in the forces of
leaders such as Andrew Murray and Robert Stewart. Edward's military structure,
with its few sieges, mounted garrisons, and a mounted, highly mobile field army
each year, seems geared to trying to come to grip with the Scots in the field, rather
than by eliminating their refuges far away from English power.
If anything, the siege at Dunbar validated this strategy as more effective than
trying to eliminate the few castles left to the Scots. The siege began on 13 January
1338, but failed to make any progress before being called off on 16 June, despite a
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blockade at land and sea and the use of several siege engines. This failure did not
seem to be from pressing the siege halfheartedly; the siege at Dunbar is the best
recorded event by chroniclers during the war other than the Berwick campaign of
1333. the spirited defense, combined with the pressures of trying to
gather enough troops to carry out a meaningful campaign against France, meant that
the siege had to be lifted without any result. The importance given the siege in
several Scottish chronicles, combined with the words of the chroniclers themselves,98
attests to how key the siege was as the indicator of a turn in the fortunes of the war.
Though there would be other major activity in Scotland such as the 1341 invasion by
Edward III, the siege at Dunbar was the last instance where the Scottish war took
precedence over continental maneuverings. After its failure, the overall thrust of
English efforts would be aimed squarely at France.
In August 1338 Thomas Rokeby took over the position of warden at
Edinburgh in addition to Stirling, receiving a prest of 300 marks at that time.99
Edinburgh would remain in English hands until 16 April 1341, when a Scottish party
led by William Douglas and William Bullock successfully disguised themselves as
•victual merchants in order to gain access to the castle and take it by surpnse. loo
 The
Scots had proven adept at these sudden strikes over the years, especially during
Robert I's reign. Edinburgh itself had fallen to Robert by a similar surprise, when
Robert's men climbed the supposedly impassible cliffs behind the castle at night to
catch the garrison unawares. 101
 Unlike the fighting decades before, the Scots did
have the wherewithal to bring siege weapons to bear on their targets: Andrew Murray
97 Anonimalle, p 13; Scotichronicon, pp 126-131; Lanercost, pp 295-6; Fordun, pp 362-3
98 Such as Scotichronicon, p 131: `... a war broke out between the kings of France and England,
which was cruel and fearful enough, but yet a fortunate thing for Scotland. For if the aforesaid king
had continued his war in Scotland, he would (as far as human judgement is concerned) have occupied
it wholly and without difficulty'.
99 CDS, no. 1284
loo Scotichronicon, pp 144-7; Fordun, p 365
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showed this to great effect in 1336 during his Fife campaign. However, subterfuge
was a very familiar and very successful tool, and the Scots saw no reason to forego
its use.
Bothwell
The castle at Bothwell was one of
the victims of Robert I and was only
remnants by 1336, when Edward III decided
to include it in the web of fortifications that
he was attempting to erect that year. Its
position in upper Clydesdale made it a good
complement to Stirling in attempting to bisect the country and prevent the north-
south movement of Scottish troops to reinforce one another. This had proven costly,
when eight hundred men from the south had gone north into Mar with Andrew
Murray and successfully defeated David Strathbogie, resulting in the latter's death
and the relief of Kildrummy, one of the major strongholds for the Bruce cause. It
would also extend English power north and west, covering the southern counties and
allowing more English power to be exerted towards those western areas under
Scottish sway.
Edward made his quick trip north in October 1336 in order to begin the
reconstruction of the fortress, gathering up the remainder of Lancaster's force and
staying in the region until 10 December.1°2 Unusually for a castle manned by royal
troops, Bothwell does not feature in the munitiones section of the wardrobe books.
1 ° 1 Barrow, Robert Bruce & The Community of The Realm of Scotland, pp 275-8
102 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 214r, 241r-244r, 259r-260r
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However, there are traces elsewhere. Several household knights of Edward III,
including Robert Ufford and Walter Mauny, received wages with their retinues for
continuing on at Bothwell through March of the following year, totaling forty-five
men-at-anns. 103
Meanwhile, the repairs of the castle were placed in the hands of the future
Bishop of Durham, Thomas Hatfield, whose efforts and costs are recorded in the
Necessaria section.'" Between October and December, Hatfield spent £87 17s 8d on
repairs, employing nineteen carpenters, twenty-eight masons, two thatchers, two
smiths, and seventy-five 'diggers' (fossatores) to render the castle defensible and
habitable. The pay for work ended on 4 December, a week before Edward III
returned to England.
Bothwell's history as a royal garrison was to be extremely short-lived. The
castle fell under siege in March 1337 from Andrew Murray, after he had spent the
winter destroying the English garrisons north of Perth and February reducing the
buildup of fortifications in Fife to the sole surviving garrison at Cupar. 105 According
to Walter Bower, the siege was carried with vigour, naming two men-at-arms who
died in the fighting. The garrison surrendered on terms, probably due to the half-
finished state of the defenses and the time of year guaranteeing that relief would be
months away; it may also have been due to the `Bostour', a siege engine employed
by Murray that supposedly caused great fear amongst the English.106
103 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 241v-242r
104 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 241v-242v (wages), 215 (Hatfield)
105 Scotichronicon, pp 124-127; Fordun, p 362; Bridlington, p 128; Lanercost, p 288; Wyntonn, p435;
Melsa, p 378
1 °6 Scotichronicon, pp 124-5
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Stirling
The most remarkable thing about Stirling during the 1330s is not its part in
the war, but rather the lack of any major part in the fighting. The defining battles of
the 1330s, Dupplin Moor, Halidon Hill, even Culblean, all occur elsewhere; the same
goes for the defining sieges, at Berwick, Dunbar, Kildrummy, or Lochindorb. Its
position at the lowest crossing point on the Forth would seem to make it the key to
Scotland, but such prominence on a national scale was missing during the
BallioUBruce conflict. Even in regional terms, Stirling was not heavily involved in
the war; the focus by far was on Berwick and Lothian to the south, and Fife in the
north. Both the Scots and the English seem to have had little difficulty in bypassing
Stirling with their armies. The pattern of the previous two reigns, which saw
Bannockburn, Stirling Bridge and Falkirk all fought on the castle's doorstep and
multiple sieges carried out, changed to one where the castle was important and worth
holding, but not an immediate priority for either side to control.
The castle did not come into Edward III's hands until August 1336, when
William Montague was assigned custody of the castle. The choice of Montague is
unsurprising: even with the lack of conflict over Stirling, the potential for it being a
strategic chokepoint still existed, and Edward would have wished it to be in the
hands of someone who could be utterly relied on to be loyal. Montague in turn
assigned the holding of the castle to Thomas Rokeby, the knight who had delivered
the news on the whereabouts of the Scottish raiders during the 1327 Weardale
campaign.1°7
107 Scotichronicon, pp 122-3; Fordun, p361; Weardale: Scalacronica, p 154; Foedera, p 717
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Rokeby took command on 25 October 1336, having served out the summer
with the royal forces. 108 Though the castle had been assigned to Montague, payment
for the garrison evidently was not, as its wages were recorded in the wardrobe
beginning in October. Under Rokeby was a garrison with forty-four men-at-arms,
eighty hobelars, and thirteen watchmen until June of the next year. Restoration work
was also undertaken, with seven carpenters, eight masons, a smith, two thatchers and
73 other workmen being paid for nearly a year's work from October through 30
August 1337.109
These men must have earned their pay well, as Andrew Murray attempted to
take the castle in April 1337, after his success at Bothwell in March. Rokeby had
either more time or more warning to prepare his defenses, along with the advantage
of one of the strongest castles in Scotland. Rather than surrendering like Bothwell,
Stirling held out for three months until 14 June, when the castle was relieved by a
hurriedly organized rescue force led by Edward III. 110 In order to avoid a repeat of
this episode, the garrison was reinforced, increasing the number of watchmen to
twenty-one and the force of men-arms to eighty. An additional forty men-at-arms
and forty mounted-archers guarded the victuals brought in to resupply the castle
during the king's residence there until 28 June, an effort which saw two ships from
Kingston-on-Hull paid £12 to ferry supplies to the castle. Another £22 9s 10d was
spent on improvements to the castle and construction materials, including 25 baskets
of lime, 390 stones of iron, and 1160 nails.
The repairs and heavy garrison did their job, as Stirling would come under
siege again in 1340, though a truce declared during the summer of that year gave the
1 °8 Rokeby served with himself and eight squires from 11 June to 25 October, having come to
Scotland with the king during his rush north. BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 244r
109 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 249v; see also CDS, appendix v, pp 364-368
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castle relief until October." After this point the siege resumed, but failed to make
any headway until Rokeby was convinced to surrender the castle on terms on 10
April 1342.112
Caerlaverock, Lochmaben, Jedburgh
Not all of the major castles in southern Scotland received royal garrisons, nor
was it English royal policy to make sure that they did. Though certain key positions
were held in royal hands, others were placed into the hands of magnates who could
use their own resources to defend them and the surrounding lands. This spared the
royal treasury from having to absorb the costs of pacifying and protecting those
regions while still seeing them incorporated into a web of defensive garrisons
capable of maintaining the peace and defending the newly won areas against
attempts to retake the region by the Scots.
Caerlaverock never technically fell into English hands at all, yet was a key
part in the maintenance of English and Balliol interests in Galloway. Located in
southern Galloway, west of Annandale and just east of the Nith estuary, it was in a
key position from which to raid the main western route from Carlisle north into
Scotland, and to threaten the castle at Lochmaben and the shire centre of Dumfries.
It was the focus of Edward I's campaign in 1300, after its garrison had repeatedly
I I° Scotichronicon, pp 130-1; Fordun, p 362; Anonimalle, p 10; Scalacronica, p 167; BL Cotton Nero
C VIII, fo. 249v for the date of the siege's end.
III Rot Scot, pp 600-1
112 Scotichronicon, pp 144-5; CDS, no. 1383
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struck at Lochmaben and threatened to destabilize Galloway despite the capture of
Dumfries and Lochmaben by the English the previous year.113
More importantly, it was by the 1330s the focus of those opposed to the
Bruce dynasty in Galloway. After the defeat of Donald of Mar at Dupplin Moor and
the crowning of Balliol at Scone in 1332, an uprising in support of Balliol began in
Galloway under the leadership of Eustace Maxwell, lord of Caerlaverock. In part
this was due to the connection of Balliol to the local region, being the heir through
his grandmother of the last Celtic lord of Galloway. These historical ties also nicely
coincided with the feud many of the Galwegians had with the Bruce family and their
supporters, as the Earldom of Carrick to their north was central to the Bruce holdings
and Annandale and Lochmaben to the east were held by the earl of Moray.
Alexander Bruce was also the current holder of the title Lord of Galloway, as the
Balliol family had been relieved of it during Robert I's reign. Unfortunately for
Maxwell and his supporters, those still loyal to the young David Bruce chose to
move south instead of continuing to siege Perth, and began to extract a high price
from Galloway for its support of Ballio1. 114
 This pressure was relieved in the fall
when Balliol moved south in support of the uprising, forcing many of the Bruce
supporters to capitulate until the ambush at Annan forced him to flee.
Maxwell stayed in the Balliol camp, and was willing to transfer his loyalties
to Edward III to some degree, a key figure in Galloway's continued support for
Balliol and Edward III despite the inclusion of Galloway east of Wighom in the
lands transferred to Fngland in l334." 5
 Household wardrobe records show Maxwell
being paid one hundred marks per quarter-year for twenty men-at-arms through 1334
and 1335 and an additional twenty pounds for 20 mounted archers during the winter
114 Lanercost, p269; AnonimaIle, p 152; Melsa, p366; Wyntoun, pp 395-6
113 Prestwich, Edward I, p 483
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campaign to rebuild Roxburgh in 1334. 11 ' In addition, he also became sheriff of
Dumfriesshire, accounting for the office from 15 October 1335 through 29
September 1336.117
Despite his affinities to Balliol and willingness to serve Edward III so as to
maintain his leading position in Galloway, Maxwell was not completely averse to the
Bruce camp, especially when faced with a deteriorating situation for the English and
a necessity to keep his own position secure. In 1337 Maxwell abandoned the English
cause and transferred his allegiance to David Bruce, severely damaging the English
position in Galloway and opening the way for raids to hit Cumberland later that
year.118
Lochmaben, Caerlaverock's rival during Edward I's time, was the largest
castle still standing in southwestern Scotland during the 1330s. It was the key to
upper Annandale and the route northward into Scotland. It was held by Thomas
Randolph, earl of Moray at the beginning of the wars in 1332, but was not taken
during the immediate aftermath of Dupplin Moor. Its garrison was still loyal to the
Bruce cause in 29 July 1333, when it was granted to Henry Percy as part of the two
thousand marks' worth of lands stipulated in the life indenture that Percy had made
with Balliol in May 1333. 119
 Percy was assigned in August to take the castle and
keep it, provided it was taken at his own cost; unfortunately for Percy, the castle
surrendered to Edward Bohun under terms protecting the garrison and leaving the
castle in Bohun's hands.
115 Foedera, p 888
116 Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 239v, 253v
117 CDS, appendix iii, pp 317-21
118 Anoninialle, p 10
119 J.M.W. Bean, 'The Percies and their Estates in Scotland', Archaeologia Aeliana, 4th ser, 35 (1957),
p 97
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The difficulty in Edward Bohun's capture of Lochmaben came from the grant
given by Edward I to Humphrey Bohun in April 1306 of Annandale and
Lochmaben. 12° Though Humphrey had died at Boroughbridge, the claim still existed
and was valid for the Bohun family, leaving two of the largest of Balliol's supporters
wrangling over who was the valid owner of the castle. The resultant dispute was
beyond the ability of Balliol to solve, requiring Edward III to intervene. Neither
claimant was willing to back down, and Edward had to threaten forfeiture in order to
get Lochmaben turned over to Henry Beaumont and Ralph Neville as neutral parties
until the dispute could be resolved.121
The matter lingered until September 1334, when Edward III was able to force
a compromise solution on both parties. In essence, Percy gave up his claims to
Lochmaben in return for the castle at Jedburgh, control of the surrounding lands, five
hundred marks a year from the customs of Berwick, and the custody of the town's
castle and one hundred marks a year as stipend for the same, except for in war when
he would receive £200. Bohun meanwhile was granted Lochmaben and Annandale.
All parties gained from the proposal, as Edward would have had far more in costs
and manpower drain attempting to garrison both Lochmaben and Jedburgh than he
would have gained from keeping Jedburgh in his own hands. It left him free to put
his resources into garrisoning Berwick and later Roxburgh, while guaranteeing that
both Bohun and Percy would be putting their resources into defending the English
control of the region.p
Jedburgh itself would remain in Percy hands far beyond this particular war.
Its position south of Roxburgh in Teviotdale made it the closest castle to England in
the southeast, and thus the most shielded from Scottish attacks. Its relative proximity
120 Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance under Edward!, pp 238-9
121 CDS, no. 1101; CCR 1333-7,p 185
229
The Garrisons
to Roxburgh meant that the two garrisons were often covering the same ground,
strengthening the English position in the upper Tweeddale region. It figures little in
the chronicle reference or royal accounts for the war, except for one incident.
William Pressen, the keeper of the castle in July 1335, helped intercept the earl of
Moray's party as it brought the recently captured Guy of Namur south to English
lands. Pressen was credited with capturing Moray, ending the latter's involvement in
this stage of the Anglo-Scottish wars. 123 The crown did take an interest in the repair
and defense of Jedburgh, as Pressen was granted 56s 4d in 1336 for money spent on
the repair of the castle.124
Dundarg, Kildrummy, Lochindorb
The three castles of Dundarg,
Kildrummy, and Lochindorb were the
major flashpoints north of the Tay, and
the focus of campaigns in 1334, 1335, and
1336, respectively. Unlike the south, this
northern region had no castles with royal garrisons; the fortunes of the English
efforts to defeat the Bruce supporters in the region depended upon the castles of
magnates friendly to Edward III and Balliol and their ability to hold out against much
more intense pressure than faced by the more southerly garrisons.
Dundarg was the centerpiece of the Earldom of Buchan, claimed by Henry
Beaumont. Its location east of Banff on the north shore of Scotland allowed it to
resupply by sea and exert control over the northernmost of the English-speaking
122 Rot Scot, p 280; CCR 1333-7, p 327; Nicholson, p 170
123 Scotichronicon, pp 112-3; Bridlington, pp 123-4; Melva, p 376; Fordun, p 359; Wyntoun, pp 420-1
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lowland areas on the eastern seaboard. Henry was able to reclaim control of the
earldom after the battle of Halidon Hill in 1333, and began refortifying Dundarg to
bring it up to modern standard. 125
 As Henry was seen as the greatest of Balliol's
Disinherited supporters and the driving force behind their attempts to take Scotland,
he was guaranteed to attract the unwelcome attentions of Bruce partisans operating
out of the lands of the earl of Moray, whose earldom abutted Buchan to the west.
Such attention came in the winter of 1334, as Beaumont retreated from Perth and a
noisy, heated debate over the inheritance of the John Mowbray killed in 1332 at
Arman. 126
 Much like Richard Talbot and David Strathbogie, his allies in the dispute,
Beaumont found himself the target of the remaining Bruce partisans as they took
opportunistic advantage of his isolation. Andrew Murray and Alexander Mowbray,
his opponent in the dispute before Mowbray's defection to the Bruce cause, had him
under siege at Dundarg by September. With the failure of the Roxburgh campaign to
gather enough men for a relief effort, Beaumont had little choice but to surrender on
23 December, eliminating Buchan from areas that could support the Balliol faction
and Dundarg from further involvement in the war.127
Kildrummy was never in the hands of the English or any Balliol supporters
during the 1330s: while it had been taken by the future Edward II in September 1306,
no English force would have such luck three decades later. 128
 It was one of the few
fortifications that remained outside of English or Balliol hands after Halidon Hill,
along with Dumbarton, Urquhart, Loch Doon, and Loch Leven. 129 It was the major
castle in Mar, located on the Don River near the headwaters of the River Bogie.
124 Rot Scot, p 434
125 Wyntoun, p 406
126 Bridlington, p 119; Scotichronicon, pp 94-95; Wyntoun, pp 406-7; Brut, p 280; Scalacronica, p
164; Melsa, p 372
127 Wyntoun, pp 427-8; Fordun p 357; Scalacronica, p 164; Lanercost p 278; Bridlington, p 121
128 Prestwich, Edward I, p 508
129 Scotichronicon, pp 92-3; Wyntoun, p 404
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More importantly, it had been the centre of Donald of Mar's earldom and was
defended through the wars by Christian Bruce, Murray's wife, sister of Robert I and
Donald's mother. 13° Where Dumbarton was the major stronghold in the west
upholding the Bruce cause, providing sanctuary for David Bruce before his escape to
France, Kildrummy was the centerpiece of defense in the east, preventing the easy
reclamation of the lowlands north of the Tay.
The most notable incident involving Kildrummy came in 1335, when David
Strathbogie began besieging the castle as part of his efforts to reduce Scotland north
of the Forth and bring it to submit to Balliol. Negotiations at the time were occurring
between the Bruce supporters and Edward III's deputies, complete with truces and
cessation of hostilities. It is uncertain whether or not this extended to those acting on
behalf of Balliol, rather than Edward III. What is certain is that Murray received
Montague's permission to attempt a rescue of his wife, which led to the defeat and
death of Strathbogie on 30 November at Culblean. 131 The castle would be bypassed
during Edward III's strike north in 1336, and otherwise remained free from attack for
the rest of the war.
Kildrummy's counterpart was the Atholl stronghold at Lochindorb, an island
fortress in the lake of the same name between the Rivers Spey and Andhorn at the
headwaters of Dorback Burn. It was not to fall to the Scots in this stage of the wars,
though it was threatened in 1336. After his victory at Culblean, Andrew Murray
took advantage of the chance to take the initiative and began a siege of Lochindorb in
March 1336, hoping to capitalize on the lack of an English royal army in Scotland
capable of interfering with the siege and the garrison's relative isolation compared to
other Balliol- or English-held lands.	 Taking Lochindorb was of particular
13 ° Wvntonn, pp 317, 319
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importance for Murray, as it lay directly between his wife at her castle of ICildrummy
and his lands in Ross. If the castle could be taken, it would allow him to link up his
lands and provide an unbroken chain across the north to allow supplies and
reinforcements to move freely eastward and push the areas of conflict further
south. 132
Instead of winning Lochindorb, Murray provided Edward III with a splendid
piece of propaganda. Lochindorb was held at the time by Catherine Beaumont,
daughter of Henry Beaumont and widow of David Strathbogie. Given the
opportunity to rescue "ladyis, that ware luvely", I33
 Edward rose to the occasion.
Taking eight hundred men north from Perth, he reached Lochindorb in only three
days on 15 July, forcing Murray to retreat into Ross and relieving the garrison. After
resupplying the nearly starved garrison by raiding the surrounding countryside and
plundering Kinloss Abbey, Edward left to burn most of the northern coast.I34
Murray's focus after this point would shift eastwards and southwards, leaving
Lochindorb behind for more successful attacks that winter on the Kincardinshire
fortifications and Fife. Edward, meanwhile, had the tale of his wild ride through
northern Scotland told far and wide in a news letter sent out by the Queen
emphasizing the bravery and care Edward III showed in rescuing and resupplying
Lochindorb and its inhabitants at great risk and effort.I35
131 Scotichronicon, pp 116-7; Wyntoun, pp 422-7; Fordun, pp 359-360; Pluscarden, p 280; Knighton,
p 475; Melsa, p 376; Lanercost, p 284; Scalacronica, p 166; Baker, p 57
132 Wyntoun, p428; CDS, no. 1221
133 Wyntoun, p 428
134 Wyntoun, pp 429-30; Fordun, pp 360-1; Scalacronica, p 166; Baker, pp 57-8; Original Letters, pp
33-9
135 Original Letters, pp 33-9
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Cupar
Cupar is centrally located in Fife,
the peninsular region between the Firth of
Forth and the Firth of Tay. The castle
was the main seat of the Earls of Fife,
and was the strongest of the fortresses
within the earldom in the 1330s. The
county had a central role in the campaigns of the 1330s, seeing action in most years.
Partly this has to do with the proximity to Perth, and its position as the de facto
capital of Scotland at the time. The Disinherited landed at Kinghorn and passed
through Fife to approach Perth before Dupplin Moor, while later years saw the Scots
fight to try to cut Perth off by controlling Fife and the English fight to guarantee the
ability to travel overland to Balliol's chosen capital.
Another reason to attempt to control Fife was the relative fickleness of
Duncan, earl of Fife. One of the more significant magnates in Scotland before the
wars, Fife would change sides four separate times, all in the face of military defeat.
After losing to the Disinherited at their landing at Kin g.horn and the disaster at
Dupplin Moor, Fife transferred his loyalty to Balliol, being granted custody of Perth
during Balliol's campaign southwards as a reward. He would transfer it again in
October 1332 when Simon Fraser and Robert Keith assaulted and took Perth,
rapturing the Earl and forcing him to switch sides. In 1335, he would surrender
without a fight to Edward III, and by 1336 was already back in the Scottish camp.
While the betrayals and defections of Patrick Dunbar and David Strathbogie have
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received far more attention, the earl of Fife surpassed them both in his willingness to
transfer loyalties due to expediency and surviva1.136
Cupar was bypassed during the Disinherited's initial invasion of Scotland,
and saw no action in either 1333 or 1335. The reason was simple: in all three cases,
control of Cupar and the rest of Fife was gained by converting the earl, without any
need to besiege the fortifications within Fife itself. Western Fife saw English armies
pass through in 1332 and 1335, but only in order to reach Perth, rather than as the
territorial focus of either campaign.
Cupar was assigned to the control of William Bullock, Balliol's chamberlain
after Halidon Hill; however, he went over to the Bruce side upon Balliol's second
expulsion in 1334. 137 The castle was returned to the earl of Fife, who had it in his
keeping when he surrendered without any conflict to Balliol and Edward III after
their massive invasion that summer. After Fife's surrender, the castle was
temporarily placed in the hands of Henry Ferrers, a Disinherited lord with interests in
Fife who would later briefly hold the castle at Leuchars in 1336. 138 Ferrers only held
it with fifteen men-at-arms for three weeks before returning the castle to Edward
Balliol on Edward III's orders. 139 Balliol then assigned the castle once again to
William Bullock, who had negotiated a return to Balliol's side along with David
Strathbogie on 18 August 1335.140
Though Cupar was held in nominally Scottish hands, funds were given by the
English exchequer for its repair and rebuilding. William Bullock received 100 marks
for his journey to the Westminster parliament in March 1336 and for the repair of
136 Both Nicholson and Rogers emphasize Dunbar and Strathbogie's defections, mainly due to the
relative importance of both individuals at the time of their changing sides. Dunbar: Nicholson, pp
143-144, 190; War Cruel and Sharp, pp 79, 86; Strathbogie: Nicholson, pp 170, 215-216; War Cruel
and Sharp, pp 81, 100-1
137 Pluscarden, p 272; Wyntoun, p 406
138 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 239r (Cupar); Scotichronicon, pp 123-4 (Leuchars)
139 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 239r
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Cupar, which had been ordered by the king's counci1. 141 By the same token, Cupar
was part of the web of garrisons such as Edinburgh, Roxburgh, and Berwick that
were attempting to maintain the interests of both Edward III and Balliol. When
Cupar came under siege in March 1336 by the earls of March and Fife, Bullock was
rescued not by a Balliol force, but by a lightning strike from Edinburgh. Upon
hearing that Cupar was under siege, the constable of Edinburgh, John Stirling,
arranged for boats to transport his entire garrison across the Forth, then made a
surprise attack upon the besiegers. Thinking that Stirling's force was the vanguard
of Edward III's army, the besiegers scattered, ending that year's threat to the
castle.142
Cupar was apparently left alone in March 1337, when several garrisons which
had been set up during August 1336 were captured and leveled by the Scots, leaving
Cupar the only significant fortification left in the county. 143 A somewhat apocryphal
story in the Scotichronicon tells of sixty of the garrison attempting to force a local
boatsman to ferry them across the Forth at some later date and being stranded on a
sandbank at Cramond Isle in recompense for their ill treatment of them. While the
tale can only be dated as between 1336 and 1339, it does show that the garrison was
undertaking long-range sweeps outside the immediate exwiroasc Cupm .144
Cupar would remain in Balliol's hands via William Bullock until 1339. In
June, Perth would be besieged, and William Douglas was sent on behalf of Robert
Stewart to negotiate with Bullock in the hopes of him surrendering Cupar and joining
the Bruce faction. Bullock had at the time several offices, including chamberlain to
140 Avesbuty, p 298; Knighton, pp 473-5; Rot Scot, p 381; Wyntoun, p421
141 PRO E 43/195 (25 March 1336)
142 Anonintalle, p 6
143 Scotichronicon, pp 124-127; Fordun, p 362; Bridlington, p 128; Lanercost, p 288; Wyntoun, p435;
Melsa, p 378; Rot Scot, pp 483,485
144 Scotichronicon, pp 134-5
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Balliol. However, he was successfully induced to switch sides in exchange for a
number of land grants, and joined in the siege of Perth, which fell on 17 August.145
Maintaining the garrisons in Scotland was a difficult task, and an expensive
one. Even the smallest garrisons, or those held for a brief time, could cost a great
deal: the castle at Dunnotar had £576 8s 2d in expenses for the brief period of 1 May
1336 to 16 July, while Stirling generated £1959 18s 8d in costs from 25 October
1336 through 30 August 1337. Larger garrisons such as the one at Perth were
amazingly expensive, and generated costs far in excess of what the local revenues
were bringing in. Even assuming that Berwick could still somehow manage the £640
annually it forwarded to the Scottish crown before the Disinherited invasion, it would
only generate roughly three year's worth of income, or £1920, against the £5551 10s
8d of expenses that manning and repairing its walls cost. 146 Granted the city had
other sources of income, but the sheer scale of the imbalance indicates precisely how
much of a drain maintaining the English conquests in Scotland was to the Exchequer.
For the cost of £22,140 12s 7d 147 for 1334 through 1337, the English gained seven
garrisons receiving funds from the wardrobe, only to lose the two at Dunnotar and
Bothwell within a year of their establishment and all but Berwick within ten years.
This does not even include the £87 17s 8d spent by Thomas Hatfield at Bothwell, or
the work of royal clerks like Nicholas Uffton in arranging work crews for the various
garrisons in southern Scotland.148
The English did try to take advantage of circumstances as they could. Many
of the garrisons had only one or two commanders throughout their existence, like
145 Scotichronicon, pp 140-4; Anonimalle, p 14; Fordun, pp 363-4;
146 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 248r
147 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 251r
148 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 215r
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William Felton at Roxburgh or Thomas Rokeby for Stirling. This allowed them to
gain a deep familiarity with the local surroundings and offset somewhat the difficulty
of being an outsider without local roots. Even where transfers were made, they seem
to have been done with an eye on maintaining that pool of knowledge. When John
Stirling took over command of Edinburgh from Thomas Roscelyn, the latter was sent
to garrison and rebuild Dunnotar. The men chosen also were veterans of Scottish or
northern service. Thomas Ughtred was a major Balliol supporter before taking over
the garrison at Perth, while John Stirling had been Balliol's sheriff at Perth before his
capture with Richard Talbot in 1334 saw him in a Scottish cell for a year. Talbot
himself would become a custodian of the March and keeper of Berwick. Northerners
such as Felton and Anthony Lucy commanded garrisons such as Roxburgh and
Berwick, while the custody of the March as mentioned previously was often in the
hands of Henry Percy and Ralph Neville. The choice of all these individuals shows
that Edward III was not blind to the advantages of previous experience and
familiarity.
In the end, the garrisons the English put into place in Scotland only delayed
the inevitable. Some successes were scored by these troops: the garrison of
Roxburgh captured the Earl of Moray in 1335 and John Stirling relieved the besieged
garrison of Cupar the following year. However, these bright spots were few and far
between, especially once the initiative had passed to the Scots after 1335. The failure
of these garrisons was their inability to stop the movements of Bruce supporters such
as Andrew Murray and prevent them from mounting attacks on the English and their
few supporters. If anything, they provided targets for the Scots to attack, allowing
them to pick and choose garrisons that they could isolate and capture before they
could be relieved by other English forces. Without gaining the local support that
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would allow the garrisons to control the countryside beyond their castle walls, these
garrisons were incapable of preventing the erosion of the English position and their
eventual expulsion from Scotland.
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The Navy
The previous two chapters have discussed in detail how the fighting men that
made up Edward III's armies and manned his garrisons were recruited, paid for, and
employed. No examination of a fighting force is complete without an examination of
how that force is supplied with the necessary food and supplies to continue operating
effectively. Estimates from Edward I's time suggest that at a minimum over a
quarter of wheat was necessary for every twenty men under arms, while cavalry
forces would also require a peck of oats per horse per day in addition.' When
discussing hundreds or thousands of men serving in Scotland, this adds up to
incredible amounts that had to be collected in England and brought to those troops in
the field and garrisons.
To understand this process, two separate elements have to be examined.
First, the navy has to be looked at with the same attention given to the forces on land
in the previous chapters. The ships in royal service during the campaigns not only
fought against Scottish ships and ports, but aXso \Nue. Axe means %z Vanspoxtimg,
supplies to the forces in Scotland. To understand their effectiveness in either role, a
thorough examination of the ships in royal pay has to be made, along with the means
by which they were acquired. Second, the methods of collecting supplies have to be
discussed, along with their storage and distribution. With the fighting occulting
almost exclusively in Scotland, the purveyance of supplies from English counties
would have the most wide-ranging of the immediate effects of the war. Comparing
the process of purveyance to other ways of supplying the troops will demonstrate
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why it was the preferred method of supply. In addition, a brief description of the
stores set up at Newcastle and Berwick will illustrate how the supplies were
distributed once in Scotland.
Shipping
The armies and soldiers on land did not fight in isolation. Both England and
Scotland have long coasts for their relative size, and their position as island
kingdoms guaranteed that both would have a major seafaring element to their
populations. The sea was vital for their economic welfare: Berwick's wealth, for
instance, came mainly from the shipment of wool to Flanders and the Low
Countries. 2 With the slowness of land transport and the rugged terrain of much of
Scotland, the sea was also essential for resupplying the English-held towns and
garrisons. This necessity was only made worse by the difficulties of moving through
areas where the English had little overt support.
Ships were acquired for the fleet through various methods. The most reliable
were those ships owned directly by the king and operated by his trusted officers. The
maintenance of any sizeable number of such vessels year-round was costb), lhovgh
several monarchs contemplated doing so at several points. 3 In practice, the numbers
paid for this way were rather limited. During the 1330s, wardrobe accounts list the
Cog Edward, Welfare, Maudeleyn and the Rodecog under Thomas Springet, John
I M.C. Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance Under Edward I (Aldershot, 1972), p127
2 A. Tuck, 'A medieval tax haven: Berwick upon Tweed and the English crown, 1333-1461', in R.
Britnell and J. Hatcher (eds.), Progress and Problems in Medieval England: Essays in Honour of
Edward Miller (Cambridge, 1996), pp 148-167; James Campbell, 'England, Scotland and the
Hundred Years War', in The Wars of Edward III, ed. Clifford Rogers (Woodbridge, 1999), p 206
3 See W. Stanford Reid, 'Sea-power in the Anglo-Scottish War, 1296-1328', Mariner's Mirror 46
(1960), pp 7-23 for examples from Edward I and II's reigns.
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Pettoris, John Gectoir, and Hugh de Reppes. 4 The costs of outfitting the ships could
mount up rapidly. Hugh de Reppes spent £43 9s on various goods for the Rodecog
including casks and anchors, while John Gectoir purchased a single sail at £8 and
other sundry goods at a further £2 10s. There is further mention of 'the king's barge'
in the wardrobe accounts, commanded by Thomas Springet before his time on the
Cog Edward, and of the 'king's barge of Westminster' in writs allowing for the
press-ganging of forty sailors in late 1334. 5 It is unlikely that these two barges are
the same vessel, as the writ allowing for the press-gang of sailors for the 'king's
barge of Westminster' came at the time that Thomas Springet was receiving pay for
captaining 'the king's barge'.
This is above and beyond the wages spent for the sailors and masters on
board. Most of these ships were medium-sized vessels for the time. The Maudeleyn
and Rodecog both took a mate and thirty-odd sailors according to pay records. The
Welfare was a smaller vessel, with 19 sailors on board. The Cog Edward was
probably the largest of the king's vessels, taking 76 sailors north during the 1335
season. The 'king's barge' commanded by Thomas Springet would have been
comparable to the Maudeleyn and Rodecog, if not the Rodecog itself: both ships took
one mate and 38 sailors to man, and the Rodecog does not appear in the wardrobe
accounts until one week after Springet moved from the king's barge to the Cog
Edward. The 'king's barge of Westminster' captained by Thomas Spigurnel would
also be comparable in size, if forty sailors were being required to man the ship.
There were no real means by which the king could provide on his own the
mass of vessels required to carry out the supply of his forces and garrisons in
Scotland and to provide for those supplies' protection en route. Even if the king
4 BL Cotton Nero VIII, fos. 264r-266v, passim
5 Rot Scot, p278
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could afford the fleet during its activities, the time between campaigns would still
require men, money, and material in greater quantities than the king's coffers could
afford. The circumstances were rather similar to those that shaped the policy of
establishing garrisons to hold areas in Scotland rather than maintaining a large field
army year-round. The ships owned by the crown provided a small but dependable
core that could be used at will and at any time, while the larger number of vessels
drawn from elsewhere did most of the major work. The drawbacks were the same as
well: it required serious effort to mobilise the ships not under crown ownership,
along with taking time and planning to move them northward. This reduced the
flexibility of the crown's naval policy.
The crown did have other means to garner the ships it needed. Along with its
own vessels, it could also call upon the obligatory service owed by the collection of
ports in the south-east of England referred to as the Cinque Ports, centred mainly in
Kent and Sussex. These ports were obliged to provide fifty-seven ships for 15 days
per year at their own expense, for which they received tax exemptions and other
privileges. After the fifteen days had passed, the king was obliged to pay the wages
for any additional service. Other ports could also be relied upon to make agreements
with the crown to provide ships in a similar fashion, though without the longstanding
agreement in place with the Cinque Ports.6
The major sources for the ships that Edward used for his Scottish wars were
the large ports of Norfolk and the eastern seaboard — Yarmouth, Lynn, Kingston-
upon-Hull, Hartlepool, and Newcastle. Distance and familiarity were certainly the
determining factors in the choice of where to draw ships. Drawing vessels from the
southern coast for operations on the eastern seaboard and off Scotland was
6 T Runyan, 'Fleets in Medieval England', in T. Runyan, (ed.), Ships, Seafaring and Society: Essays
in Maritime Histoty (Detroit, 1987), pp 38-42
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needlessly expensive in the costs of wages, due to the time it would take for those
ships to travel from the south to the theatres of operation. In addition, these captains
would not have the familiarity with the waters and ports of the North Sea that the
local shipowners would have. Another reason not to draw too heavily from the
southern ports was the need to defend against French and Flemish raids on the south,
a point driven home with the burning of Portsmouth in 1338.7
Also at the crown's disposal was the right to arrest ships in port, order their
cargoes offloaded, and then use them for their requirements in defending the country.
Three clerks were tasked with arresting ships of over 40 tuns throughout England and
Wales in 1335, while nine ships were arrested at Newcastle and Skinburness in late
1335 and 1336 by Gilbert de Halghton and Walter Wetwang to carry supplies north.8
While this provided the crown with badly needed ships that could not be arranged
through obligation or voluntary service, this forcible impressment into service was
disruptive to shipping and commercial activity, and must have been seen as the least
preferred means by which the crown could arrange shipping. There was also the
question of the cargoes: the Grace de Dieu was arrested at Waterford in 1335 and its
cargo allowed to deteriorate while the vessel was employed on the king's business.
In this case, compensation was granted.9
The ships themselves were used for two major purposes. With the large
number of troops that would be campaigning in Scotland and the garrisons that
would be required to hold the areas under English control, the crown needed to
provide large amounts of supplies and victuals in order to avoid starvation among the
troops, such as that that hit Edward I before Falkirk. Many of the ships in the
wardrobe accounts received pay specifically for the carrying of victuals, such as
7 Bridlington, p 135; Anonitnalle, p 138 Rot Scot pp 305-9; BL Cotton Nero VIII, fo. 265v
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sixteen vessels from various ports that served the crown for periods in the summer of
1335. 10
 No viable alternative existed, as land transport via cart from England's
eastern seaboard could not hope to match the carrying capacity or speed of shipment
by sea to the supply depots at Newcastle and Berwick, let alone further to the
garrisons and armies operating in Scotland.
The second capacity in which the fleet operated was the protection of the
supplies from what there was of Scottish naval activity, piracy, and raids upon
various targets in Scotland. While there is little enough mention of naval opposition,
it certainly did happen. During the Disinherited's attack on Scotland in 1332, John
Crabbe, then working for the Scots, attacked the Disinherited's fleet with ten Flemish
vessels, taking Henry Beaumont's Beaumondescogge before the Disinherited fleet
fully engaged his ships and burnt them." There was also constant worry of Flemish
and French intervention, and simple prudence to argue for the protection of ships
loaded with cargo and supplies for the north.
While offering protection, these ships also could and did attack various places
in Scotland. Ships from the English fleet participated in assaults on Berwick in 1333
before the truce that led to Halidon Hill. 12
 English ships also were responsible for
the sack of Inchcolm Abbey and the burning of Dundee in 1335. 13
 Ships could also
be sent specifically to intercept other vessels, such as those meant to catch ships
providing supplies to Dumbarton in February 1335 and the three vessels sent to
recapture the Beaumondescogge in May of the same year.I4
9 CCR 1337-9, p 27
I ° BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 265r
II Bridlington, p 108; Nicholson, p92
12 Pluscarden, p268; Lanercost, p273; Scalacronica, p 162; Wyntoun, p398; Brut, p28!;
Bridlington, p 112
13 Lanercost, pp 272, 282; Liber Phtscardensis, p 278
14 Rot Scot, pp 320, 340
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Management of the actual fleet was handled by the appointment of
individuals as admiral for short periods, usually no more than a few months at most.
Furthermore, responsibility was often split between two or more men, along
geographical lines. 15
 The Thames was the usual boundary line, with an admiral
being appointed for 'North of the Thames' and 'West of the Thames'. Admirals
assigned to the north were responsible for the naval efforts of carrying supplies to the
northern ports for action against Scotland and for the use of the fleet against the
Scots. Those assigned to the 'west' were tasked with defending the southern coast
against the French fleet and any raiding activities coming from Brittany, Normandy,
or Flanders.
Between April 1327 and July 1338, nine separate appointments were made to
the admiralty of the northern fleet, and eight to the western fleet. 16
 The shortest of
these was the appointment of Thomas Ughtred to the admiralty of the north in
February 1336. He would hold the appointment only for two months, before giving
over his duties to John Norwich. Others would hold the posts given them for several
months, though rarely years. Thomas Ughtred's predecessor, John Howard, had held
the post since April of the year before. 17
 With only a small number of vessels owned
by the king, no standing navy, and no sustained effort to maintain one by other
means, there simply was not the necessity for appointing admirals permanently for
the navy. That admirals were appointed consistently through this period speaks to
the sustained nature of the wars.
These admirals were not sailors first and foremost. Most of them were
soldiers and captains, often with other duties and responsibilities to the crown and
other magnates. Thomas Ughtred, admiral of the north for two months during 1336,
15 erdE.B. Fryde, et al (eds.), Handbook of British Chronology, 3 a (Cambridge, 1986), p 137
16 E.B. Fryde, et al (eds.), Handbook of British Chronology, 3 'd ed (Cambridge, 1986), pp 137-8
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was keeper of Perth in 1337. Two of Edward's closest household men, William
Clinton and William Montague, served as admirals of the western fleet, while
carrying out numerous other duties as bannerets of the household and as the earls of
Huntingdon and Salisbury after 1337. Robert Ufford and Walter Mauny, also trusted
household knights, served as admirals of the north. Barons such as John Ros of
Watton, Geoffrey Say, and Bartholomew Burghersh also served time as admirals.18
Social standing was as important for the leaders of the fleets as it was for military
captains on land.
That they did develop some specialization in handling the navy is obvious
from the repeated appointment of several men to be admirals at different periods.
John Norwich served in the northern fleet for three months in early 1335, then took
up the job as Thomas Ughtred's replacement in April 1336 for another eight months.
Peter Bard was in charge of the western fleet along with John Cobham for nearly a
year in 1335, and later was vice-admiral for the western fleet in the summer of 1338.
John Perbroun, who had commanded the northern fleet during the Weaydale
campaign, was put in charge of the fleet heading to Scotland in 1333. Other
appointees had complementary offices which explained their competency William
Clinton, heading the western fleet in 1333, was a baron of the Cinque Ports,
constable of Dover Castle, and eminently familiar with the main source of ships for
that fleet.19
Pay for vessels employed by the navy from 1334-7 was computed using one
of two relatively simplistic systems. The first was that which had been in common
17 Rot Scot, pp 403-4 (Ughtred), 415 (Norwich), 335 (Howard)
8 A full list of the admirals of England at this period can be found in E.B. Fryde et al (eds.),
Handbook of British Chronology, 3`d ed (Cambridge, 1986), pp 137-8
19 For examples of writs naming Clinton as either baron of the Cinque Ports or constable of Dover, see
CCR 1330-33, pp 553-555; CCR 1333-37, pp 327-8
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use from before Edward I's time, pay by sailor. 20 Rather than computing a fee based
on a ship's size or character, the captain of the vessel was paid a set, traditional daily
wage per crewman. Sailors commonly received 3d per day, while captains and their
mates (listed as 'constables') received 6d per day. No other mention of the
capabilities of the ships exist, other than the occasional separation of some entries
into lists for the carrying of diverse victuals of the king, rather than simply 'in the
king's service' or 'over northern seas in expedition to Scotland'.21
The other entry format is even more vague regarding numbers. Rather than a
set amount per sailor, pay was issued in a lump sum per week at a fixed rate set by
the king's clerks acting as commissioners. The rates set could vary widely, from ten
to one hundred shillings a week. While the lack of numbers is unfortunate, the
negotiation that must have gone on to set the rates allowed other factors to be shown
in the records. For instance, the Cuthbert from Hartlepool was receiving almost 66
shillings a week, in its 3d and 6d allotments, for its service during the summer of
1335. In the winter of 1336, its captain was receiving 100s per week for a two-week
run to Scotland. 22 While this second entry does not give us the number of crew, it is
safe to assume the crew sizes would be similar for such a run. The marked increase
in the hiring costs are from three factors; the participation of the Cuthbert in one
royal expedition already the summer before, the dangers of sailing far afield in the
winter season, and the manner of selection for the second expedition — the ship was
arrested in Newcastle by Walter Wetwang to provide the ships for the flotilla heading
north.
20 M.C. Prestwich, Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: the English Experience (New Haven,
1996) p 275
21 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 264r-266v
22 BL Cotton Nero VIII, fos. 264v 265v
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Though not stated explicitly, the relative sizes of the ships and the nature of
their role in the navy can be worked out by the crew sizes recorded in the vadia
nautanun portion of Ferriby's wardrobe book and from individual pay sheets such as
Thomas Cross's account for the Irish expedition of 1335. William de Melchbourne's
ship Magdalene out of King's Lynn had one of the smallest crews of the ships that
went north to Scotland in 1335, with one mate and 38 sailors. 23 While this number
seems like a large one for the size of the ships at the time, it makes sense given the
king's preference for doubly manned ships and the need for extra crew in case of
trouble or conflict. In comparison, the king's own Cog Edward under Thomas
Springet carried a mate and 76 men in the same sailing, while the Cuthbert of
Hartlepool had 98 sailors aboard. The same could be done with the periods when
lump sums per week were used for pay, though the more subjective nature of these
payments makes it harder to determine even relative sizes with any accuracy.
Unfortunately, only one vessel - the previously mentioned Cuthbert from Hartlepool
— appears with both types of pay recorded, leaving us without enough material for a
proper comparison.24
While the nature of maritime service makes the entries in Ferriby's wardrobe
book much more reliable than they are for land forces, the presence of the same type
of shorthand notation that plagues the vadia homimun ad arma and vadia hobelarum
sections of his accounts introduces a small degree of uncertainty. For example,
Thomas Springet, captain of the king's barge, received the pay for himself, one mate,
and 38 sailors from August 1334 to May 1335, excepting the pay for one sailor,
vacantus for 21 days during the pay period. -)-5
 This precisely mirrors the same sort of
notation found for retinues of individuals such as Ralph Neville, where independent
23 BL Cotton Nero VIII, fo. 264v
24 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 264v, 265r
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pay records demonstrate that the pay listed by Ferriby is a summation of the fees
owed and paid, rather than an exact statement of the number of men serving per day.
However, the same argument for accepting the figures for the land forces also applies
to the ships employed: the numbers listed provide a useful average of the manpower
during the periods listed, especially for naval vessels where the crew can only depart
while in harbour.
In 1333, the attack on Berwick mandated a naval force be available to seal off
the city from outside intervention and also to participate in assaulting the town itself.
John Perbroun and Henry Randolf were appointed admirals of the fleet on 6 April,
while several towns received requests for aid in terms of ships and men. Great
Yarmouth received a request for four warships, Bristol for three vessels, and
Ravenser for one. 26 By the end of the month, it had been determined they should be
at Newcastle for 17 May along with a single ship each from the ports of Little
Yarmouth, Gorleston, Hartlepool, Scarborough, Barton, and Lynn. 27 Newcastle also
received a request for a warship to be ready on this date. The force was small in
comparison with those used in similar circumstances during the previous two reigns,
but operations in support of the victualling efforts and commissions from Edward
Balliol had reduced the number of ships available for action. 28 Though participating
in a failed assault on the town in late June, the fleet's role was mainly to supply the
soldiers maintaining the blockade by land and to prevent any Scottish ships from
reaching Berwick. 29 As Balliol had been besieging Berwick since 13 March. the
fleet blockading Berwick must have been comprised both of the royal ships which
BL Cotton Nero VIII, fo. 264r
26 Rot Scot, pp 225-6
27 Rot Scot, p 232
28 Nicholson, p 116; CPR 1330-4, pp 418,429
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would have joined it in May and those ships that had already taken service with
Balliol previously.
At the same time, efforts were being taken to protect the southern coasts and
to make advances on other fronts. The Isle of Man was taken in May, which
Nicholson attributes to the three ships from Bristol. Considering the unlikelihood of
the vessels from Bristol participating in the activities of the eastern seaboard without
the participation of the much closer southern coast ports, it is a likely supposition.3°
Meanwhile, the south was ordered to prepare against possible invasion and raiding
by the French, with numerous writs sent out for the array of men in the maritime
counties and the preparation of ships to counter any threat under William Clinton as
admiral of the western ports. 31 Though nothing came of this, the concern of invasion
from France while engaging in conflict in Scotland would be a recurring theme
during the wars.
The second expulsion of Balliol from Scotland in 1334 resulted in another
flurry of writs preparing for further campaigning in Scotland, including preparations
for the proper supply of the fleet. Writs on 1 September mandated Richard de
Suthorp to collect four warships and two barges from the western ports to be at
Skinburness by 16 October, while two 'large ships' were to carry supplies from Hull
to Berwick for the same date. Thomas Spigurnel was granted the right to press-gang
forty men to man the king's barge of Westminster. Two ships were requested from
Newcastle, Hartlepool, and Kingston-upon-Hull for operations in Scotland, with
another from Ravenser and four from the counties of Lincoln, York, and
Northumberland. 32 Nine ships in the end received pay from the wardrobe during the
29 Lanercost, p 272
30 Nicholson, p 123; Rot Scot, pp 226, 231, 233
31 Rot Scot, pp 248-250, 254
32 Rot Scot, pp 277, 278
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time of the Roxburgh campaign, beginning 22 November. Two ships, the Elene
from Grimsby and the Saint Mary Cog out of Ravenser had departed within two
weeks, stopping pay on 7 December. The George and Fleming from Kingston-upon-
Hull, the Katerine from Lynn, and the Nicholas from Newcastle had departed by 19
December, while the remaining three, the Isabelle of Gosforth, Ceale of Kingston-
upon-Hull, and the Blithe of Newcastle received pay through 4 January 1335.33
With only 352 sailors and 20 officers, the fleet was anything but large. Other
means for bolstering the naval presence in the area were taken, if only to provide
more impetus to private activities to interfere with Scottish shipping and maritime
activity. Thomas Guyot and Nicholas Caldecot received protections from the crown
while they preyed on Scottish shipping in October 1334, with Laurence Baldswell
receiving similar license in the following month.34
Summer brought a much stronger effort to the war effort, both on land and
sea. Planning began as early as 24 December 1334, with the clerks Richard
Wolyngham, Thomas Geyrgrave, and John Percebrigg each being assigned a large
section of the country's ports from which to draw ships for the summer's fleet. All
ships over 40 tuns were to participate in the summer sailing, following the usual
formula of eskippamentum duplex. Further notices of these orders were sent to
William Clinton in his capacity as custodian of the Cinque Ports, John Langford
holding the Isle of Wight, and the bailiffs and barons of most ports. 35 Their activities
were supplemented by the appointment on 1 February of James Kingston and John
Crabbe to select two ships in Great Yarmouth and one each from Little Yarmouth,
Ipswich, Lynn, Kingston-on-Hull, Ravenser, Hartlepool, Scarborough, and
Newcastle, with a thousand mariners between them. They were to arrive in
33 BL Cotton Nero VIII, fo. 264r
34 Rot Scot, pp 283. 286
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Newcastle for 1 March. 36 The ports of Bristol, Liverpool, and Dartmouth were
ordered on 7 February to provide two ships each to intercept ships meant for the
Bruce stronghold of Dumbarton, while the Cinque Ports, Bristol, Falmouth,
Southampton, and Plymouth were to provide a squadron of twelve ships to further
block supplies from the west coast of Scotland on 18 February.37
A diplomatic row resulted from the taking of an English ship, the Little
Lechevard, in the Seine on 20 April by some Scots, souring relations between
Edward and the French. 38 Meanwhile, Richard Holand was appointed admiral in the
west and the ports in Ireland were ordered to provide transport for troops and victuals
to Scotland, with John de Atholl appointed as their admiral. Lynn and Blakeney
received immunity from the year's call-up of hobelars in lieu of providing
warships. 39 Further ships were called up from Bristol in May, while three ships were
to be outfitted in Kingston-upon-Hull and Ravenser to take the Becuimondscogge,
taken by John Crabbe during 1332 during his service with the Scots and still in
Scottish hands. 46 While the period was one of truce, neither side seemed to extend
the truce to maritime activities.
By June, the year's flotilla had sailed north in support of the massive
offensive Edward was carrying out on land. Thirteen ships from the eastern
seaboard, along with the Cog Edward and the Rodecog, received pay starting in late
June. A further nine vessels joined the fleet in July, replacing eight of the original
ships which had ended their period of service. Their activities were mainly
victualling the army on the eastern seaboard, though a ship did sack the abbey of
35 Rot Scot, pp 305-9
36 Rot Scot, p 316
37 Rot Scot, pp 320, 322
38 Nicholson, p 195
39 Rot Scot, pp336-8
40 Rot Scot, pp 340-1
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Inchcolm and some raided Dundee, burning much of the town to the ground.41
Chroniclers exaggerated the size of the fleet, some naming the fleet as two hundred
or more vessels. 42 While other ships than those in the wardrobe accounts probably
participated, the numbers were unlikely to be so high.
Naval activity was not confined solely to northern waters. Worries ran high
that the French were planning an invasion of the south of England in support of the
Scots, and rumours had it that 700 ships had been gathered for the task. 43 Orders to
arrest ships of 40 tuns or more in ports on the southern and eastern seaboard to
counter possible French invasion were sent on 22 July and 29 August. 44 The ships
gathered at this time were not recorded in the wardrobe book, but some do appear
elsewhere. The clerks John Windsor and John Tunford oversaw the collection of
thirty vessels in the Cinque Ports, while other clerks such as Ambrose Newbury,
John Bridgewater, and Matthew Craitthorn canvassed the southern and eastern
coasts. The defence of North Wales' coast was put in the hands of Nicholas Acton,
while the two guardians of the coast in South Wales, Philip Clanvow and Owen
Montgomery, made arrangements with eight vessels of large size to be manned for
action. 45 Most ships saw delays in putting to sea, but did sail in later August and
early September, though without meeting the French.
In the west, an Irish expedition had been organised to coincide with the
summer campaigns originating from northern England, necessitating the collection of
a fleet to transport the Irish to their target of Bute. Richard Holland was appointed
admiral in the west to oversee the gathering of the fleet at Carlingford, while orders
41 Pluscarden, p 278; Lanercost, p 282
42 Pluscarden, p 278; Wyntoun, p412; Scotichronicon, pp 108-9, and Forchm, pp 358-9, put the fleet
at 180 vessels
43 J. Sumption, The Hundred Years War: Trial By Battle (London, 1990), pp 147-8
44 Rot Scot, pp 364-5
45 Nicholas, p 208
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were given to arrest all ships in the Irish ports and have them at the muster by 11
June.46 £22 16s 4d was spent preparing ships to transport the army's horses and to
build cabins for John Darcy and the earls of Ormond and Desmond. Due to the
delays in sailing, Cross was allowed to distribute £10 in wages to the sailors of seven
sequestered ships.47
John of Athy took over as admiral of the actual fleet in April, and was still in
command in August when the fleet descended on western Scotland. The fleet has
been well described by Nicholson in his article on the expedition: forty-nine separate
vessels received pay from Thomas Cross, of which eighteen were Irish, one from
Bayonne, and the balance from English ports, mostly on the western and southern
coasts.48 The sheer size of the flotilla required for just under fifteen hundred soldiers
underscores the limited size of the vessels being used; on average only thirty men per
ship could be managed, though this varied widely depending on the size of the
particular vessel. Most ships varied between fifteen and 30 sailors, though seven
ships had under ten sailors. 83 masters and mates and 788 sailors were needed to
man the fleet, nearly two-thirds the size of the small force it had to transport.49
After 1335, the thrust of naval activities was in defence of England against
attacks by France, rather than activity directed against the Scots. Relatively few
ships were taken under pay by the household, and their usage was for moving
supplies to Scotland. Most of the ships were taken under wages individually, or in
small numbers: the large collection of ships seen in 1335 was not repeated. Seven
vessels were arrested at Newcastle at the beginning of January 1336, but were only
employed for two weeks. Individual vessels were arrested and impressed to send
46 Rot Scot, pp 33-8
47 PRO E101/19/16, m. 2; see also CCR 1339-41, p 518
48 Thomas Cross's account is PRO E101/19 16; see also R. Nicholson, 'An Irish Expedition to
Scotland in 1335', IHR vol 13, no. 51 (1963), pp 203-4
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supplies, such as Trinite and the Seinte Anne Bot of Chester, which had the
misfortune to be at Skinburness when Gilbert Halghton required ships to send
supplies north. 5° Nine ships did begin receiving pay in May and June 1336, but the
beginning dates were widely disparate, and the notations attached indicate that they
were specifically ferrying supplies in this period, rather than acting as a fleet in direct
support of Henry Lancaster's troops. For example, William Bronn's vessel Leonard
from the port of Hull is recorded as carrying supplies to Perth from 26 May to 14
September 1336.51
This diminution in the need for ships is unsurprising, considering the
reduction in the number of available ports and refuges for Scottish vessels. By 1336,
only Aberdeen was available as any sizeable port to provide an anchorage: Dundee
had been burnt the year before, and the entire coast south of Perth was essentially in
English hands, barring the small harbour at Dunbar. Even Aberdeen would be
unavailable for a time, thank to Edward III's deliberate destruction of the town
during his northern chevauchee in July. 52 What Scottish raiding was being carried
out was likely to be in conjunction with the French on the southern coast.
Ships were retained for other purposes, usually in support of individual
garrisons by their commanders. Thomas Roscelyn engaged eight vessels to transport
him and his garrison from King's Lynn to his new command of Dunnotar in May
1336, paying £123 1 Os over the six weeks of the operation. 53 Thomas Rokeby
employed two ships to resupply Stirling after it was besieged unsuccessfully by
Andrew Murray in 1337, costing £12. Naval resupply was key for any coastal
49 PRO E101/19/16, mm. 3 and 4
50 BL Cotton Nero C VIII fo. 265v
51 BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fa 266r
52 Wyntoun, p430; A nonimalle, p7; Fordun, pp 360-1; Scalacronica, p 166; Baker, pp 57-8; Original
Letters, p 37.
BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fo. 251r
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garrison — even those held by the Scots. Part of why Montague's siege of Dunbar in
1338 failed was that a small ship under Alexander Ramsey managed to avoid the two
galleys blockading Dunbar and land supplies and men at the castle.54
Further evidence on the precise numbers of ships employed are patchy,
though the alarms in the south saw orders for the arrest of ships sent out in most
years and admirals appointed every year for the latter part of the 1330s. The raids
on Orford and the Isle of Wight in 1336 saw a panicked series of orders to arrest and
collect ships for the latter part of the year: though the force did little, it was
representative of matters versus France for the time.55 Other orders for double-
manned ships went out in January 1337 to eighty-two ports; 56 from this point
onward, naval activity was focused upon France.
Victualling
Napoleon's famous phrase 'An army marches on its stomach' holds as true
for the fourteenth century as it does for the nineteenth. Without the proper supplies to
keep it going, an army or castle garrison will rapidly break down, with morale
rapidly dropping and disease setting in. The concept was a well-understood one by
the English crown, especially Edward III: his first taste of campaigning in the
Weardale campaign of 1327 was plagued by insufficient supplies and poor food,
despite being within England itself 57 By the fourteenth century the crown's
bureaucracy had evolved complex and far-reaching tools for providing the necessary
54 Scotichronicon, pp 128-9
55 Rot Scot, pp 467-468; Surnption, Trial By Battle, pp 164-5
56 Rot Scot, pp 477-8
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supplies to its soldiers when on campaign, requiring a great deal of effort, time, and
money to administer.
The victuals that were required were varied and sizeable. Estimates from
Edward I's time suggest that a quarter of wheat, two quarters of malt, and large
amounts of meat and fish were required for every twenty men in a garrison, with
similar amounts being required for forces in the field. Any cavalry forces would also
require a peck of oats per horse per day. 58
 The wheat was used to make bread; malt
and barley were brewed into beer, or replaced with wine. Beans and peas were used
to make pottage. Such numbers added up quickly: an army of 30,000 would need
nearly 5,000 quarters of grain a week and 2,000 quarters of fodder.59
While the army could attempt to forage from the land to supply itself, doing
so had severe difficulties. For one, the Scots were old hands at hiding food supplies
and using a scorched earth policy against the English. The land was relatively poor
in comparison with its southern neighbour and any effort to hide or destroy supplies
in an area would make foraging for supplies an essentially useless endeavour.
Second, for much of the time Edward III and the English were not engaging in
punitive expeditions with the ability to destroy randomly wide swathes of the
countryside. Initially they were acting in support of one claimant to the Scottish
throne, Edward Balliol; later, they would be acting in defence of both Balliol and
Edward III's new possessions of the southern Scottish counties transferred in 1334 to
England. Indiscriminate destruction could alienate the very people whom Edward
was trying to win over. Tn fact, the indiscriminate destruction carried out in Lothian
at the end of the Roxburgh campaign in 1334-5 was one of the reasons Patrick
57 Chronique de Jean le Bel, ed. Jules Viard and Eugene Deprez (Paris, 1904), reprinted in The Wars
of Edward HI: Sources and Interpretations, ed C. Rogers (Woodbridge, 1999) pp 10-11
' s M.C. Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance Under Edward I (Aldershot, 1972), p127
59 M.C. Prestwich, Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages (New Haven, 1996), pp 247-8
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Dunbar, earl of March returned to the Bruce camp after having made peace with
Edward III after Halidon Hi11.60
This is not to say that such foraging did not take place: if anything, it was
depressingly common, with numerous descriptions of the countryside being put 'to
fire and sword' by both English and Scots. The stripping of Kinloss Abbey in 1336
to resupply Edward III's chevauchee and the garrison at Lochindorb was just one
incident of many. 61 Such methods of supply are not sustainable: any troops using
them would need to move on to new supplies, an option not available for garrisons or
an army of occupation. Both politically and practically, other options had to be
exercised.
There was considerable effort to induce merchants to carry supplies to
Scotland for sale to the army in the field and the various castle garrisons. The crown
did not have a separate duty to provide victuals as well as pay: wages were assumed
to include the costs of provisions. Since the wages of the army were meant in part to
feed them, it would save the crown considerable expense, effort, and depletion of its
stores if independent merchants could be convinced to transport supplies and offer
them for sale. Writs encouraging such activities were commonplace, and had been
well before Edward III's time. 62 Those merchants willing to carry out this trade could
profit handsomely: the merchants who came to the army in 1328 found the soldiers
willing to pay twenty times the normal cost of bread from hunger.63
Other times the crown engaged more directly with merchants for supplies.
Tvlanent Francisci of the Bardi was employed as an agent of the crown on 26
60 Capgrave, p 203; Melsa, p 373
61
62
63 
Original Letters, p 36
For two early examples from Edward III, see Rot Scot, p 206; Foeclera p 855
Chronique de Jean le Bel, ed. Jules Viard and Eugene Deprez (Paris, 1904), reprinted in The Wars
of Edward III: Sources and Interpretations, pp 11-12
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February 1333 to purvey 15,600 quarters of wheat and 22,100 quarters of oats.64
Unfortunately for Francisci, his efforts were unable to match Edward III's
expectations: by April, the crown had reverted to directly administering its attempts
to gather victuals. 65 The matter showed the shortcomings of depending on private
enterprise, especially when dealing with the machinery of government: part of
Francisci's failure was due to the exchequer failing to pay him an ordered advance
on the ordered victuals. 66 Without the legal mechanisms the crown had to acquire
supplies, a merchant's abilities to gather foodstuffs were limited by his own
resources, and by the hesitancy to spend those without signs that payment was
forthcoming. Francisci had more options than the usual merchant in acting as an
agent of the crown, but still found himself in difficulty from lack of funds.
The most successful but intrusive method the crown had at its disposal for
gathering victuals was purveyance, or the mandatory purchase of foodstuffs by royal
officials at a standardised price. 67 This right had initially extended to providing
supplies for the king's immediate household: in Edward I's reign it had become well
entrenched as a tool for supplying the king's army as a whole. It was arbitrary, much
like tallages on royal lands: the crown could levy it at will, without the necessity for
prior consent. 68 Writs were issued to the sheriffs of various counties demanding a set
amount of goods from each county; 69
 these numbers were also arbitrary, though
normally were set to fit the capacities of a given shire to actually be able to provide
the requested materials. The means for determining where the supplies from within
each county came from varied, from the use of local juries to the county court. The
64 CPR 1330-4, p 409
65 Rot Scot, pp 229-30
66 CCR 1333-7, p 27; Nicholson, pp 113-4
67 J.R.S. Maddicott, The English Peasanuy and the Demands of the Crown 1294-1341 (Past and
Present Supplement, 1975) is the standard on this subject, and the following discussion draws its
substance from it.
68 Maddicott, The English Peasantry and the Demands of the Crown 1294-1341, pp 15-16
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process was intended to cream off the surplus food from the country, leaving those
forced to sell with the means to continue their livelihood and avoiding the poor
altogether.
The system by its arbitrary nature could be abused on several levels, and
often was. The practice of issuing tallies for purveyances, rather than paying
immediately was very common; these payments could be delayed for years,
essentially putting the burden of the purveyance on the shoulders of those it was
taken from, rather than the crown. This was an increasing problem as the crown's
financial situation worsened due to the costs of the war and as the amount of ready
cash available to make immediate payment dwindled. The officials making the
purveyances also engaged in abuses, taking bribes in order to overlook individuals or
institutions, or reserving a portion of what they gathered for themselves without
reporting it to the crown. The fixed cost of the goods could also be an abuse: as the
men in Scotland were expected to spend their wages on the victuals transported to
them, the crown could make money by purveying foodstuffs at low cost and selling
them at market price to the garrisons and armies in Scotland.7°
Not only were foodstuffs purveyed, but the transport necessary to move the
goods was also taken. The purveyances from Northamptonshire in 1334 required
117 carts to move the goods to Peterborough, all drawn by four horses, for a total
cost of £7 3s id in transporting 380 quarters of wheat, oats and peas. 71
 Another £3
4s 5d was spent on river transport to King's Lynn, and £10 us 6d for loading and
shipment on the Lytfin and Massanger to Berwick. When looked at in monetary
terms, the effort to transport the goods to Berwick cost a full fifth of the value of the
goods being shipped north.
69 Rot Scot, pp 229-30, 278-9, 297, 316-7, 409, 436-7, 444
70 J. Maddicott, The English Peasantry and the Demands of the Crown 1294-1341, pp 25-28
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As with Edward I's reign, most of the supplies purveyed were shipped to
either one of two stores placed as close as possible to the border to facilitate
supplying the military endeavours in the north. In the west, Carlisle's port at
Skinburness took on its accustomed role, with Robert Barton being appointed
receiver of the king's victuals at the port in April 1333. 72 In the east, Newcastle
served briefly as the major supply depot for the campaign leading to Halidon Hill,
with Gilbert Halghton being appointed keeper of the victuals in March. 73 This depot
was then transferred to Berwick after its surrender in 1333 and placed under Robert
Tughale, also appointed chamberlain of the town; supplemented by Robert Tong as
receiver. 74
 Supplies were shipped into Berwick on a regular basis: the previously
mentioned Lytfot appears in Tughale's account for July-October 1334 along with
three other ships, delivering 840 quarters of wheat, while agents of Richard de la
Pole, the king's butler, delivered 52 tuns of wine. Other supplies kept on hand
include cider, flour, horseshoes, and salt.75
These goods could either be sold to troops, sold to individuals in the area, or
simply given away. Guy de Ferrers received £12 6s 8d of the wages owed to him
and his men for serving in the garrison at Perth in 1337 in the form of two chalders
of wheat, two chalders of malt, and two tuns of wine. 76 Tughale sold grain and wine
in 1334 to varied parties such as Anthony Lucy, Henry Ferrers, John Kingston, and
the Carmelite, Augustinian, and Franciscan orders of friars. 77 He also gave away
71 PRO E101/577 9
72 CFR 1327-37, p 353
73 CCR 1333-7, p 29
74 Rot Scot, pp 257, 260; PRO E101/19/3, E10112014, E101/612 35
75 PRO E101/18/31
76 PRO E101/21/16
77 PRO E101/18/31
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sixty-nine quarters of wheat by the king's orders to several individuals including the
earl of March and Joanna Comyn in the same year.78
Though the commissariat arrangements of the English crown were mostly
successful, the system was not without flaws. Supplies at Berwick were useless for a
garrison at Roxburgh or Stirling unless they could be safely transported to the more
distant garrison. While supplies sent by ship were relatively secure, the Scots
targeted supply shipments going overland, as part of their general tactic of harrying
and raiding the English. William Douglas was a keen proponent of this strategy,
leading guerrilla groups in Lothian beginning in 1335, raiding supply lines, and
helping to capture the unfortunate Guy of Namur. 79
 Supplies could also be hampered
by bureaucratic complacency, especially after the conflict with France began in
earnest. The garrison at Perth was forced to surrender due to lack of victuals on 17
August 1339, despite Thomas Ughtred having secured a detailed indenture
guaranteeing his garrison would be fully supplied by the crown.80
Edward III was able to supply the victuals necessary for his troops in
Scotland thanks to a well-established system of purveyance. This guaranteed the
crown access to the supplies it needed to continue the campaigning in the north and
garrison the strongholds which would keep the newly won territory. The system was
not without its problems: abuses at home created resentment while the unsettled
circumstances in Scotland meant those supplies did not always make it to the men
who needed them most. At the same time, Edward used a combination of personal
resources and royal compulsion to arrange the naval forces necessary to support his
78 PRO E 101/20/10
79 Scotichronicon, pp 112-5, 134-7
so	 •Anornmalle, p 14; Scotichronicon, p140-4; Andrew Ayton, 'Sir Thomas Ughtred and the Edwardian
Military Revolution', in The Age of Edward III, ed. J.S.Bothwell (Woodbridge, 2001) p121-2
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campaigns and transport the bulk of the purveyed supplies north to the stores at
Newcastle and Berwick for distribution. These ships contributed to the success at
Berwick, the capture of the Isle of Man, and the strangulation of Scottish trade.
Without either his supply system or his ships, Edward III would not have been able
to project his power far enough into Scotland to carry on his war against David Bruce
and his partisans. Where new innovations in tactics and troop recruitment allowed
Edward to create armies that could effectively defeat the Scots in battle, the navy and
the supplies they carried made it possible to keep the gains they had made — for a
time.
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Conclusion
The Anglo-Scottish War of Edward III, while not being as revolutionary as it
would appear from the sudden appearance of new troop types, tactics, and victories,
was a watershed. England entered 1327 with an underage king under a self-serving
regency, a legacy of defeat against both its northern and southern neighbors. Ten
years later, England had shed the regency and its legacy of defeat, had developed a
cadre of experienced, battle-tested leaders, and had nearly managed to conquer the
smaller of its two neighbors before the other intervened.
Part of this was simply the passing of generations: Edward III was too young
to have been tainted by the factional battles of his father, and did not have the
political baggage of the previous reign, thanks to the short regency under Mortimer.
Edward had strengthened his position by promoting a broad spectrum of the nobility,
especially among those of his age.' Another part was simply luck: the Disinherited's
thrust into Scotland allowed him to repudiate the Treaty of Northampton and reopen
the entire question of sovereignty. Once Scottish raiders had crossed the border in
1333, he was able to gain widespread popular support for such a plan, leading to the
Berwick campaign and the battle at Halidon Hill.
There was little difference between the tools that Edward III had to gather an
army and those his grandfather used. Both relied on commissions of array to gather
set quotas from the counties, though there was more consideration of the type of
troop being arrayed in Edward III's time than in Edward I's. Both relied on
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summonses to magnates, though Edward III used personal summonses rather than
the broader feudal summons wielded on several occasions by Edward I.
In methods of recruitment, Edward III had two advantages that his
grandfather had not enjoyed. First, by the 1330s the concept of magnates serving
under pay had become well-entrenched and had lost any controversy once attached to
the notion. While under Edward I the earls would not accept pay during his Scottish
campaigns, by Edward III's they had no difficulty whatsoever in serving for pay,
including their entire retinues. 2 Secondly, the utility of hobelars or mounted archers
for the purpose of speed and agility had been hammered home during the repeated
raids by the Scots through Edward II's reign. By the 1330s, Edward could rely on
both individual magnates and the counties providing large numbers of appropriate
equipped hobelars and mounted archers, rather than simple foot soldiers. Though
counties still provided the largest part of the infantry, the magnates were now using
their resources to bring mounted archers as part of their retinues, giving rise to the
'mixed retinues' of the Hundred Years War and further expanding the pool of higher
quality archers available for the campaign. The increase in the proportion of
mounted troops allowed Edward III's troops to move more quickly, taking advantage
of their speed to cover more ground and carry out devastating raids, as he did north
of the Tay in 1336. Though the use of dismounted men-at-arms and wings of archers
was not apparently used before Dupplin Moor in 1332, its use the next year at
Halidon Hill suggests that the tactic had been adopted as standard by the English.
Edward was reliant on a relatively small body of men to carry out his military
activities. The household in the 1330s could muster somewhere around three
see J. Bothwell, 'Edward III and the 'New Nobility': Largesse and Limitation in Fourteenth-Century
England' EHR, v. 112 no. 449 (1997), pp 1111-1140
2 M.C. Prestwich, Armies and Watfare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience (New Haven,
1996) p 98; BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fos. 233r-247r
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hundred and fifty men between its individual members and their retinues, and was
reliant on magnates willing to serve for further troops. Twelve men provided the
bulk of the men-at-arms for the Roxburgh army: a similar pattern occurred for all
four campaigns from 1334-7. It is unsurprising that Edward was able to get the men
to serve: many were Disinherited lords like Gilbert Umfraville, Henry Beaumont and
John Mowbray, with interests of their own to protect. Others were prominent
northern lords like Henry Percy and Ralph Neville, and a third group fit into the
category of 'new men', such as Hugh Audley.
The counties were still the main source of infantry, though the non-mounted
element of the contingents was in decline. Northern counties provided the majority
of the troops, though this was due to proximity and several southern counties
purchasing exemptions from hobelars being arrayed in the summer of 1335. Wales
was another large source of men, and continued to send masses of foot soldiers
despite the trends from the English counties.
Though the army had been successful during the early part of the war, by
1336 cutbacks in numbers due to the French threat and financial concerns and the
increased self-assurance of the Scots meant that Lancaster and Beauchamp were
having to regain lost ground, if they were not actually stopped from having too few
men. While Lancaster was successful in retaking the remnants of Perth, Beauchamp
was unable to rescue Stirling without royal reinforcements due to the lack of
numbers in his command. As resources were turned increasingly southward, matters
in the north suffered. The six-month-old siege of Dunbar was called off in July 1338
due to the army being summoned south to cross over the Channel and provide some
sort of active force to oppose France that year.
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All things considered, the Anglo-Scottish war was not very successful in
terms of territorial expansion. The turning point was the entry of France into the
conflict as an interested party. The failed siege of Dunbar, though appearing to be an
obvious turning point, was well after matters had already begun their downward
slide. Even when hostilities had not yet broken out, the worry of French raid or
invasion was sufficient to begin the diversion of attention and resources southwards,
though doing so gave the Scots precisely the chances they required. Every garrison
except for Berwick, Jedburgh and Lochmaben had been eliminated by 1342, David
Bruce had returned from France, and four years later would be secure enough to
invade England before being defeated and captured at Neville's Cross. In terms of
tactical development, the war greatly aided the English military machine, helping to
confirm the trend of moving towards an all-mounted force for both cavalry and
infantry, and proving that the formation of dismounted men-at-arms flanked by
archers was effective when provided the proper proportion of troops. Those lessons
would be put to great effect in France.
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Appendix 1: Men -at-arms, 1334-7
1334 Men At Arms
Contingent Leader Total
Earls Knights
Bannerets	 Squires Dates Cost
Magnates
Ralph Neville 60 60 11 Nov - 9 Feb £	 300
Henry Percy 120 120 11 Nov - 11 Feb £	 600
John of Elthann 100 100 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 500
Richard FitzAlan 80 80 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 400
Thomas Beauchamp 40 40 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 200
John de Vere 28 1 5 22 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 140
Henry Lancaster 60 60 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 300
Ebulo Lestrange 40 40 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 200
James Audley 26 26 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 130
John Mowbray 40 40 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 200
Anthony Lucy 30 30 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 150
Ranulph Dacre 20 20 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 100
Gilbert Talbot 20 20 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 100
Roger Swynnerton 20 20 14 Nov - 11 Feb £ NG
Hugh Freyne 20 20 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 100
Giles Baddlesmere 10 10 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 50
Henry FitzHugh 10 10 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 50
John Mutton 10 10 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 25
John Grey of Rotherfeld 14 1 2 11 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 70
Gilbert d'Umfraville 30 30 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 100
John Warenne 40 40 4 Nov - 20 Feb £	 133 6s 8d
(Nov) 818 1 1 7 809 £3,948 6s 8d
Household
Reginald Cobham 7 2 5 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 40 10s
Robert Ferrers 4 1 3 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 22 10s
Wulfard Gifthil 6 1 5 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 31 10s
Thomas Bradeston 6 1 5 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 22 10s
Thomas Rous 2 1 1 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 13 10s
John Sturmy 4 1 3 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 22 10s
Gawain Corder 4 1 3 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 22 10s
Maurice Berkeley 8 2 6 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 45
John Neville of Hornby 6 2 4 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 36
Giles Beauchamp 6 1 5 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 31 10s
Amaneuo Fossato 4 1 3 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 22 10s
William Gillesford 4 1 3 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 22 10s
John Sully 3 1 2 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 18
Robert Benhale 3 1 2 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 18
William FitzWarin 6 1 5 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 29 6s
John Montgomery 5 1 4 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 27
John Ufford 4 1 3 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 22 10s
John Lovel of Tithmarsh 4 1 3 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 22 10s
Nicholas Langford 4 1 3 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 22 10s
Edward Chandos 3 1 2 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 18
John Melton 2 1 1 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 13 10s
Ralph Soforil 2 1 1 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 13 10s
Ralph Ufford 'frer' 4 1 3 50 days £	 12 10s
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Earls	 Knights
Contingent Leader	 Total	 Bannerets	 Squires	 Dates Cost
Household
Edmund Ufford 'frer' 3 1 2 43 days £	 8 12s
Walter Mauny 4 1 3 54 days £	 13 10s
Norman Darcy 3 1 2 73 days £	 18 5s
Richard Denton 6 1 5 69 days £	 24 3s
Gerard Audeno, etc. 8 2 6 84 days £	 42
Jean de Jens 3 1 2 58 days £	 11 12s
Terence Synyngfeld 2 1 1 28 days £	 4 4s
Geoffrey Upsalo 4 2 2 20 days £	 6
Robert Honel 20 20 87 days £	 43 10s
William Trussel 6 6 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 27
John Brocaz 6 6 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 27
Robert Boswell 10 10 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 54
William L'English 4 4 64 days £	 12 16s
Arnold Garcy 3 3 77 days £	 11 11s
Hugh Grisel 1 1 70 days £	 3 10s
William Pressen 6 6 70 days £	 21
William Exchequer 3 1 2 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 18
Thomas Hugate 1 1 £	 4 10s
John Langton 1 1 £	 4 10s
Stephen Batterly, etc. 2 2 £	 9
Robert Middleton, etc. 3 3 £	 18 11s	 3d
William Trussel, etc. 62 62 £	 104 12s	 6d
William Standervvyk, etc. 15 15 £	 42 3s	 9d
Roger de Northell, etc. 5 5 £	 8 8s	 9d
William Northwell 84 5 79 53 days £	 232 8s
13 13 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 58 10s
Thomas Wake of Blisworth 3 1 2 24 Dec - 11 Feb £	 15
(Nov) 379	 0	 0 42 337 £1,379 13s	 3d
Counties
North Riding 18 1 17 30 Oct - 11 Feb £	 99 15s
East Riding 28 1 27 9 Nov - 11 Feb £	 152 5s
North Riding 12 12 14 Nov - 3 Feb £	 49 4s
Nottinghamshire 10 10 1 Jan - 15 Feb £	 23
Lincolnshire 24 4 20 19 Feb - 23 Feb £	 7
(Nov) 58	 0	 0 2 56 £	 301 4s	 Od
Totals as of November: 1255 men-at-arms £5,629 3s 11d
Welsh contingents: 62	 men-at-arms and centenars £ 349
Entire campaign, Oct-Feb: 1354 men-at-arms £6,023 3s 11d
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Men-at-Arms summer 1335
Earls Knights
Contingent Leader Total Bannerets	 Squires Cost
Magnates
John of Eltham 135 1	 3 24 107 675 Os Od
John Warenne 242 2	 6 47 187 1,210 Os Od
Richard FitzAlan 106 1	 1 20 84 800 Os Od
John de Bohun 135 1	 3 21 110 675 Os Od
Thomas Beauchamp 92 1	 2 17 72 575 Os Od
Gilbert d'Umfraville 40 1 5 34 250 Os Od
Henry Lancaster 113 2 19 92 706 5s Od
William de Bohun 43 1 10 32 215 Os Od
Ebulo Lestrange 60 1 10 49 300 Os Od
Hugh Audley 110 3 18 89 550 Os Od
James Audley 40 1 8 31 200 Os Od
John Mowbray 43 2 8 33 215 Os Od
Henry Percy 140 2 28 110 700 Os Od
Ralph Neville 85 1 15 69 531 5s Od
Robert Ufford 43 1 10 32 268 15s Od
Gilbert Talbot 32 1 5 26 160 Os Od
Thomas Berkeley 38 1 6 31 190 Os Od
Roger Swynnerton 20 1 6 13 100 Os Od
Edward Monthernner 15 1 1 13 75 Os Od
Peter Dundale (Dounedale) 17 1 3 13 85 Os Od
Adam WeIle 14 1 4 9 70 Os Od
Thomas Hastangs 16 1 2 13 80 Os Od
John Grey of Rotherfeld 20 1 3 16 100 Os Od
Anthony Lucy 30 4 26 150 Os Od
William FitzWarin 40 40 100 Os Od
William la Zouche 20 1 19 100 Os Od
William Kilsby 10 10 50 Os Od
William Latimer 81 1 6 74 303 15s Od
William Clinton 66 1 12 53 97 10s Od
John Norwich 26 1 6 19 97 10s Od
Hugh Freyne 28 1 5 22 87 10s Od
William Montague 180 2 24 154 1,012 10s Od
50 2 10 38 15 12s 6d
John Kirkby (B Carlisle) 40 4 36 150 Os Od
Ranulph Dacre 30 1 3 26 112 10s Od
Henry Beaumont 92 1	 2 16 73 611 1s Od
(July) 2242 8	 46 371 1817 11,603 11s Od
Foreign
William Count Juliers 92 3	 1 24 64 £ 791 Os 6d
Jean de Jens 3 1 2 £ 32 Os Od
Gerard Andeno +named 21 7 14 £ 124 10s Od
Cornelius Hapstalus 3 1 2 £ 18 Os Od
119 3	 1 33 82 £ 965 10s 6d
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Earls	 Knights
Contingent Leader Total Bannerets Squires Cost
Household
Reginald Cobham 9 2 7 £	 52 5s Od
Walter Mauny 8 1 7 £	 40 10s Od
John de Moeles, John Sully 6 2 4 £	 36 Os Od
Maurice Berkeley 11 2 9 £	 50 10s Od
Wolfard Gisthill 5 1 4 £	 27 Os Od
Robert Ferrers 8 2 6 £	 45 Os Od
Nicholas Langford 3 1 2 £	 18 Os Od
Amaneo Fossato 5 1 4 £	 27 Os Od
Norman Darcy 5 1 4 £	 27 Os Od
Warin, Giles Bassyngburn 9 2 7 £	 49 10s Od
William Frank 4 1 3 £	 22 10s Od
Edward Chandos 3 1 2 £	 18 Os Od
Robert Benhale 4 1 3 £	 22 10s Od
John Lovel 4 1 3 £	 22 10s Od
John Kyryel 3 1 2 £	 18 Os Od
Thomas Lucy 3 1 2 £	 18 Os Od
William Ellford 5 1 4 £	 27 Os Od
John Melton 3 1 2 £	 18 Os Od
Ralph Sefoul 3 1 2 £	 18 Os Od
John Ufford 6 1 5 £	 31 10s Od
Thomas Wake of Blisworth 5 1 4 £	 36 Os Od
Thomas Bradeston 6 1 5 £	 31 10s Od
Ralph Ufford 4 1 3 £	 22 10s Od
Edmund Ufford 3 1 2 £	 18 Os Od
Robert Ufford (jr), Edmund 7 2 5 £	 38 14s Od
Ufford
John Sturmy 5 1 4 £	 27 Os Od
Gawain Corder 4 1 3 £	 22 10s Od
Thomas Saunford 3 3 £	 10 16s Od
Diverse household squires 92 92 £	 412 9s Od
Stephen Bitterle+1 2 2 £	 9 Os Od
Robert Middleton, +2 3 3 £	 18 11s 3d
Various squires 70 70 £	 118 2s 6d
Various squires 18 18 £	 50 12s 6d
William Exchequer 3 1 2 £	 18 Os Od
Thomas Hugate 2 2 £	 9 Os Od
334 0 0	 34 300 £	 1,431 10s 3d
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Earls	 Knights
Contingent Leader Total Bannerets
	 Squires Cost
Non-Household
Henry Illary 3 1 2 £	 12 Os Od
Richard Denton 10 1 9 £	 33 Os Od
William Gramary 6 1 5 £	 27 3s Od
Robert Langton+1 8 2 6 £	 22 10s Od
Nicholas Wortle 3 1 2 £	 13 12s Od
William Willoughby 3 1 2 £	 3 16s Od
John Marshal 4 1 3 £	 19 Os Od
Edmund de la Beche 10 10 £	 35 10s Od
Robert Boswell 7 7 £	 23 16s Od
54 0 0	 8 46 £	 190 7s Od
Earls Knights
Contingent Leader Total Bannerets Squires Cost
Counties
Lancashire 19 19 £	 5 9s 3d
Total as of July: 2768 11 47 446 2264 £ 14,196 8s Od
Balliol chevauchee
John de Bohun 34 2 6 26 £	 34 Os Od
Thomas Beauchamp 92 1 2 17 72 £	 115 Os Od
Gilbert d'Umfraville 40 1 5 34 £	 50 Os Od
Henry Lancaster 113 2 19 92 £	 141 5s Od
Ralph Neville 85 1 15 69 £	 106 5s Od
Robert Ufford 43 1 10 32 £	 53 15s Od
William Latimer 21 1 5 15 £	 52 10s Od
William Clinton 47 1 12 34 £	 117 10s Od
John Norwich 13 1 1 11 £	 32 10s Od
Henry Beaumont 92 1 2 16 73 £	 114 19s Od
580 3 13 106 458 £	 817 14s Od
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Men At Arms 1336
Contingent Leader Total
Earls	 Knights
Bannerets
	 Squires Dates Cost
John of Eltham 85 1 2 14 68 28 Jul - 12 Sep £	 252 4s
Henry Lancaster 100 2 16 82 1 May - 7 Sep £	 793
50 2 11 37 8 Sep - Nov 15 £	 234 10s
Thomas Beauchamp 74 1 2 9 62 1 May - 7 Sep £	 624
57 1 1 6 49 8 Sep - Nov 15 £	 255 10s
John de Vere 20 1 5 14 13 May - 8 Aug £	 137 12s
17 1 4 12 7 Aug - 1 Sep £	 36 8s
10 1 2 7 2 Sep - 24 Oct £	 50 8s
Gilbert d'Umfraville 30 1 3 26 14 May -3 Sep £	 226
23 1 3 19 4 Sep - 6 Oct £	 156 15s
Henry Beaumont 36 1 1 5 29 17 May - 5 Dec £	 499 4s
Henry Percy 74 2 13 59 1 May - 3 Sep £	 581 9s
46 2 11 33 4 Sep - 5 Dec £	 296 2s
Ralph Neville 36 5 31 14 May - 5 Dec £	 390 11s
Giles Baddlesmere 20 1 4 15 4 May - 3 Sep £	 166 1s
14 1 3 10 4 Sep - 11 Dec £	 99
John Segrave 18 1 3 14 14 May -7 Nov £	 213 12s
Thomas Ughtred 12 1 2 9 9 May - 16 May £	 6 16s
15 1 2 12 17 May - 29 Oct £	 166
Ranulph Dacre 15 1 2 12 21 May - 8 Sep £	 112
Bartholomew Fanacourt 7 1 6 1 May - 8 Sep £	 52 16s
John Tibetot 15 1 3 11 5 May - 18 Oct £	 209
William Bohun 56 2 9 45 1 May - 15 Sep £	 489 18s
43 1 8 34 16 Sep - 9 Dec £	 232 4s
William Montague 6 1 1 4 14 Jun - 15 Jun £	 1
15 1 2 12 16 Jun - 18 Jun £	 3
19 1 2 16 19 Jun -2 Aug £	 54
34 1 3 30 3 Aug - 9 Aug £	 14
58 1 10 47 10 Aug - 24 Aug £	 53 5s
55 1 9 45 25 Aug - 28 Sep £	 117 5s
52 1 8 43 29 Sep - 7 Oct £	 28 7s
47 1 6 40 8 Oct - 19 Nov £	 120 8s
51 1 8 42 20 Nov - 2 Dec £	 40 6s
49 1 7 41 3 Dec - 17 Dec £	 44 5s
Robert Ufford 3 1 2 14 Jun - 2 Aug £	 15
6 1 1 4 3 Aug - 16 Sep £	 22 10s
11 1 2 8 17 Sep - 29 Sep £	 10 8s
7 1 1 5 30 Sep - 14 Nov £	 25 6s
19 2 3 14 15 Nov - 10 Dec £	 36 8s
16 1 2 13 3 Jan - 14 Jan £	 12 12s
34 2 7 25 15 Jan - 13 Mar £	 136 6s
47 2 10 35 14 Mar - 23 Mar £	 34 13s
Henry Ferrers 7 1 6 14 Jun - 13 Oct £	 55
16 1 2 13 14 Oct - 10 Dec £	 60 18s
John Grey of Rotherfeld 4 1 3 14 Jun -26 Oct £	 47 5s
Thomas Bradeston 3 1 2 14 Jun - 10 Dec £	 28 13s
Richard atte Wood 1 1 14 Jun - 10 Dec £	 9
Ademar Athelia 1 1 8 Aug - 10 Nov £	 4 15s
Hugh Savenalus 1 1 12 Sep - 10 Dec £	 4 10s
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Contingent Leader Total
Earls	 Knights
Bannerets	 Squires Dates Cost
Henry Herth 1 1 31 days £	 1 11s
Edmund de la Beche 8 8 12 Sep - 23 Oct £	 16 16s
John Eleydon 5 5 12 Sep - 13 Nov £	 15 15s
Geoffrey Mortimer 8 1 7 15 Aug - 10 Nov £	 42 17s
John Molyns 7 1 6 20 Jul - 15 Sep £	 23 4s
John Houton 7 1 6 9 Apr - 28 Sep £	 68 16s
Thomas Rokeby 9 1 8 11 Jun - 25 Oct £	 68
21 May: 446 4 12 68 362
28 June: 562 4 18 84 456
11 August: 701 5 20 108 568
17 September: 484 4 16 76 388
14 October: 415 3 16 65 331
25 October: 407 2 14 63 328 Total Cost: £ 7,496 19s	 Od
Household
Walter Mauny 7 1 6 14 Jun - 6 Aug £	 27
7 1 6 7 Aug - 13 Oct £	 24 4s
14 1 13 14 Oct - 10 Dec £	 43 10s
6 1 5 3 Jan - 19 Apr £	 40 8s
Ralph Ufford 3 1 2 14 Jun - 10 Dec £	 39 16s
1 1 76 days, inc above
5 2 3 3 Jan - 26 Mar £	 29 1s
Robert Ufford jr. 6 3 3 14 Jun - 10 Dec £	 81
Thomas Lucy 6 2 4 14 Jun - 10 Dec £	 60
Maurice Berkeley 3 1 2 24 Jun - 10 Dec £	 28 16s
William Gillesford 4 1 3 15 Jul - 10 Dec £	 37 5s
Giles Beauchamp 4 1 3 15 Jul - 19 Oct £	 24 5s
Edmund Ufford 'frer' 4 2 2 1 Aug - 10 Dec £	 39 12s
William Stury 2 1 1 5 Jul - 10 Dec £	 23 17s
William Kilsby 3 3 14 Jun - 11 Aug £	 5 18s
3 3 12 Aug - 13 Sep £	 4 19s
6 6 14 Oct - 10 Dec £	 17 8s
John Brocaz 12 12 14 Jun - 10 Dec £	 100 16s
William L'English 13 13 14 Jun - 10 Dec £	 111
Walter Facomberge 3 1 2 22 Jul - 6 Oct £	 15 8s
William FitzWarin 6 1 5 7 Aug - 10 Dec £	 33 12s
Thomas Wake of Blisworth 4 1 3 7 Aug - 10 Dec £	 41 8s
Robert Athol 4 1 3 7 Aug - 10 Dec £	 30
John Sturmy 5 1 4 7 Aug - 10 Dec £	 34 11s
Gawain Corder 3 1 2 7 Aug - 10 Dec £	 25 4s
John Leukenor 4 1 3 7 Aug - 10 Dec £	 31 10s
Ralph Darcy 5 1 4 7 Aug - 10 Dec £	 37 10s
Robert Boswell 5 5 14 Jul - 31 Aug £	 19 15s
William Daumers, Walter 2 2 14 Jun - 10 Dec £	 18
Wetwang
Thomas Baddeby, etc. 16 16 90 days £	 45
John Scot, etc. 8 8 58 days £	 17 8s
William atte Wood, etc. 3 3 168/134/53 £	 17 15s
John Alspath, Peter Brugge 2 2 140/90 £	 15 16s	 3d
Robert Lucy, etc. 8 8 14 Jun - 10 Dec £	 27
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Contingent Leader Total
Earls	 Knights
Bannerets
	 Squires Dates Cost
Household
Robert Maule, etc. 10 10 150 days £	 99 18s
John Garcy, etc. 7 7 126 days
Hugh Garton, John Perot 2 2 104 days
William Trussel, etc. 4 4 92 days
Oliver Ingham, etc. 20 20 90 days
Roger Beauchamp, etc. 7 7 58 days
Guy Brian, Walter Sewall 2 2 40 days
Thomas Hatfield, etc. 2 2 20 days
William Skelton, etc. 5 5 126 days £	 38 16s	 3d
Richard le Guturer 1 1 90 days
William Standerwyk, etc. 9 9 58 during7 Aug - 10 Dec
William Frank 4 1 3 14 Oct - 10 Dec £	 14 10s
28 June: 152 0 0 8 144
11 August: 213 0 0 21 192
17 Sep: 202 0 0 21 181
14 Oct: 219 0 0 20 195 Total Cost: £ 1,287 6s	 6d
25 October: 205 0 0 20 185
Counties:
Westmoreland, Cumberland 41 6 35 25 Oct - 3 Nov £	 23 10s
Bothwell:
Richard FitzAlan 10 1 3 6 14 Oct - 30 Oct £	 17
50 1 1 13 35 31 Oct - 10 Dec £	 150 13s
1 1 20 days, inc above
Thomas Berkeley 19 1 2 16 17 Nov - 10 Dec £	 28 16s
John Beauchamp+2 6 3 3 14 Oct - 10 Dec £	 26 2s
Robert de Ros+2 8 3 5 36 days 16 4s
William Redeness 2 1 1 44 days 6 12s
John Sutton 2 1 1 14 days 2 2s
Roger Burton 2 1 1 23 days 2 9s
Hugh Scolles+4 5 5 20 days 5
14 October: 35 1 0 12 22 Total Cost £	 254 18s	 Od
25 October: 35 1 0 12 22
Totals:
21 May: 446 4 12 68 362
28 June: 714 4 18 92 600
11 August: 914 5 20 129 760
17 September: 686 4 16 97 569
14 October: 669 4 16 97 548
25 October: 688 3 14 101 570
Total Cost Overall: £	 9,062 13s 6d
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1337 Men At Arms
Contingent Origin Total
Earls	 Knights
Bannerets	 Squires Dates Cost
Personal Contingents
Thomas Beauchamp 63 1 1 7 54 7 May - 31 May £	 100
117 1 4 16 96 1 Jun - 30 Aug £	 690 2s
Gilbert d'Umfraville 31 1 2 28 7 May - 20 Jun £	 90
10 1 2 7 21 Jun - 30 Aug £	 67 9s
Henry Percy 40 1 8 31 7 May - 31 May £	 63 15s
50 1 12 37 1 Jun - 30 Aug £	 293 17s
Ralph Neville 33 1 4 28 7 May - 31 May £	 50
48 1 7 40 1 Jun - 30 Aug £	 259 16s
Thomas Wake of Liddell 40 1 9 30 7 May - 30 Aug £	 298 4s
John Kirkby (b Carlisle) 44 1 3 40 13 Jun - 30 Aug £	 213 6s
Ranulph Dacre 15 1 2 12 13 Jun - 30 Aug £	 79
Robert Clifford 20 3 17 1 Jul - 15 Aug £	 52 18s
17 2 15 16 Aug - 29 Aug £	 13 2s
John Mowbray 44 1 4 39 31 May - 30 Jun £	 79 1s
20 2 18 1 Jul - 14 Aug £	 49 10s
53 2 8 43 15 Aug - 30 Aug £	 53 12s
William Ros of Helmsley 20 3 17 7 May - 30 Aug £	 133 8s
John Darcy 27 1 4 22 7 May - 25 Jun £	 83 7s
Ralph Hastings 10 1 9 17 May - 17 Jun £	 17 12s
Roger Swynnerton 10 1 2 7 7 May - 15 Jun £	 30
Household knights (4) 17 4 13 7 May - 13 Jun £	 39 1s
Brabant knights 5 1 4 7 May - 18 Jun £	 12 18s
Robert Littlebury 3 1 2 7 May - 18 Jun £	 8 12s
John Mourez 6 1 5 11 May - 16 Jun £	 12 19s
Roger Rile, etc. 5 5 24 May - 17 Jun £	 6 1s
William Kellesy 3 3 25 May - 27 Jul £	 17 1s 4d
7 7 29 Jul - 30 Nov £	 58 6s 8d
Thomas Ufflet 1 1 27 Mar - 27 Jul £	 20 10s
6 6 7 May - 27 Jul £	 24 12s
John St. Albans 6 6 15 Aug - 30 Sep £	 23 8s
3 3 1 Nov - 30 Nov £	 4 10s
William de Bohun 59 1 2 7 49 4 Jun - 31 Jul £	 229 2s
Henry Ferrers 14 1 2 11 24 May - 16 Jun £	 22 16s
Edward Monthermer 4 1 3 14 days £	 4 18s
Walter Mauny 12 2 10 22 May - 17 Jun £	 18 18s
John Molyns 7 1 6 14 Jun - 11 Jul £	 11 4s
12 2 10 21 Jul - 30 Aug £	 28 14s
William Kilsby 6 6 4 Jun - 17 Jun £	 11 4s
12 1 11 15 Aug - 30 Aug £	 10 8s
John Brocaz, etc. 10 10 4 Jun, 14 days £	 7
Household squires 23 23 14 days £	 6 9s
Diverse squires 27 9 18 17 Aug - 26 Sep £	 92 5s
John St. Albans 13 13 17 Aug - 31 Oct £	 49 8s
6 6 25 Aug - 26 Sep £	 9 18s
5 5 6 Nov - 13 Nov £	 2 18s 6d
9 9 5 Oct - 5 Dec £	 28
1 1 2 days, inc above
Hugh Audley 36 1 2 7 26 25 May - 16 Jun £	 63 7s
All entries taken from BL Cotton Nero C VIII, 233f-247f
	
276
Appendix 1: Men-at-arms, 1334-7
Totals: Total
Earls	 Knights
Bannerets	 Squires
11 May: 285 2 5 43 235 Total Cost: £3,456 3s Od
1 June: 509 3 14 78 414
1 July: 460 4 10 67 379
29 July: 462 4 10 68 380
Counties:
Derbyshire 10 10 15 Aug - 18 Sep £	 17 10s
10 10 19 Sep - 10 Oct £	 11
Nottingham 9 9 15 Aug - 18 Sep £	 15 15s
9 9 19 Sep - 17 Oct £	 13 1s
Lancashire 21 21 15 Aug - 18 Sep £	 36 15s
4 4 19 Sep - 11 Nov £	 10 16s
Northumberland 3 3 25 Aug - 18 Sep £	 3 15s
10 10 6 Nov - 14 Nov £	 3
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Troop Numbers Winter 1334
Mounted Archers
Contingent Origin
	 Total	 Dates Cost Days in England
John Ward (Royal Guard) 100 20 Oct - 23 Oct £	 10
124 24 Oct - 5 Nov £	 40 6s
174 6 Nov - 19 Nov £	 61 5s
181 20 Nov - 17 Dec £	 126 14s
215 18 Dec - 18 Feb £	 340 4s
175 19 Feb -25 Feb £	 30 16s	 6d
2 19 Feb - 22 Feb
Cheshire (John Daneport) 55 20 Nov - 24 Dec £	 47 18s
John of Eltham 40 10 Nov -4 Feb £	 63 13s	 4d	 17
Richard FitzAlan 70 4 Nov - 4 Feb £	 118 3s	 18
Ebulo Lestrange 40 £	 69 13s	 4d	 23
Thomas Beauchamp 40 £	 68 18
Henry Lancaster 100 27 Oct - 4 Feb £	 188 6s	 8d	 24
Ralph Neville 40 11 Nov - 4 Feb £	 57 6s	 8d
Henry Percy 50 13 Nov - 4 Feb £	 70
John de Vere 12 11 Nov - 24 Jan £	 16 10
John Warenne 40 10 Nov - 4 Feb £	 58
Gilbert d'Umfraville 80 22 Nov - 8 Jan £	 64
James Audley 35 11 Nov - 4 Feb £	 54 16s	 8d	 16
William de Bohun 60 16 Nov -7 Jan £	 53
1 15 days of above 5s
Roger Swynnerton 25 4 Nov - 9 Feb £	 45 8s	 4d	 22
John Multon 20 4 Nov - 9 Feb £	 32 13s	 4d
Hugh Freyne 13 26 Oct - 1 Feb £	 24 5s	 4d	 26
William Tynedale 40 24 Nov - 25 Dec £	 21
William Pressen 22 20 Nov - 28 Jan £	 25 13s	 4d
William FitzWarin 7 4 Nov - 22 Jan £	 9 5s
Nicholas Langford 15 24 Oct - 3 Feb £	 25 15s
John Neville of Hornby 6 4 Nov - 23 Jan £	 8 2s
John Montgomery 10 7 Nov - 11 Feb £	 16 3s	 4d
Thomas Wake of Blisworth 6 8 Nov - 25 Dec £	 5 15s	 19
Robert Boswell 15 7 Nov - 14 Feb £	 25 12s	 6d
3 51 days £	 1 5s	 6d
Arnold Garcy 7 14 Nov - 11 Feb £	 10 10s
William Stransale 4 4 Nov - 29 Jan £	 5 16s
Richard Castle 12 14 Nov -8 Feb £	 17 8s
William Northwell 60 3 Nov - 18 Feb £	 120 24
43 39 days £	 27 19s
(24 Nov) 1152 £	 1,421 1s	 8d
Eustace Maxwell 20 4 Dec - 1 Feb £	 20
William L'English 4 3 Dec - 4 Feb £	 4 5s	 4d
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County Contingents - Hobelars, Mounted Archers, Vintenars
Contingent Origin Total Dates Cost
West Riding 103 30 Oct - 11 Feb £	 180 5s
2 19 days 12s	 8d
East Riding 82 9 Nov - 11 Feb £	 129 16s	 8d
North Riding 32 13 Nov -3 Feb £	 43 14s	 8d
2 20 days 13s	 4d
Richmondshire 15 17 Nov - 4 Feb £	 20
Forest of Dean 20 29 Oct - 4 Feb £	 33
Criminals 42 4 Nov - 9 Feb £	 73 15s	 ld
256 £	 481 17s	 5d
Palatinate of Durham 120 1 Dec - 19 Dec £	 38
53 20 Dec 17s	 8d
Lancaster 17 15 Jan - 4 Feb £	 5 19s
Nottinghamshire 20 1 Jan - 15 Feb £	 23
9 1 Jan - 15 Feb £	 6 18s
Lincolnshire 185 19 Feb -23 Feb £	 15 6s	 8d
Derbyshire 17 8 Dec - 20 Dec £	 3 13s	 8d
10 21 Dec - 3 Feb £	 7 10s
368 £	 92 17s	 4d
Total (24 Nov) 1408
'Armati'
York 100 4 Nov - 10 Feb £	 165
Foot
Arnold Garcy 1 14 Nov - 11 Feb 15s
William Northwell 40 3 Nov - 18 Feb £	 36
West Riding 359 30 Oct - 11 Feb £	 314 2s	 6d
East Riding 258 9 Nov - 11 Feb £	 204 5s
North Riding 177 13 Nov - 3 Feb £	 120 19s
Richmondshire 158 17 Nov -4 Feb £	 105 1s
Forest of Dean 124 29 Oct - 4 Feb £	 102 6s
Criminals 160 4 Nov - 9 Feb £	 133 5s
Total (24 Nov) 1117 £	 1,016 13s	 6d
Lancaster 13 15 Jan - 4 Feb £	 2 5s	 6d
Nottinghamshire 174 1 Jan - 15 Feb £	 66 4s	 6d
Derbyshire 331 8 Dec - 20 Dec £	 35 17s	 2d
200 21 Dec - 3 Feb £	 75
2 4 Feb - 11 Feb 2s	 8d
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Troop Numbers Summer 1335
Mounted Archers
Contingent Origin	 Total	 Dates Cost
John Ward 162 5 Jun - 12 Oct £	 530 16s 8d
John Eston 40 3 Jul - 13 Sep £	 48 13s 4d
Thomas Beauchamp 24 30 Jun - 7 Oct £	 40
John de Bohun 29 30 Jun - 11 Sep £	 35 15s 4d
Gilbert d'Umfraville 48 12 Jul - 7 Oct £	 70 9s 4d
John Warenne 24 3 Jul - 23 Sep £	 33 4s
Richard FitzAlan 24 26 Jun - 23 Sep £	 36
Ebulo Lestrange 39 28 Jun - 10 Sep £	 48 15s
Henry Percy 20 26 Jun - 23 Sep £	 30
William Montague 40 11 Jun - 23 Sep £	 70
26 14 Jul - 29 Jul £	 6 18s 8d
18 30 Jul - 26 Aug £	 8 8s
William Clinton 40 27 Jun - 6 Oct £	 56 4s
Hugh Audley 56 3 Jul - 9 Sep £	 67 4s
James Audley 64 3 Jul - 9 Sep £	 72 13s 4d
William de Bohun 30 1 Jul - 7 Sep £	 34 10s
Anthony Lucy 34 27 Aug - 7 Oct £	 24 3s
Thomas Berkeley 12 2 Jul - 23 Sep £	 16 16s
John Leyburn 34 30 Jun - 9 Sep £	 43 4s
Hugh Freyne 30 23 Jun - 20 Aug £	 29
Richard Denton 18 12 Jul - 9 Sep £	 18
Thomas Lucy 20 23 Jul - 23 Sep £	 21
Thomas Ughtred 12 23 Jul -7 Oct £	 15 8s
Robert Manners 54 30 Jul - 26 Aug £	 25 4s
40 27 Aug - 7 Oct £	 28
John Deping 12 27 Aug -7 Oct £	 8 8s
William Felton 36 30 Jul - 26 Aug £	 16 16s
Walter Creik 40 30 Jul - 12 Aug £	 9 6s 8d
Thomas Featherstonehaugh 60 30 Jul - 26 Aug £	 28
7 26 Aug - 7 Oct £	 11 18s
Robert Ogle 126 30 Jul -5 Aug £	 14 14s
100 6 Aug - 12 Aug £	 11 13s 4d
Stephen Swynnerton 34 30 Jul - 12 Aug £	 6 18s 8d
Roger Swynnerton 5 10 Jul - 30 Aug £	 4 6s 8d
John Brocaz 27 3 Jul - 30 Sep £	 40 10s
St. Mary's, York 12 10 Aug - 26 Aug £	 3 8s
5 27 Aug - 7 Oct £	 3 10s
1206 £	 873 13s 8d
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Mounted Archers
Contingent Origin 	 Total	 Dates Cost
Wells 10 23 Jun - 11 Sep £	 13 9s
Gloucester 10 21 Jun - 28 Sep £	 16 7s 8d
Ludlow 10 27 Jun - 7 Oct £	 17 3s 4d
Lichfield 10 23 Jun - 12 Sep £	 13 11s 4d
Northampton 10 3 Jul - 14 Sep £	 12 5s
Lincoln (John Aldham) 60 23 Jun - 7 Sep £	 79 5s 8d
Pontefract 10 26 Jun - 23 Sep £	 13 5s 8d
120 £	 165 7s 8d
Middlesex 8 23 Jun - 10 Sep £	 10 13s 4d
Buckinghamshire 17 23 Jun - 14 Sep £	 26 7s
Northamptonshire 76 23 Jun - 1 Sep £	 89 18s 8d
Nottinghamshire 28 23 Jun - 30 Aug £	 32 4s
Derbyshire 110 28 Jun - 30 Aug £	 119 3s 4d
Somerset 55 23 Jun - 30 Aug £	 64 3s 4d
Dorset 60 23 Jun - 6 Sep £	 77 16s 8d
Wiltshire 67 23 Jun - 30 Aug £	 80 8s
Gloucestershire 16 23 Jun - 23 Aug £	 16 10s 8d
Shropshire 23 23 Jun - 21 Aug £	 23
Staffordshire 57 27 Jun - 30 Aug £	 59 5s
Lancaster 232 27 Jun - 3 Sep £	 265 6s 8d
North Riding 54 25 Jun - 27 Aug £	 57 12s
East Riding 54 30 Jun - 20 Aug £	 46 16s
West Riding 54 30 Jun - 25 Aug £	 51 6s
Palatinate of Durham 190 10 Jul - 26 Aug £	 153 12s Od
32 8 days of above £	 4 5s 4d
Cumberland 835 8 Aug - 26 Aug £	 199 5s 3d
Westmorland 202 7 Aug - 26 Aug £	 50 8s
Diverse archers 47 3 Jul - 18 Sep £	 61 2s
2217 £	 3,326 5s 3d
Total Mounted Archers: 3543
'Armati'
York 100 25 Jun - 9 Sep £	 128 8s 1d
Foot
William Montague 60 11 Jun - 23 Sep £	 78 15s
William Count Juliers 51 4 Jun - 25 Sep £	 144 1s 6d
Beverley 21 26 Jun - 23 Sep £	 15 16s 2d
Doncaster 12 28 Jun - 23 Sep £	 7 19s
33
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Foot
Contingent Origin 	 Total	 Dates Cost
Surrey 39 23 Jun - 29 Aug £	 23 2s 6d
Sussex 120 10 Jul - 22 Aug £	 46 4d
Kent 174 5 Jul - 28 Aug £	 86 17s 6d
Middlesex 39 23 Jun - 10 Sep £	 26 6s 8d
Essex 107 10 Jul - 20 Aug £	 40 16s 4d
Hertford 56 23 Jun - 22 Aug £	 30 10s
Northamptonshire 191 23 Jun - 1 Sep £	 120 12s 7d
Nottinghamshire 216 23 Jun - 30 Aug £	 136 6s
Derbyshire 250 28 Jun - 30 Aug £	 145 11s 2d
Somerset 156 23 Jun - 30 Aug £	 100 6s 2d
Gloucester 215 23 Jun - 23 Aug £	 110 16s 8d
Shropshire 178 23 Jun - 21 Aug £	 97 12s 6d
Staffordshire 202 27 Jun - 30 Aug £	 120 1s 6d
Hereford 182 2 Jul - 16 Aug £	 75 8s 6d
Lancaster 641 27 Jun - 3 Sep £	 476 13s 2d
North Riding 260 25 Jun - 27 Aug £	 157 7s 10d
East Riding 202 30 Jun - 20 Aug £	 96 5s 2d
West Riding 275 30 Jun - 25 Aug £	 144 10s 8d
Cumberland 127 8 Aug - 26 Aug £	 27 17s 8d
67 4 days £	 2 4s 8d
Westmorland 31 7 Aug - 26 Aug £	 8 8s
Criminals 171 4 Aug - 7 Sep £	 52 2s 8d
Diverse archers 60 £	 40 19s
Totals 3959 £	 2,413 8s 11d
Total Foot: 4092
Total English Infantry: 7735 £	 5,868 2s 3d
Total Infantry: 10820
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Appendix 2: Infantry
Troop Numbers Summer 1336
Mounted Archers and Hobelars
Contingent Origin Total Dates Cost
Personal Contingents
John Stanford 61 14 Jun - 31 Aug £	 122 9s
Henry Pledour 57 1 Sep - 9 Dec £	 142 10s
Henry Lancaster 70 1 May - 13 Aug £	 123 10s	 4d
Thomas Beauchamp 40 19 May - 13 Aug £	 57 8s
Henry Percy 60 7 May - 17 Aug £	 102 4s
Ralph Neville 31 14 May - 14 Aug £	 48 1s
1 6 days of above 2s
Anthony Lucy 28 20 May - 4 Jul £	 21 2s	 4d
Giles Baddlesmere 12 7 May - 17 Aug £	 20 12s
1 3 days of above 1s
John Denholm 13 12 May - 3 Jul £	 11 7s	 8d
William Montague 186 14 Jun - 16 Oct £	 387 10s
3 5 days of above 5s
Richard FitzAlan 13 25 Oct - 27 Nov £	 7 7s	 4d
Robert Holm 20 1 May - 11 Aug £	 51 10s
John Houton 42 1 May - 29 Sep £	 121 18d
John Tibetot 12 5 May - 18 Oct £	 33 12s
21 May: 391 Total Cost: £	 1,250 13s	 2d
28 June: 578
11 August: 534
17 September: 297
14 October: 255
25 October: 70
Counties
Lincoln, York, Derby 744 1 May -5 Aug £	 1,235 6s
York, Northampton, Leicester, Staffordshire,
Shropshire, Nottinghamshire 457 6 Aug - 26 Aug £	 159 12s
Lincoln, York, Derby 402 27 Aug - 4 Sep £	 60 6s
Lincoln, York, Derby, Shropshire,
Northampton, Leicester 277 5 Sep - 24 Oct £	 229 15s	 8d
271 25 Oct - 7 Nov £	 63 4s	 8d
61 8 Nov - 21 Nov £	 14 4s	 8d
Northumberland 467 3 Jun - 17 Aug £	 591 4s	 8d
628 25 Oct - 14 Nov £	 218 11s
Westmorland, Cumberland 261 22 May - 17 Aug £	 382 2s	 8d
825 25 Oct - 3 Nov £	 137 10s
553 4 Nov - 10 Nov £	 64 10s	 4d
396 11 Nov - 20 Nov £	 66
Palatinate of Durham 1R6 8 Jun - 17 Aug £	 222 8s	 8d
21 May: 744 Total Cost: £ 3,444 16s	 4d
28 June: 1658
11 August: 1371
17 September: 277
14 October: 277
25 October: 1724
All entries taken from BL Cotton Nero VIII, fos. 252r-264v 283
Appendix 2: Infantry
Totals, Mounted Archers and Hobelars
21 May: 1135 Total Cost £ 4,695 9s	 6d
28 June: 2236
11 August: 1905
17 September: 574
14 October: 532
25 October: 1794
Foot
William Montague 51 14 Jun - 16 Oct £	 58 6s	 8d
Robert Holm 20 1 May - 11 Aug £	 16 10s
York, Northampton, Leicester, Staffordshire,
Shropshire, Nottinghamshire 614 6 Aug - 26 Aug £	 114 6s	 4d
Lincoln, York, Derby 45 27 Aug - 4 Sep £	 4 10s
Lincoln, York, Derby, Shropshire,
Northampton Leicester 124 5 Sep -24 Oct £	 65 14s	 8d
177 25 Oct - 7 Nov £	 24 14s	 8d
24 8 Nov - 21 Nov £	 6 17s	 8d
Northumberland 56 25 oct - 14 Nov £	 9 16s
Westmoreland, Cumberland 245 25 Oct - 3 Nov £	 20 8s	 4d
65 4 Nov - 10 Nov £	 3 15s	 10d
21 11 Nov - 20 Nov £	 1 15s
21 May: 20 £	 326 15s	 2d
28 June: 71
17 Sep: 175
14 Oct: 175
25 October: 478
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